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What Is Poetic Critique?
Poetic critique – is that not an oxymoron? Do these two forms of behavior – the po-
etic and the critical – not pull in different, even opposite, directions? For many schol-
ars working in the humanities today, they largely do, but that has not always been
the case. Friedrich Schlegel, for one, believed that critique worthy of its name
must use philology and history not to bury the work, but to renew and intensify
it. In his essay “On Goethe’s Meister,” for example, Schlegel suggests that we need
to criticize in and through poetry: The poetic critic, he writes, “will want to represent
the representation anew, and form once more what has already been formed; he will
add to the work, restore it, shape it afresh” (Schlegel 2003, 281). It is a literary exam-
ple that motivates him, namely the discussion of the staging of Hamlet in Goethe’s
novel. Still, Schlegel prompts us to envision a mode of critique and of criticism (Kritik
can mean either) that reflects on the poetic dimension of its own practice. Criticizing
here means: rewriting, broadening, amplifying, advancing, vitalizing, valuing, and
evaluating the wealth of meaning in literature. Schlegel suggests that only this
form of critique – he calls it poetische Kritik – stands a chance of responding ade-
quately to a work of art.
This is not a book about Schlegel’s concept of criticism, though his name and his
ideas haunt many chapters that follow. Rather, his notion of poetic critique serves us
as a provocation to rethink and to reimagine what critique and criticism could be
today. It is an invitation to examine the possibilities and limitations of such a critique
in our encounters with art and literature, especially in view of debates that the prac-
tice of critique has recently called forth. We do not hold fast to a definitive meaning
of the notion, nor do we have a ready-made idea of which practices would fall under
the term and which would not. Yet we do find the time right to experiment with a
mode of critical thought and practice that runs counter to the received notion of cri-
tique as invariably negative, a mode that dares to bridge the gap supposedly dividing
art from critique. More than anything, the concept of poetic critique gives voice to a
desire – characteristic of Schlegel’s time and of our own – to draw close the realms of
literature and art, on the one hand, and of research and critique, on the other, and let
them mingle and affect each other.
As we use it, the term poetic critique is an umbrella for the many different ways
of crossing the boundaries by which the poetic and the critical have often been held
apart. Poetic critique takes on many guises: it can be a mode of thinking, philological
practice, poetic process, exercise in immersion, and intellectual challenge.While the
essays gathered here approach the concept from many angles and put it to use in a
variety of periods and constellations, they have in common a commitment to reflect
on how poetic critique might lead to a fresh understanding of the nature and func-
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tion of critique. The thread running through the volume is this question: how can the
idea of poetic critique shape our own critical practice?
Critique and Postcritique
By no means are we the first to have raised the question of critique. It looms large in
a number of recent debates in the humanities.¹ Well before the publication of Rita
Felski’s influential volume The Limits of Critique in 2015, various authors had
begun to rethink critical practice, seeking ways of engaging with literature and art
in a less ‘suspicious,’ symptomatic, and antagonistic manner. There have been
pleas for “uncritical reading” (cf. Warner 2004), “reparative reading” (cf. Sedgwick
2003), “surface reading” (cf. Best and Marcus 2009), “just reading” (cf. Marcus
2007, 73‒108), and “descriptive reading” (cf. Love 2010), to name only a few. Inevi-
tably, these disparate efforts have been diagnosed as signaling yet another ‘turn,’
this time a postcritical turn. Though their modes of transport and their destinations
differ, these approaches do have a common starting point: a dissatisfaction with a
form of criticism common since the 1980s, particularly in the Anglo-American con-
text, that focuses on a text’s context and gaps, its latent meanings, ideological impli-
cations, hidden truths, and repressed content.
Against these practices – associated, for example, with some forms of decon-
structive, psychoanalytic, Marxist, feminist, postcolonial, and queer criticism – the
models proposed by postcritics seek to be more attentive to a text’s manifest content,
aesthetic properties, and affective capacities. Their stated goal is to be more affirma-
tive and open-minded towards literary texts and other works of art. This reorientation
coincides with the emergence of a number of new, or updated, theoretical models:
while critical criticism was geared to schools of thought that Paul Ricœur has called
the “school of suspicion” – with its three “masters of suspicion,” Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud, showing the way (Ricœur 1970, 32‒33) – postcritical criticism seeks its
theoretical orientation elsewhere: in actor-network theory, the new materialism, ob-
ject-oriented ontology, affect theory, and ordinary language philosophy.
But while the adherents of these and similar methodologies may see, and appre-
ciate, the dawning of a new postcritical era, others claim that now is precisely the
right “time for critique” (cf. Fassin and Harcourt 2019). Some fear that the hard-
won practice of examining texts in their historical context and in view of their social
conditions and political implications might give way to a quietist aestheticism or for-
malism, just when critical voices are desperately needed. Then there are disciplinary
and methodological debates: Is literary studies falling back into close reading? How
does a postcritical approach to literature conceive of the relationship between text
 Cf., among others, the following anthologies: Jaeggi and Wesche 2009, Anker and Felski 2017, Graw
and Menke 2019, and Fassin and Harcourt 2019.
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and context? And what would be the consequences of redefining this relationship as
one of actors and networks? Some of these challenges are raised by essays in this
volume. For the rest, the challenges form the background against which the essays
unfold their thinking.
Practicing Poetic Critique
While some essays in this volume take their bearings from the above-mentioned new
methodologies, others strike out on their own; yet others go back to Ricœur’s “school
of suspicion,” perhaps to go beyond suspicion. Poetic critique, as reflected in this
volume, sometimes has affinities with postcritique and sometimes not, yet in no
case is it prepared to forsake critique as a whole.
As the editors of this volume, we acknowledge the debates that swirl around us,
debates that shape our work and that we, in turn, aim to shape. At the same time,
framing our project in terms of the distinction between critique and postcritique
risks shortchanging poetic critique, for now we find ourselves faced with a choice:
either we are for or against critique. Yet this frame is too tight and too rigid to
hold all that poetic critique can do. What draws us to poetic critique is that it can
jumble, even shatter, such schemas. It reveals that critique is sharpest not when it
is stripped of all poetry, but, just the opposite, when it makes the vigor of the poetic
impulse its own.
Poetic critique highlights the poetic dimensions of every critical act and thus
urges us to attend to the ways we engage and respond to art. As the essays assembled
here make clear, this is not a question of mere presentation or rhetoric; we are not
suggesting putting old wine in new bottles. Attending to the poetry in critique
changes both the concept and the practice of critique, and profoundly so. Here,
we name just three aspects that show what is at stake.
First, poetic critique loosens the link between critique and judgment. If some of
us feel bored by conventional critique, that is because critique can be a predictable
affair – and it is most predictable when it dispenses its judgments. Here, once the
critical routine is set in motion, it unspools like a mechanical toy. Automatically ap-
plying fixed criteria – be they aesthetic, ethical, or political – can make for dreadful
reading. Worse, it can make us oblivious to the very experience we typically seek in
works of art. Poetic critique changes the game, not because it promotes a lyrical sub-
jectivity or an emotional response. Indeed, Schlegel stresses that it is a “necessary
experience when reading a poetic work to give ourselves up entirely to its influence,
to let the writer do with us what he will” (Schlegel 2003, 273). But he also insists on
the importance of going beyond affective participation and even demands that we
“destroy what we adore” (273) to better understand it. Poetic critique is a plea neither
for nor against being moved by literature. Rather, its attitude towards art is ambig-
uous, even paradoxical. “Perhaps then we should judge it, and at the same time re-
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frain from judging it,” Schlegel writes about the work of art, and right away con-
cedes: “which does not seem to be at all an easy task.” (275)
Second, in poetic critique the relationship between work of art and work of criti-
cism is realigned, changing both the idea of criticism and of art and the temporal
logic that prevails over them. If we take our bearing once again from Schlegel, we
can see that critique is not a belated, supplementary phenomenon that parasitically
feeds on the work of art. Rather, true works of art call for critique; they need critique.
A literary work, Schlegel claims, always surpasses the author’s intentions. Because
“every great work […] knows more than it says, and aspires to more than it
knows,” all criticism, of whatever kind, “makes suppositions and assertions which
go beyond the visible work” (281). If Schlegel thus elevates the role of the critic, it
is because literary works are meant to be understood differently, and more fully,
in future readings, for their meaning emerges only through the interaction with read-
ers. This idea is radicalized by Theodor Adorno. He takes the Romantic idea that the
artwork is essentially incomplete (or fragmentary, as Schlegel likes to put it) and
gives it a further turn: critique is now seen as an agent of the work’s historical be-
coming. According to Adorno, the truth of works of art, a truth both immanent to
them and in excess of them, only unfolds in “interpretation, commentary, and cri-
tique” (Adorno 1997, 194). The practice of poetic critique therefore entails a peculiar
temporality: reading is a creative engagement with the past and the present, whereas
criticism is conceived of as poetic activity that addresses itself to the future.
Third, poetic criticism undercuts the distinction between formalism and its other.
Adorno’s reading and re-writing of romantic ideas of criticism (as filtered through the
work of Walter Benjamin) makes this especially clear: it reminds us that the often-
supposed alternative between an attentiveness to the formal properties of a work
of art and its so-called critical content is false. Whatever the truth of an artwork
may be, it can never exist in isolation from its singular form. It is only through
form that art marks a difference to empirical life and becomes art, but it is also
only through form that art stands in relation to the social world. Hence, it is in
form that art and critique converge: “Form converges with critique. It is that through
which artworks prove critical of themselves” (144, translation modified). Poetic cri-
tique can take on many forms, but it is not by accident that from Schlegel to our
own moment, poetic critics have been drawn to the genre of the essay. For what
“essay” (stemming from the French essai) implies is a form of writing that allows
for precisely the kind of experimentation that an effective convergence between
the poetical and the critical typically requires.
Because of these three features, poetic critique is not in a position to prescribe a
certain mode of reading – suspicious or uncritical, negative or affirmative – nor is it
able to issue programmatic calls for ‘how we (shall) read now.’ It is too preoccupied
with the singularity of the work at hand to do that. It neither entails post- nor anti-
critique but seeks to promote a practice of critique characterized by a special atten-
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tiveness to the workings of art and literature. It thus implies a reciprocal becoming:
as critique becomes poetic, literature and art become critical.²
The Philological Laboratory
Most essays published here began as contributions to a conference on “Poetic Cri-
tique” that took place in Berlin in June 2019. It was convened by the Philological Lab-
oratory, a collaborative project led by the four editors of this volume. The Laboratory
is funded by the Einstein Foundation Berlin and housed in the Friedrich Schlegel
Graduate School for Literary Studies at Freie Universität Berlin. At its core, the Phi-
lological Laboratory is devoted to examining and exploring the past and future of
critique – as a theoretical position, as a practice of speaking and writing, and as
an ethos.
This examination and exploration have taken multiple forms. In two semester-
long colloquia, we sought to map the complex pedigree of the idea of critique. We
did this not as an exercise in intellectual history, but to uncover the poetic potential
in a tradition too swiftly identified with a mood of distrust. Several day-long work-
shops were designed to direct the attention of participants, mostly advanced gradu-
ate students in literary studies and related disciplines, from theory to practice, and
urge them to experiment with new ways of doing criticism. A third set of events, more
public facing, approached the topic from the other side, as it were: here we invited
poets, musicians, visual and other artists to reflect on ways that critique enters their
thinking and their work.
The Philological Laboratory would not exist without the generosity of the Ein-
stein Foundation Berlin, nor would this volume. We are grateful to the Foundation
for the trust it has placed in our project.We are also grateful to the Indiana University
Europe Gateway office in Berlin and the Center for International Cooperation of Freie
Universität for supporting the conference that led to this volume. The editors also
wish to thank the contributors and, for their editorial assistance, Luca Lil Wirth
and Elisa Weinkötz. And a particular thanks to the anonymous reviewer of this vol-
ume for many valuable insights and suggestions.
 In this respect, there are clear affinities between the concept of poetic critique and a number of
contemporary currents that seek to bring art and literature closer together with research and critique.
This tendency is most obviously embodied by ‘artistic research,’ an approach that highlights art’s
“entanglement with theory” (Busch 2009) and the role of art in the production of knowledge. Cf.,
for example, Mersch 2015, Busch 2016, and Caduff and Wälchli 2019.
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Jennifer Ashton
Why Adding ‘Poetic’ to ‘Critique’ Adds
Nothing to Critique
The provocation for the June 2019 Poetic Critique conference (from which this volume
originated) contains a number of propositions: (1) that there is a distinctive mode of
critique in literary studies that differs from the discipline’s prevailing modes of cri-
tique; (2) that what makes this mode special is its ‘poetic’ approach to its subject
matter; and (3) that the approach is sufficiently distinctive to command a special
name ‒ ‘poetic critique.’ And insofar as this special mode is also understood to be
one that, as the conference organizers put it, “has failed to gain a firm foothold in
literary studies as it transformed itself into an academic discipline,” then at least
part of what must distinguish “poetic critique” from all those other modes of critique
that have prevailed is simply that this one has not (Chaouli et al. 2019). These prop-
ositions also appear to add up to a hortatory one: that poetic critique should with-
draw from the margins and move to the center of what we do. From my standpoint,
however, there is little to compel the exhortation, not because I believe there is some-
thing wrong with the critical practice just described ‒ certainly not in Friedrich
Schlegel’s terms ‒ but because arguing for a particular critical practice to prevail
seems misplaced when it has never not prevailed.¹ Or to put this another way, I can-
not help thinking that the interpretive activity that Schlegel describes ‒ to “present
anew what has been presented,” “to shape once again what has already been shap-
ed,” and thereby to “complete the work” (qtd. in Chaouli et al. 2019) ‒ also repre-
sents the unstated ambition of much of the literary criticism that I read, or for
that matter, much that I strive to emulate myself (though I will readily admit to
being no Schlegel). Indeed, as someone who devotes most of my research to poetry,
I can barely imagine producing a compelling reading of any poem ‒ much less show-
 By “never” I mean in the discipline we identify with academic literary interpretation, which covers
a relatively short time span in proportion to the much longer period during which the works we un-
derstand to count as literature have been produced. As Nicholas Brown points out in his 2013 essay
“Close Reading and the Market,” (in which Schlegel makes a key appearance – indeed, I am indebted
to Brown for calling my attention to a key passage from The Atheneum Fragments, which I discuss
further below): “Questions about the way we read ‘now’ are always beside the point, for the reason
that the way we read now is the way we have always read ‒ provided we understand that the domain
of this ‘always’ is limited to the rather young ‘we’ of literary studies as a discipline. […] To be specific,
literature is invented in the aftermath of the Kantian revolution ‒ particularly in the wake of its ele-
vation of aesthetic judgment to a keystone position ‒ at the turn of the nineteenth century, in the
circle around Friedrich Schlegel” (Brown 2013, 145‒146).
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ing someone else how to produce one ‒ without also reshaping and remaking the
poem in the process.²
For academic critics who also teach, of course, part of our job is to help students
see how to perform such labor. An obvious way to do it is simply by example, to
which end I sometimes assign my students George Herbert’s well-known devotional
poem “The Altar” alongside the American scholar Stanley Fish’s tour-de-force read-
ing of it in his 1972 book Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Cen-
tury Literature:
A broken A L T A R, Lord, thy servant reares
Made of a heart, and cemented with teares:
Whose parts are as thy hand did frame;
No workman’s tool hath touch’d the same.
A H E A R T alone
Is such a stone,
As nothing but
Thy pow’r doth cut.
Wherefore each part
Of my hard heart
Meets in this frame,
To praise thy Name:
That, if I chance to hold my peace,
These stones to praise thee may not cease.
O let thy blessed S A C R I F I C E be mine,
And sanctifie this A L T A R to be thine.
(Herbert 1633, 18)
In Fish’s reading, the ingenuity Herbert displays in the poem’s meticulously sculpted
form must be read as evidence not of the poet’s creative powers but of God’s. But to
feel the force of the divine agency that Herbert designed the poem to promote, the
reader must also feel the force of the human agency that it is designed to demote.
The reader is able to recognize the latter, Fish argues, by the end of the very first
line of the poem, and it is precisely by rearranging the syntax of that line that
Fish most clearly shows us what Herbert has done:
The delaying of the verb momentarily suspends the sense and leaves us uncertain of the rela-
tionship of the three noun phrases. Is one subject and the other object? If so, which one, and
what of the third? Or are all three (or perhaps two) in apposition to one another? These questions
represent syntactic and semantic options which are available, and in their availability, pressur-
ing, until the verb arrives. […] In its position “reares” […] unmixes “ALTAR,” “servant,” and
“Lord” by arranging them in syntactical relationships which are also temporal-spatial relation-
 I should make clear here that I am addressing Schlegel’s idea of “presenting anew” somewhat
loosely, and that I am not trying to suggest that he is somehow inviting the critic to take the place
of the poet (or the scholarly analysis to replace the poem). It’s the “re” in “reshaping and remaking”
that matters for the critical practice that I am arguing is quite prevalent.
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ships of cause and effect (“I, thy servant, O Lord, rear this broken altar”). (Fish 1994 [1972],
208‒209)
In settling the causal relationship among the three entities in question, the terminal
position of the verb, Fish explains, also “reaffirms the claims […] for the ingenuity of
[the poem’s] author by specifying ‘thy servant’ [i.e., the human speaker of the poem]
as agent” (209). In other words, while the syntax does indeed establish “thy servant”
as the subject who “reares” the “altar,” nevertheless the initially unsettled relation
among subject and object and the third term, “LORD,” also sets the stage for the
poem to deliver that third term as the maker of both subject and object. But it is
the final couplet of the poem that seals the deal in this transfer of power, which
we do not even need Fish to help us grasp if we simply imagine the difference it
would make were the lines transposed: “O sanctifie this ALTAR to be thine, / And
let thy blessed SACRIFICE be mine.” Unlike the syntactical rearrangement that
Fish performs, this ‘reshaping’ is one we can carry out at no cost to the poem’s in-
tricate form. But while the meter and the rhyme are in no way affected by reversing
the couplet, we can also see that the poem’s greatest feat is all but made to disappear
in that rearrangement. For “The Altar’s” central purpose ‒ to pay homage to God’s
sovereignty ‒ is only fully achieved when what is “thine” overtakes what is “mine.”
Of course, seeing how this is done is one thing and doing it is another. To that
end we might examine a related but somewhat different interpretive exercise involv-
ing two more recent works of poetry. But Fish’s reading of Herbert raises two matters
that I want to lay out briefly before turning to that exercise. The analysis Fish per-
forms in Self-Consuming Artifacts is also part of the history of a larger theoretical en-
terprise aimed at identifying the meaning of any given literary work with the con-
structive activity of the reader and by contrast to the idea that the meaning of the
work might inhere in it or exist prior to the reader’s activity. Or as Fish would put
it a decade later in his well-known essay “How to Recognize a Poem When You
See One”: “Interpretation is not the art of construing but the art of constructing. In-
terpreters do not decode poems; they make them” (Fish 1982, 327). My use of Fish
here might therefore be read as a way of presenting that theoretical claim ‒ which
flew for a time under the banner of so-called ‘reader-response theory’ ‒ as founda-
tional both to what Schlegel appears to mean by ‘poetic critique’ and to the kind of
remaking that I am arguing we are always doing in our capacity as literary critics. But
my argument will show instead why the fantasy of our constructing the poem is not
what Schlegel has to mean (much less what is happening) when we “shape again
what has already been shaped” (qtd. in Chaouli et al. 2019).
For we might also recall that the very same Schlegel who was interested in the
reader’s ability to reshape the poem also seemed to believe the very opposite of
one of Fish’s corollary claims, namely that a poem (or for that matter any object of
interpretation) has no inherent “distinguishing features”: “acts of recognition,”
Fish writes, “rather than being triggered by formal characteristics, are their source”
(Fish 1982, 326). In other words, for Fish, whatever we might mean when we talk
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about interpreting a text, including simply describing the text, what we are really re-
ferring to is our construction (and not our construal) of the text. For Schlegel, by con-
trast, it would appear that poems themselves both construe and construct their own
interpretations: “In all its descriptions,” writes Schlegel in one of the Athenaeum
fragments, “[…] poetry should describe itself, and always be simultaneously poetry
and the poetry of poetry” (Schlegel 1991 [1798], 51). If poetry can be said to describe
itself, it is hard to see how that can happen without the description being in some
sense inherent in the poem, and therefore also part and parcel of the poem’s “distin-
guishing features” or “formal characteristics.” And it is the relationship between
form and meaning implied in Schlegel’s suggestion that “poetry should describe it-
self” that is essential not only to the kind of critique that we as literary scholars can-
not help but perform as a matter of course, but also to recognizing the critique that
poems themselves perform as the primary object of our study.
Anyone familiar with “How to Recognize a Poem When you See One” may recall
that it famously begins with a classroom experiment in which Fish showed his stu-
dents a list of names on a reading assignment for another class and then instructed
them that it was a seventeenth-century poem they were expected to analyze: inter-
pretive labor that, if Fish’s description is remotely accurate, the students in proceed-
ing to unearth a trove of clever prosodic devices and literary and biblical allusions
were able to perform with spectacular success. I want to turn now to a very different
(but also successful) interpretive experiment that I had my own students perform;
however, if the point of Fish’s experiment was to show that neither a list nor a
poem ‒ nor anything else we might call a text ‒ has any inherent formal features,
because whatever we see in it is imposed on the poem by our communal act of read-
ing it, the point of my experiment is exactly the opposite. That is, while my students’
exercise might seem to bear out both Fish’s claim that readers make poems and
Schlegel’s imperative to “reshape” them, it also bears out Schlegel’s other proposi-
tion that “poetry should describe itself.”
The assignment is one that I gave to a first-year undergraduate class on poetry ‒
the students in which were largely non-literature majors ‒ where one of the works we
read was Claudia Rankine’s 2014 National Book Award finalist, Citizen: An American
Lyric. It is worth noting that the reworking of Rankine’s poetry that the exercise asks
students to do is based on an aspect of Citizen that most reviewers and scholars writ-
ing about it have commented on, namely Rankine’s extensive use of the second-per-
son “you.”³ With few exceptions, the largely prose format of the work is delivered in
this second-person voice, as we see in this passage:
You are rushing to meet a friend in a distant neighborhood of Santa Monica. This friend says, as
you walk toward her, You are late, you nappy-headed ho.What did you say? you ask, though you
 The poet and novelist Ben Lerner, for example, devotes an extended section of his 2016 book-
length essay to an analysis of the effects of Rankine’s second-person address on a white reader (Lern-
er 2016, 69‒74).
10 Jennifer Ashton
have heard every word. This person has never before referred to you like this in your presence,
never before code-switched in this manner. What did you say? She doesn’t, perhaps physically
cannot, repeat what she has just said.
Maybe the content of her statement is irrelevant and she only means to signal the stereotype of
“black people time” by employing what she perceives to be “black people language.” Maybe she
is jealous of whoever kept you and wants to suggest you are nothing or everything to her. Maybe
she wants to have a belated conversation about Don Imus and the women’s basketball team he
insulted with this language. You don’t know. You don’t know what she means. You don’t know
what response she expects from you nor do you care. For all your previous understandings, sud-
denly incoherence feels violent.You both experience this cut,which she keeps insisting is a joke,
a joke stuck in her throat, and like any other injury, you watch it rupture along its suddenly ex-
posed suture. (Rankine 2014, 41‒42)
The predominant referent for the “you” here is clearly the speaker of the poem,
whom we also are given to read as black, and more specifically, to identify with
the poet herself. This passage is just one of many that combine to depict a subject
confronting a relentless barrage of microaggressions by white people, acts that
even in the short space of this passage range from the oblivious to the malicious.
Moreover, insofar as the “you” mostly refers to the speaker herself, we can see
that the second-person voice is serving a first-person point of view. I say “mostly”
because the “you” in the question that the speaker asks twice in this passage
‒ “What did you say?”, which also acts as a kind of refrain throughout the volume ‒
clearly does not refer to the person asking the question. In this respect, this passage
like many others in Citizen, also serves as a bold reminder of the second-person pro-
noun’s flexibility of reference. “What did you say?” ‒ which reads simultaneously as
the speaker’s stunned expression of disbelief at the racial slur and a pained attempt
to call the friend out for it ‒ marks this capaciousness even as (or precisely because)
we have no trouble seeing that the “you” who provokes the question is distinct from
the “you” who asks it. And as a by-product of that same flexibility of reference, what
also emerges here ‒ after we are reminded of the notorious 2007 radio broadcast
where the American talk-show celebrity Don Imus and his guest used the same racial
slur (along with string of others) discussing the Rutgers University women’s basket-
ball team’s loss in a tight NCAA final against the University of Tennessee ‒ is that the
speaker identified with the “you” is not a lone injured subject but one of many who
have suffered the effects of an identical verbal violence. The poem also reminds us,
in other words, that in strict grammatical usage, the “you,” unlike the “I” that it can
be used to stand in for (and notwithstanding the kind of poetic license that might
enable one, say, to use the first-person singular to “contain multitudes”), can refer
either singularly or plurally.
Using the second-person “you” as an equivalent of the first-person “I” is hardly
Rankine’s invention, of course; it is a speech pattern that has been put to literary use
not just by poets but also by fiction writers, and one that occurs in everyday parlance
as well. So an obvious question for us as critics, particularly when we consider Citi-
zen’s subtitle, An American Lyric, is what Rankine is trying to accomplish by mobi-
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lizing “you” both for its ability to stand in for the more familiar lyric “I” and its abil-
ity to shuttle between plural and singular referents. It is a question that, as a teacher
of Rankine’s book, I also want my students to try to answer. So to help them under-
stand Rankine’s decision to make the first-person “you” one of the primary cogs in
Citizen’s machinery, I gave them an assignment that would help them examine the
differences it would make to Rankine’s lyric endeavor if the poem were constructed
differently and she were to voice it through the genre’s more conventional first-per-
son pronoun. The assignment asked students to follow a two-step procedure: Step 1)
Choose one of the shorter sections (ideally less than a page long) from Claudia Ran-
kine’s Citizen and rewrite it, substituting a first-person pronoun wherever a second-
person pronoun seems to refer to the speaker, and making any other necessary gram-
matical changes that follow from the substitution. Step 2) Circle or underline any in-
stances where you’re not sure what the right change would be or where it seems the
original sense of the passage would be significantly altered or rendered nonsensical
by the change from second person to first person.
Here is what the second-person to first-person conversion looks like with the pas-
sage discussed above:
[I am] rushing to meet a friend in a distant neighborhood of Santa Monica. This friend says, as [I]
walk toward her, You are late, you nappy-headed ho.What did you say? [I] ask, though [I] have
heard every word. This person has never before referred to [me] like this in [my] presence, never
before code-switched in this manner.What did you say? She doesn’t, perhaps physically cannot,
repeat what she has just said.
Maybe the content of her statement is irrelevant and she only means to signal the stereo-
type of “black people time” by employing what she perceives to be “black people language.”
Maybe she is jealous of whoever kept [me] and wants to suggest [I am] nothing or everything
to her. Maybe she wants to have a belated conversation about Don Imus and the women’s bas-
ketball team he insulted with this language. [I] don’t know. [I] don’t know what she means. [I]
don’t know what response she expects from [me] nor do [I] care. For all [my/our]? previous un-
derstandings, suddenly incoherence feels violent. [We] both experience this cut, which she
keeps insisting is a joke, a joke stuck in her throat, and like any other injury, [I/we?] watch it
rupture along its suddenly exposed suture. (Rankine 2014, 41‒42)⁴
Entirely by virtue of the “you”’s first-person capacities, there’s very little change in
the sense of the situation in the first paragraph except perhaps a sharpening of
the lines differentiating the speaker’s words from those of the friend. But the conver-
sion also makes clear what the “you” can do that the “I” cannot, which is to cut in
two directions at once, offering us the grammatical possibility of the speaker and the
friend occupying common ground even as, in the second paragraph, that prospect is
made to collapse, as if the pronoun “you” itself were at once both “suture” and “rup-
ture” between them. For this reason, it is also clear why Rankine did not attempt
 I have marked with underscoring those moments in this poem (as well as in another discussed
below), where it is unclear which first-person pronoun would offer the most appropriate substitution.
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some first-person variation on the friend’s comment in this particular section of the
work, even though in many of the vignettes in Citizen, the white people who are given
voice do address the speaker from a first-person point-of-view, as in this short pas-
sage:
Because of your elite status from a year’s worth of travel, you have already settled into your win-
dow seat on United Airlines, when the girl and her mother arrive at your row. The girl, looking
over at you, tells her mother, these are our seats, but this is not what I expected. The mother’s
response is barely audible ‒ I see, she says. I’ll sit in the middle. (12)
But if we return to our translation exercise we can see all the better why giving Citi-
zen’s black lyric speaker (as opposed to its white ones) a first-person pronoun will
not serve, for it is precisely around the moment of the poem that points most explic-
itly to common ground between its black and white subjects ‒ “you both experience
this cut” ‒ that we run up against the real challenges to our translation. That is,while
“all your previous understandings” might also point to something the speaker and
her friend share in common, the fact that “you” cleaves so undecidably between
the singular and the plural when we try to replace the second-person pronoun
with the first suggests why we might have trouble settling on either “my” or “our.”
The rupture that cuts between the speaker and her friend certainly points to a
divide that would rule out “our understandings” as an alternative to “your” in this
translation. But it is Citizen as a whole that makes a case for why the singular
“my,” “I,” and “me” might be unavailable not just to the speaker in this particular
situation, but to any African American citizen who would sing “An American
Lyric.” Indeed until the very final poem of the book, it is only the white perpetrators
of racism who refer to themselves in the first-person singular, while the speaker never
uses “I” except in mentioning the pronoun, as in these lines a few pages before the
end of the book: “Who do you think you are, saying I to me? // […] Don’t say I if it
means so little, / holds the little forming no one / […] You are injured” (142‒143). But
even if Rankine has erased the difference between use and mention here by omitting
the customary scare quotes in these lines,we as readers have no problem recognizing
the difference between these occurrences of “I” and the one that begins Citizen’s
final vignette:
I can hear the even breathing that creates passages to dreams. And yes, I want to interrupt to tell
him her us you me I don’t know how to end what doesn’t have an ending.
Tell me a story, he says, wrapping his arms around me.
Yesterday, I begin, I was waiting in the car for time to pass. A woman pulled in and started to
park her car facing mine. Our eyes met and what passed passed as quickly as the look away. She
backed up and parked on the other side of the lot. I could have followed her to worry my ques-
tion but I had to go, I was expected on court, I grabbed my racket.
The sunrise is slow and cloudy, dragging the light in, but barely.
Did you win? he asks.
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It wasn’t a match, I say. It was a lesson. (Rankine 2014, 159)
Upon reaching this point in the poem readers are well prepared to grasp the lesson
they have been given. If one commonplace of the lyric as a genre has been famously
expressed in John Stuart Mill’s remark that “All poetry is of the nature of soliloquy”
such that “no trace of consciousness that any eyes are upon us must be visible in the
work itself” (Mill 1981 [1833], 349), then what Rankine’s “American Lyric” teaches us
to see is the privilege that attaches to that un-self-conscious first-person standpoint.
The highly self-conscious self-description that the poem Citizen enacts through its
pronouns is a drama of withholding, in which self-description is exactly what is re-
lentlessly denied to the poem’s black speaker.We discover in place of the unselfcon-
sciousness of the traditional (read: white) lyric speaker the double-consciousness (to
recall W.E.B. Du Bois) of the African American lyric speaker beset by hostile projec-
tions.⁵ Thus when Citizen’s speaker summarizes the effects of this disparity in the
phrase “you are injured,” we also see what would be needed to redress the injury
– a subjectivity unmolested by the projections of others.
In this respect, however, what we might call Citizen’s ‘poetic critique’ of the lyric
also maintains the genre’s broader contours insofar as in overturning one common-
place ‒ that of the un-self-conscious solitary singer ‒ it upholds another ‒ that of
expressing, to recall one of the genre’s major Romantic practitioners, the “spontane-
ous overflow of powerful feelings” (Wordsworth 1988 [1800], 246). But as the African
American critic Kenneth Warren has observed, in embracing that commonplace in
order to describe the subjective wounds of racial inequality, Citizen also actively oc-
cludes a different form of injustice, and one that disproportionately affects black
Americans ‒ that of economic inequality:
That is, the young men depicted [as victims of racist acts] elsewhere in Citizen appear to us as
victims not because (unlike you and me) they cannot afford to purchase ‒ or are otherwise un-
able to earn ‒ elite status tickets, but rather because they, like you, are on the receiving end of
actions and gestures that stem from prejudice, racism, and bias. (Warren 2016)
To show what it can look like to perform the kind of ‘poetic critique’ that would ad-
dress the economic violence that Rankine’s Citizen, whether deliberately or inadver-
tently, occludes, I want to turn now to another recently published work of poetry, Le-
slie Kaplan’s Excess – The Factory. The work was published in French as L’excès –
L’usine in 1987, but it appeared in English translation only decades later, in 2018,
with the Oakland-based press Commune Editions (although as the remainder of
this essay will suggest, it is not obvious that the choices made by the translators
 “The Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American
world – a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through
the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of
always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others.” (Du Bois 2007 [1903], 8)
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are all that compatible with the ostensive ideological commitments of the press’s
name). Like the speaker of Citizen, the speaker of the poems in Kaplan’s book is
also rendered in the second person, and to somewhat similar effect, in that we wit-
ness a subject grown increasingly wounded by and weary of the oppressive condi-
tions of daily existence:
You make cables near the window, cables of different colors. You roll them into coils. Light is
there, space is soft. You come, go. Corridors, oblivion.
You make the cables near the window. Extreme tension. The sky, and the cables, this shit. You
are seized, gripped by the cables, the sky. There is nothing else.
All space is occupied : all has become waste. Skin is dead. Teeth bite an apple, a sandwich. You
absorb. The gaze sticks to everything like a fly.
You work 9 hours, making holes in parts with a machine. You place the part, bring down the
lever, take out the part, and raise the lever again. There’s paper everywhere.
Time is outside, in things. (Kaplan 2018 [1987], 15)
Just as with Rankine’s poem, because the second-person voice is standing in for a
first-person point of view, we can try to gain a clearer sense of the effects of Kaplan’s
use of “you” here if we see what difference it would make if we reconstruct the poem
with the more familiar lyric “I”:
[I] make cables near the window, cables of different colors. [I] roll them into coils. Light is there,
space is soft. [I] come, go. Corridors, oblivion.
[I] make the cables near the window. Extreme tension. The sky, and the cables, this shit. [I am]
seized, gripped by the cables, the sky. There is nothing else.
All space is occupied : all has become waste. Skin is dead. Teeth bite an apple, a sandwich. [I]
absorb. The gaze sticks to everything like a fly.
[I] work 9 hours, making holes in parts with a machine. [I] place the part, bring down the lever,
take out the part, and raise the lever again. There’s paper everywhere.
Time is outside, in things. (15)
Here although most would probably agree that the first-person voice does not quite
work, there are nevertheless fewer disjunctions than in our translation of Rankine. At
the same time we can certainly point to the awkward shift from “Teeth bite an apple”
to “[I] absorb” in the third verse. Partly by virtue of the lack of an interlocutor like the
clueless white friend in Rankine, there are, however, almost no moments here where
the substitution of the first person for the second would raise a question about which
pronoun to use. Of course, a key difference between Rankine’s speaker and the
speaker here is that the latter is depicted grappling not with the oppressive effects
of systemic racism but instead with those of capitalism. Meanwhile there is no infor-
mation here that would enable us to ascertain the race or gender of the worker whose
point of view Kaplan gives us, even as we receive a great deal of information (espe-
cially considering the short length of the poem) about the physical work being per-
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formed and its effects on the speaker. Nevertheless, converting this poem has some
similar consequences to those we saw with Rankine. For instance, in the strange dis-
embodiment of the teeth that “bite an apple” in the third verse, we are at least invited
to imagine the teeth belonging to the speaker. At the same time, the jump to first-per-
son perspective in the next line, “I absorb,” clearly reinforces the subjective aspects
of the poem ‒ we might also say the traditional lyric aspects of it ‒ in ways that the
“you” does not. It is as if, in our revision, what would appear to have mattered most
to Kaplan would be getting the poem to express this particular individual’s subjective
experience of this particular labor in this particular factory.
But if we return to the original French, we begin to see a very different picture of
the poem’s speaker, one that we need to see in order to discover Kaplan’s full pur-
pose in so vividly depicting the factory worker’s immiseration. Both the translator’s
choice of “you” and our experiment with “I” actually distort the original poem’s
aims, and the distortion has everything to do with the fact that the poem is intended
less as a critique of the laborer’s suffering than as a critique of what causes it, name-
ly capitalism. And in this respect, Kaplan’s poems demonstrate the extent to which
pursuing such a critique ‒ unlike, say, the critique of racism ‒ precisely requires an
impersonal rather than a personal point of view. Hence the pronoun that prevails in
Kaplan’s French is neither the second-person nor the first-person pronoun, but the
impersonal “on”:
On fait des câbles près de la fenêtre. Les câbles ont beaucoup de couleurs, on les enroule en
circuits. Il y a de la lumière, l’espace est mou. On va, on vient. Couloirs, oubli.
On fait des câbles près de la fenêtre. Tension extrême. Le ciel, et les câbles, cette merde. On est
saisie, tirée par les câbles, le ciel. Il n’y a rien d’autre.
Tout l’espace est occupé : tout est devenu déchet. La peau est morte. Les dents mordent une
pomme, un sandwich. On absorbe, le regard se colle à tout comme une mouche.
On travaille neuf heures, on fait des trous dans des pièces avec une machine. On met la pièce, on
descend le levier, on sort la pièce, on remonte le levier.
Il y a du papier partout. Le temps est dehors, dans les choses. (Kaplan 1987, 13)
Given that there’s a perfectly serviceable equivalent of “on” in English, what do we
discover when we read this poem in translation again, but this time with the imper-
sonal “one” in place of the personal “you” imposed on it by the Commune Editions
translators:
[One makes] cables near the window, cables of different colors. [One rolls] them into coils. Light
is there, space is soft. [One comes, goes.] Corridors, oblivion.
[One makes] the cables near the window. Extreme tension. The sky, and the cables, this shit.
[One is] seized, gripped by the cables, the sky. There is nothing else.
All space is occupied : all has become waste. Skin is dead. Teeth bite an apple, a sandwich. [One
absorbs.] The gaze sticks to everything like a fly.
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[One works] 9 hours, making holes in parts with a machine. [One places] the part, [brings] down
the lever, [takes] out the part, and [raises] the lever again. There’s paper everywhere.
Time is outside, in things. (Kaplan 2018 [1987], 15)
There is no question here, as with Rankine’s Citizen, that the speaker is experiencing
“powerful feelings,” but the effect of Kaplan’s impersonal speaker is to make them
entirely secondary ‒ by-products of an injustice that is structural, but precisely not
in what we mean when we speak, say, of structural racism. Unlike racism, the struc-
ture of exploitation under which “one” suffers in Kaplan’s Factory, the structure that
produces the ‘excess’ or surplus value that is foundational to capitalism, is a struc-
ture indifferent to the individual experiences of the laborer on the one hand and the
factory owner on the other. As Warren says in the conclusion to his critique of Citizen,
“What then makes these poems ‘good’ on their terms is their capacity to keep in the
foreground the idea of injustice as a matter of how we feel about each other and how
we make each other feel, and to keep our attention away from economic injustice,
which is not at all rooted in our feelings toward each other” (Warren 2016). We
might then say that what makes Kaplan’s poems “‘good’ on their terms” (to borrow
Warren’s language) is their ability to imagine the grounds of social change from the
standpoint of an impersonal subject. Or to put the point slightly differently, the self-
description these poems perform generates a critique of capitalism from the stand-
point of no subject at all, a critique we can see all the more clearly in these
poems when we see how a re-making of them makes that critique disappear.
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Michel Chaouli
Schlegel’s Words, Rightly Used
Philological Disarmament
“Poetry,” Friedrich Schlegel writes in a fragment, “can only be criticized by poetry”
(Schlegel 1991 [1797], 14– 15). For a while now, I have thought that the line says all
one needs to know about poetic criticism, what it is and how to do it, and that it
therefore requires neither commentary nor critique. It is clear as day, and yet, like
so many of the best aphorisms, this is an enigmatic clarity, which may be why I
keep returning to it.¹ I keep failing to find the right way of hearing it and responding
to it. If I knew how, then it would stop coming back to me, and before long I could
forget it. Criticism thinks of itself as memorializing a work, but if it is done right, then
it is a way of overcoming it, of digesting and metabolizing it, and thus of forgetting it.
“Poetry can only be criticized by poetry.” It is a plain phrase, yet right away I feel
the urge to poke and prod its every part. After all, can I be sure what it means by the
word poetry, if poetry is even the right translation of Poesie, or if the first usage of the
word denotes the same as the second? As Schlegel uses the term elsewhere, poetry is
not restricted to a genre such as the lyric nor even to verbal artworks in general, but
reaches for the essence of creative making itself, whatever form it might take. Does
that hold here? Then there is the word only: am I to take literally the assertion that
poetry can be criticized by poetry alone and by nothing else? Now I notice the pas-
sive voice and find myself asking by whom – by what unnamed agency – it can only
be thus criticized? And what of this criticizing? The word itself – kritisiert – rankles,
as does the idea it evokes: does poetry stand in need of being criticized? These mis-
givings are further roused by the very next concept the fragment offers: “A judgment
of art,” it reads, “that itself isn’t a work of art […] has no right of citizenship in the
realm of art.” “A judgment of art”: a phrase I have come across a thousand times, yet
only now do I hear how off-key it sounds, how grating it is to join “judgment” to
“art.” Worse, this “judgment” is apt to give the aimless drift of associations that
have been stirred up by “criticize” a Kantian bent. And suddenly all I am able to
see in “criticize” is “critique,” that prosecutor that summons the accused before
the Tribunal of Reason to press them for answers. Before I know it, an air of anxiety
has settled over the line, and rather than enjoying the cloudless simplicity that it had
once offered, I become restless and turn over each of its words.
 One response to the fragment can be found in my essay “‘We Hear That We May Speak’: Overtures
for Doing Criticism,” Arcadia: International Journal of Literary Culture, forthcoming. Since I do not
start from scratch, some passages from that essay reappear here.
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But why such unease? I approach the phrase as though in it I confronted a being
that speaks an unintelligible idiom whose meaning requires decipherment, when in-
stead I could begin by crediting its affinity. It is, after all, not very mysterious: “Po-
etry can only be criticized by poetry.” The words show the way, by a stroke of luck
more clearly even in the English translation, which begins and ends with “poetry.”²
Poetry is where I set out and where I land, my dwelling and my destination. Though I
may not know its dimensions nor the measure of its boundaries, I do not face in it an
alien object, but something with which I maintain an unknown intimacy. Often I ap-
proach it as though it were an obscure substance to be probed from a distance with
the stick of scholarly analysis, but then I forget that I know it from inside, even when
its meaning confounds me – forget that its meaning confounds me in the way that
poetry does because I know it from inside.
Knowing it from inside does not mean that it harbors no mysteries. It means that
poetry is not an object to be studied, dissected, and decoded. It is, in fact, no object
at all. That, too, is something the line intimates: when poetry encounters poetry, the
two do not occupy opposite poles – here I, the reading subject deploying “poetry,”
there a poetic object that I approach and whose meaning I seek to parse – with cri-
tique or criticism coursing between us. If criticism itself is done “by poetry,” as Schle-
gel puts it, then poetry is the medium through which I move, not a thing I hold before
me. Even the term “medium,” recruited to dissolve the dyad of subject and object,
will not quite do. It fails to capture the strange affinity that I have with poetry –
and it with me – if I am to hear it in the right way. For poetry is not a medium in
the sense of a means, not a tool I wield or a channel I select to tune into a special
form of communication. Nor is it a medium in the more capacious sense of a setting,
the stage of my actions or the stream that carries me away. In either case – whether I
hold it or it holds me – it remains alien to me, something I think of as belonging to
the world rather than to myself. Yet to do criticism by poetry names something more
intimate: a form of comportment, a way of doing things.
Hearing That We May Speak
We scholars have been reading this fragment (along with the other fragments, es-
says, dialogues, and other writings in the archive of “Early Romanticism”) as a build-
ing block in an intricate theory of literature, when in fact it is a call to action. It pres-
ents us not merely with new thoughts, but with a demand. It asks us to “hear, that we
may speak,” as Emerson says (Emerson 2001 [1837], 60). But do we need to learn how
to hear and speak? Do we not do it in our sleep? Of course we do, but that is just the
reason Emerson urges a different mode of hearing and speaking. Every day, language
passes through me without leaving a ripple. Yet from time to time I come across
 The original reads, “Poesie kann nur durch Poesie kritisiert werden” (Schlegel 1967 [1797], 162).
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words, and something happens. The words snap me out of my slumber and suddenly
I hear in them a call that demands something of me. No longer do I read to add to my
stock of interpretations; I read, rather, to take part in a form of making. I remain vig-
ilant about the ways of seeing – the theories – that the text unveils, yet mainly be-
cause it can lead me to new ways of doing. I change my posture and lean forward,
ready to learn how these words set in motion something in me, rather than leaning
back, content to behold the shape they reveal.
So: I hear Schlegel’s word that I might act. The way of acting towards which they
guide me is clear. I am to encounter poetry with poetry, to act poetically when com-
ing across poetry, where poetry is not a special category of artful writing (lyrical,
complex, sophisticated – what have you), but names ways of making that outstrip
utility – call it passionate making. The fragment asks me to face the coming into
being of something new not with the aim of fixing its location in a grid of meanings,
but rather with a gesture that launches my own ways of making. If criticism names
my encounter with the poetic, then a real encounter, and real criticism, must itself be
poetic. How do I bring about such an encounter? The fragment does not say. Yet, in
whatever way I go about it, my work – criticism – no longer remains the same. It
ceases to serve as the mere occasion for assigning praise or blame, nor does it docu-
ment an arrangement of meanings derived from – or imposed on – a source. Some-
thing different happens.
For one thing, something happens. In poetic criticism, someone speaks, someone
ventures an act of speech – an act in speech. Even if it has been uttered before, such
a speech act is unheard of. Ideas that have grown flaccid gain fresh vigor, like a mus-
cle that one learns to feel anew. Yet this speaking, though new, emerges not out of
thin air, but follows upon another act, this being an act of hearing – hearing this
fragment, for example – an act as fragile as the speech to which it gives rise. For
to hear “that we may speak,” to hear poetically, demands of me to open not my
ears alone, but also my self, to allow myself to be exposed to what speaks to me, un-
shielded by my usual armaments – with effects I cannot foresee. Learning to become
vulnerable in this way lies at the core of encountering poetry with poetry.
What changes, then, what is at stake in hearing the fragment, is more than criti-
cism. If I succeed in hearing the poetry in some arrangement of words (just as I might
perceive it in a composition of images, sounds, or movements), then they rouse me
from the torpor of my habits and bring to consciousness ways of encountering things
that had lain dormant. My whole organism comes alive, and as I learn to hear and
see and feel anew, fresh possibilities of making sense of the world reveal themselves,
which turn out to be just fresh possibilities of making the world. That would change
everything.
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Second Thoughts
Have we been reading too much into this line? Does it really say that poetry is not an
object nor I a subject, that hearing it involves knowing it from inside, that it names a
form of intimacy? If so, how and where? These are fair questions. Still, it is irksome
that they interrupt our reverie. Was not the idea to keep at bay the unease that our
usual modes of reading have taught? Yet here we are, ready to shadowbox with chal-
lenges of our own making. And once we start, there is no stopping: behind these
questions a hundred others lurk, each ready to take a swing.
When interpretation runs into trouble, we like to place the blame on the ‘difficul-
ty’ of the object before us (for example, the line by Schlegel), when the real obstacle
lies elsewhere. Strange that ease does not come easily to us. Second thoughts molest
us before we have come to know the first. But then, why not simply plug up our ears
and get on with it? Are we too hidebound? No doubt we are.We know well how to vex
each other with textual and historical riddles, but we are at a loss at how to go about
hearing the words someone has uttered. The new, we fear, might ask too much of us,
so we stick with old tricks.
But this timidity is not only a flaw. It masks another, more significant reason for
why skeptical questions hold our attention. If ease were a state that we once pos-
sessed, a state we had lost to the agitation that roils our lives, then shutting out ques-
tions would be a technique worth trying; it might smooth the waves and return us to
stillness. Yet nothing we know from experience or history lends weight to this sup-
position. There does not seem to be a primitive condition in our childhood, nor in
the ‘childhood of humanity,’ in which human beings enjoy a calm that is then dis-
turbed by psychic and social traffic. Even infants are plagued by disquiet. (They
aim to sooth it by dreaming up games such as fort-da.) Tranquility, it seems, is some-
thing to be attained, not something to be retrieved, since the most strident voices re-
verberate in our heads. Plugging our ears does not silence them, far from it; it per-
mits them to echo more violently. The lament about first and second thoughts may
have it backwards: what are called second thoughts in fact beset us first. We start
with a head full of noise, and we manage to get some peace when the quarrelsome
voices have lost their edge. It is only then that they teach us something worth know-
ing.
In attempting to hear Schlegel’s fragment or any poetic configuration, we can-
not, then, simply shrug off challenges issued by philology, by history, or by critique,
hoping to return to a state of mind unmolested by questions, for we never knew such
a state. Instead, the way of making we seek is also a way of relating to knowledge –
knowledge derived from philology, history, critique and other sources – that, rather
than unspooling more and more questions, allows us to find words adequate to our




How do I know that I am to read the fragment poetically? Who tells me that I must
lean in to hear it, that I must know it from inside? The answer is trivial: the text itself
does – who else? If we now ask how the text tells me, we think we know where to
look. When the fragment says that to hear and understand poetry one must hear it
and speak about it poetically, there is just a small step to conclude that it speaks
not only about poetry as such and in the abstract, but also about itself, about this
very line by Friedrich Schlegel. Now we know what to imagine: the fragment’s mean-
ing forks in two, one prong raising itself above the other and from that perch speak-
ing about the one below. The image comes easily. For some time, scholars of litera-
ture, like interpreters of other arts, have turned our gaze from the world that the
artwork evidently shows to the way the artwork reflects on itself: the novel turns
out to be about writing, the movie about film making, the painting about painting.
When it comes to our fragment, we are all the happier to hold fast to this image be-
cause the writings of Friedrich Schlegel, and early Romanticism generally, often use
the figure of doubling through self-reflection to describe poetic production, some-
thing that readers such as Walter Benjamin have noted.
So at home are we with this figure of self-reflection that it takes time to notice
that the fragment does not tell me to read it poetically by splitting itself into fragment
and meta-fragment (or fragment to the power of two, as some of the Romantics like
to put it). It does not announce itself as poetry in the same way that it speaks about
poetry. We know what goes on when the text speaks about poetry: it deploys con-
cepts and puts them in relation to one another to yield a proposition. It makes an
assertion, such as: poetry can only be criticized by poetry. The meaning of the line
may be mysterious, but there is no mystery to the fact that it is a proposition
about some matter.
What about the other case, when I take the words not to be issuing a statement
or a directive about ways of criticizing poetry, but a demand to hear the very words of
the fragment as poetry, a demand therefore to hear them poetically? Though spelled
in the same letters and composed of the same words, now they do not seem to speak
in the same manner as before, and thus solicit a different way of hearing. Like every
poetic act, no matter its form or the medium in which it shows itself, the fragment
guides me to read it poetically not by splitting itself in two to supply meta-informa-
tion about itself. It holds up no sign alerting readers that they are entering a poetic
zone. There is no about, no cleavage between words communicating ideas and words
instructing readers that they are to take this communication poetically. In a poetic
act, the words bring forth the things by chafing at conventional systems of meaning.
They arrive with a tension that shakes off their ordinariness and charges them with
an unforeseen intensity. Like an electric surge, this intensity leaps from the words to
the things they name and lights them up. The tension is not always easy to notice.
Some texts – our fragment is an example – keep their readers so busy with the mys-
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teries of the propositions they contain that their poetic intensity takes time to unfold.
Their prose works like bait that distracts from their poetry, where poetry and prose do
not name genres but degrees of vibrancy: what is conventionally labeled prose at
times pulsates with a poetry lacking in much of what is called lyric poetry – open
any page by Kleist or Conrad, Nietzsche or Emerson.
The Intense Life of Language
The philosopher Gaston Bachelard may be thinking along these lines when he writes
that “poetry puts language in a state of emergence.” How to picture this state of
emergence? Here is how Bachelard develops the thought:
The poetic image is an emergence from language, it is always a little above the language of sig-
nification. By living the poems we read, we have then the salutary experience of emerging. This,
no doubt, is emerging at short range. But these acts of emergence are repeated; poetry puts lan-
guage in a state of emergence, in which life becomes manifest through its vivacity. (Bachelard
2014 [1957], 11)
The passage begins where we too find ourselves, namely with the mystery at the
heart of the poetic image: poetry partakes of language, and yet stands apart from
it. To grasp this excess of poetic language over the ordinary language of naming,
Bachelard, like so many other thinkers, reaches for a spatial image in which poetry
“is always a little above the language of signification.” Now he has us thinking that
language has separated itself into layers, the poetic layer floating atop the signifying
layer like oil over water. But then he catches himself, drops the spatial image, and
switches to a temporal logic: he asks us to live the poems we read, and thus to
live the emergence from language. Poetry now does not hover over ordinary lan-
guage, regarding it from above, but names the metamorphosis of the ordinary. If
reading a poem is living a poem, then the poetic emergence from language is not
a release from language; it offers no escape into ineffability or wordless ecstasy.
This emergence from language, this intensity that shakes language loose from its en-
crustations, occurs in language. Poetic acts, we now see, rather than splitting lan-
guage in two, effect a transformation within language – a transformation of language
by language. Which just means that poetry is not something that enters language
from outside (thanks to a muse or to genius, for example), nor is it a specially
marked region of language, “parasitic” on its “normal” uses, as philosophers of lan-
guage and linguists often assert.³ It is, rather, one of the basic things you do with
words. It reveals itself as a force that language holds in reserve, allowing it – com-
 J.L. Austin, for example, writes apropos of poetry: “There are parasitic uses of language, which are
‘not serious,’ not the ‘full normal use.’” (Austin 1962, 104)
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pelling it – to emerge from itself. Hearing the poetic edge in language is hearing lan-
guage as though it had not been heard before.
We have become accustomed to finding the poetic in clearly marked regions (the
book, the classroom, the museum, the theater, and so on), but we recognize that this
emergence can come about anywhere. As Schlegel writes in another fragment, poetry
“embraces everything that is purely poetic, from the greatest systems of art, contain-
ing within themselves still further systems, to the sigh, the kiss that the poetizing
child breathes forth in artless song” (Schlegel 1991 [1798], 31). Even if there were a
sign alerting me to the presence of poetry – the book cover, for example, might iden-
tify its content as “literature” – it can at best serve to sharpen my attention, the way a
gallery encourages me to look, but it can never yield the exuberance of feeling “lan-
guage in a state of emergence.”
Has the mystery of poetic speech been lifted? If you are of a scholarly or scientific
disposition, then hardly, for then you wish to know what, precisely, propels words
beyond their practical utility into the orbit of poetry. What does that force consist
of and how does it unfold? You would be in your rights to ask for a catalogue of fea-
tures that characterize the state of emergence, the better to identify poetry. When
Bachelard then offers the thought that “poetry puts language in a state of emergence,
in which life becomes manifest through its vivacity,” you cannot help but be disap-
pointed. Do we know how life manifests itself in its vivacity any better than we know
how language manifests itself in poetry? It seems that one mystery – that of poetry –
has been replaced with another – life.
Yet we could also be led to a different insight. Instead of feeling let down by
Bachelard’s failure at providing an explanation, we might wonder what an explana-
tion of the force of poetry might look like. Are we even in need of explanation? Is
poetry? The texture of Bachelard’s meditation – the fact that it has texture – reveals
that I cannot learn to grasp the force of poetic words by launching a theoretical inves-
tigation. I come to see, rather, that the account I give of the way I read poetry – the
account I give of living it: call it criticism – must itself occur in language that is in a
state of emergence. Schlegel’s fragment says nothing more than what Bachelard’s
words show. One way of criticizing poetry by poetry is to say that in the poetic
image “life becomes manifest through its vivacity.” A scholar or scientist might, in an-
other bout of scruples, insist on a list of features that characterize life (metabolism,
reproduction, etc.), which would then be used to judge every case that presents itself.
Yet to say that life manifests itself through its vivacity simply means that life can only
be known through life, as poetry can also be criticized by poetry. The poetic edge of
the phrase lies in the audacity with which it turns on itself.
And there is another turn worth following. Life, we begin to see, is not merely a
model for poetry. Poetry showing itself through the intensity of language is not like
life showing itself through its vivacity. No, the very way life manifests itself through
its vivacity comes about in the intensity of poetry. The quickening we feel in poetic
intensity is a manifestation of life in its vivacity. “These linguistic impulses,” Bach-
elard continues, “which stand out from the ordinary rank of pragmatic language, are
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miniatures of the vital impulse” – this being the élan vital made famous by Henri
Bergson, whose vitalism Bachelard sees everywhere in poetry. The élan linguistique
is not a sign – a representation, a metaphor – of the élan vital, but one of its instan-
ces. If we learn to see “language-as-reality,” rather than “language-as-instrument,”
then Bachelard promises that we “would find in poetry numerous documents on
the intense life of language” (Bachelard 2014 [1957], 11). Here, then, is another
non-definition of poetry: language lived intensely.
What and How
“Language-as-reality”: what of this “as”? When we think of words announcing them-
selves “as poetry,” we risk imagining the words appearing as something, as though
they were engaged in impersonation. But words do not lead a quotidian existence
that issues into poetry through an act of masquerade. The conjunction “as” yields
another form of doubling, distinct from the self-reflection that Benjamin and others
have noted in the Romantic conception of the work of art, yet as likely to lead us off
track. It opens a distance between words and poetry just where we want to feel their
intimacy. Bachelard, too, seems to be led by this intuition, which is why he speaks of
langage-réalité and langage-instrument, leaving as little daylight between the terms
as he can get away with. (The spacing insinuates itself in the English translation.)
If instead of asking how words appear “as poetry,” we wonder how they come to
speak poetically, then we nudge ourselves the right way. For now, we are more likely
to see that poetry is not an object nor a phenomenon, not a being to which I can
point. Its center of gravity lies not in a noun, but in an adjective or an adverb. It
is not “poetry” we seek, then, but rather the manner – the style – in which a
word, a gesture, or a motion comes to make itself felt poetically.
Agreed, but does that bear saying? Do I not already know that I must look to the
how and not to the what? Of course I do, yet strangely this way of knowing seems to
maintain its claim on me for only as long as my gaze is fixed on it, and no longer. The
instant my mind wanders, the insight, which only moments before had the clarity
and cogency of self-evidence, slips into obscurity, and as I lose my grip on it, I
reach for the solidity of nouns to steady myself: I talk of “poetry,” its features, its his-
tory, its influence, its effects, its essence. The habit is hard to break, but at least I
come by it honestly, for I have learned it from philosophers and critics, Friedrich
Schlegel among them. To be fair, many of them do mention the how, but usually
the way one recommends a dish for its nutritional benefits. Their duty discharged,
they proceed to feast on a rich spread of whats: on “poetry,” “art,” “literature,”
“the absolute,” “the work of art,” “the beautiful,” “the sublime” – each concoction
more elaborate than the next, each requiring years of exacting training to construct
and assess.
As so often, the master showing the way is Plato, whose signature skill lies in
turning adjectives into nouns. By asking what the beautiful dress, the beautiful
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horse, and the beautiful face have in common, with each other and with all other
beautiful things, he means to direct our attention from surfaces, which, by his lights,
shimmer with illusion, to the essence of things, imagined as resting in a remote re-
gion, shielded from change. Plato has the integrity to admit failure – at the end of the
Greater Hippias, the dialogue devoted to discovering what makes beautiful things
beautiful, we find Socrates empty-handed – yet this failure turns out to bear more
fruit than most successes do. Now there is something called “beauty” to be accounted
for, unseen yet ubiquitous, manifest in countless shapes yet unchanging, an entity
filled with metaphysical mysteries in need of examination and explanation, which
a long roster of keen minds strive to supply: philosophers, theologians, poets, rhet-
oricians, historians, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, biologists, and
many others. (The most recent to try their hand are neuroscientists, as devoted to
the laws of beauty as any Platonist, except that they seek to find them etched not
in immutable tablets handed down from the realm of ideas, but in the soft tissue
of the brain.)
It is true that in Plato’s writings “beauty” maintains no especially close link to
“poetry” or to “art”; only centuries later will these concepts be woven into a network
that in the Western tradition is called aesthetics. Yet when the network emerges, its
nodes are understood by aesthetic theorists, even by those who decline to carry the
full weight of Plato’s philosophy, according to a Platonic model. The perplexity at the
heart of poetic experience is made to disappear with an elegant act of metaphysical
legerdemain: the poetic force of words is taken to be caused by their “poetry,” the
how by a what. (Nietzsche debunks the process by doing what good debunkers do:
he shuts out the magician’s patter and keeps the eyes fixed on his hands. An expert
demonstration of this technique can be observed in the first few pages of his essay
“On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense.”)
The Knot of Experience
The question that led us here was how something – how a configuration of words,
sounds, colors, shapes – can come to make itself felt poetically and in turn elicit a
poetic reception: how poetry can be criticized by poetry, how it can be heard so
that we may speak. We would be barking up the wrong tree (the tree of philosophy
and of science) if we sought the answer to this how in a what: in a technique, a genre,
a convention, an essence, an object belonging to the genus “art,” or in other such
conceptual determinations. The poetic is the how. It is how language-reality emerges
from language-instrument.
We won’t be able to undo the knot at the core of poetic experience, nor would we
wish to, for then the experience itself would unravel. Yet we can follow the twists and
turns that make up the knot, the better to see what kind of grip the experience has on
us. The first twist of the thread seems to pull away from the objective world and into
subjectivity. That is because of the sort of thing a poem – which just means: anything
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poetic – is. And we know what sort of thing: it is a singular thing. One way the power
of the poetic manifests itself, we said, lies in its being singular. But singular in what
way? Is the poetic something utterly new, something never before seen or heard? Yes
and no. An image, a phrase in a work of reflection (take Bachelard’s), the pause an
actor makes in delivering a line – when they arrive with poetic intensity, then I am
led to think that they have not been invented or written or performed before. But
their novelty is not exhausted by the fact that a new phenomenon has appeared
on the horizon. A solar eclipse or a stock market crash too may be singular: it
may be true that in our lifetimes there has not been an eclipse or a crash quite
like this one. Yet the event has not thereby become a poetic singularity, and not be-
cause eclipses and crashes are not poetic or artistic, but because a poetic singularity
cannot appear in a general guise. Acknowledging it is not a matter of scientific ver-
ification or collective consensus. This includes a scholar’s assurance, backed by his-
torical evidence and formal analysis, that some phenomenon – Schlegel’s fragments,
say, or Manet’s Olympia – breaks new ground. The scholar’s insight may even per-
suade me, but unless I make it my own, it is just something I read in a book. The
poetic must not only have been made singularly, but also experienced as having
been made singularly – here, now, by me.
What if I miss the poetic force that others have felt in a work, because I am dis-
tracted or a dunce? That will be my loss. I may feel shame for having failed where
others have succeeded, yet I would be mistaken to conclude that what continues
to elude me is something hard and real whose presence could be demonstrated by
objective means. The idea that aesthetic experience remains deaf to the force of con-
cepts is not new; it lies at the heart of Kant’s aesthetic theory. “If someone reads me
his poem or takes me to a play that in the end fails to please my taste,” Kant writes, I
am moved neither by famous critics trying to sway me nor by rules that supposedly
govern a successful work. Quite the contrary:
I will stop my ears, listen to no reasons and arguments, and would rather believe that those rules
of the critics are false or at least that this is not a case for their application than allow that my
judgment should be determined by means of a priori grounds of proof. (Kant 2000 [1790],
284–85)
Coming upon this one image – Immanuel Kant himself plugging up his ears against
arguments, an obstinate child shutting out the voice of reason – is fair recompense
for the hours spent navigating the long, cheerless corridors of the Critique of Judg-
ment.⁴ But its drollness should not mislead us about how far-reaching the idea is
for the enterprise of criticism. Criticism that operates with “reasons and arguments,”
Kant is saying, has no authority over aesthetic experience – none. The reasons may
 I exaggerate. One of the wonders of reading Kant is that these corridors can suddenly become the
sites of intense joy and illumination. My Thinking with Kant’s Critique of Judgment (2017) seeks out
such moments.
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be airtight or specious and the arguments well supported by evidence or not: it
makes no difference. By the same token, a piece of scholarship that places a work
in a conceptual frame – a historical trajectory, a genre, a philosophical truth, a po-
litical program, a social tendency, a technique – can be right only at the cost of
crushing what is poetic in a poetic work. Which means that most of what passes
for critical scholarship of poetic works (literary studies, art history, film studies, mu-
sicology, and so on), whatever else it does that might be of value, misses the poetic
core of those works. The thought may seem insurrectionary to professional critics;
everyone else knows that if I fail to pick up the poetic force of a work because I
am inattentive or tone-deaf, then no amount of formal or historical analysis can
make up for my failure, just as little as a meticulous study of the words someone
has uttered is able to disclose their seductive or sarcastic overtones.
Following the thread leading into the knot seems to have landed us in the thick
of subjectivity. Now it sounds as though the poetic is whatever I say it is. Is that what
we are saying? Again, yes and no.We said that acknowledging the force of the poetic
cannot happen in general, not in the “we” of science, scholarship, or common opin-
ion. (Another question crowds in: Is the snake devouring its own tail here? The “we”
of science and scholarship is being rebuffed by none other than … “we.” Is this sen-
tence not suffering from an acute case of performative contradiction? It would be if
all “we”s were created equal and if the “we” speaking here had effaced itself to chan-
nel the disembodied voice of science.) To acknowledge the poetic, a sharply con-
toured “I” is required. This “I” need not be confined to an individual: the audience
in a theater, the crowd in a stadium, or, indeed,We the People of the United States,
seeking to establish a more perfect Union, can become such an “I.”
But the poetic has not thereby become arbitrary. I cannot, led by a flight of fancy,
simply declare a thing poetic and be done with it. That is because the experience of
poetic singularity – and here is another loop in the knot – is not mine alone, walled
off from others by the boundaries of my person, by my particular tastes and distastes.
In its very makeup and quite apart from my intentions and my place in the social
order, it opens to others and calls on others. Society is woven into it. The experience
is social, and essentially so, even if it takes place on a desert island or in the solitude
of my skull, yet not social in the sense that it must align itself with the acclaim of
others. Its validation lies not in market value or in market share. Nor is it social be-
cause it typifies a social position. Poetic experience, even at its most intensely singu-
lar, exceeds myself not because sociology has revealed it to be shared with a group or
to exhibit a well-defined marker of identity (my class, my nation, my sexuality, my
geography, and the rest). It is true that my experience cannot help but emerge
from the welter of ways of knowing, feeling, judging, making, acting, speaking, imag-
ining, daydreaming, even hallucinating that have pressed on my life. And how could
it? “There is no delirium,” Gilles Deleuze has written, “that does not pass through
peoples, races, and tribes, and that does not haunt universal history” (Deleuze
1998 [1993], 4). What goes for my feverish reveries also goes for my experience of
the poetic. Yet to be haunted by history and to haunt it does not mean that my expe-
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rience adds up to the sum total of historical forces and no more. It means, rather,
that, having passed through them, it surpasses them. The experience registers the
singularity of the poetic just when it lays bare not the commonalities of shared life
but the impersonal in my person, the place where an opacity keeps me distant
from my quotidian self.
We have been tracking the loops in the knot of poetic experience. Has it brought
us anything but more entanglement? Recall how we came upon the knot. We said
that encountering the poetic – “criticizing” it, as Schlegel likes to say, hearing it
“that we may speak,” in Emerson’s words – has a shape that differs from my expe-
rience of ordinary objects. To hear and feel the poetic impulse – the élan poétique –
means hearing and feeling things in a way that takes them beyond their ordinary
ways of signifying and functioning. Familiar things – words, colors, materials, move-
ments – now have an intensity that jolts them out of known circuits of meaning and
into something unknown, something singularly new. That was our first description of
the knot. In following the thread that leads into it, we were led from objectivity into
subjectivity – from an account of the singularity that would characterize the poetic
thing to the singularity with which I receive it. Then we saw how this subjectivity
loops back out of the subject and opens to the public.
But we have not gone in one end of the knot only to emerge from the other into
the same objective world. Rather, the way my experience of the poetic relates to the
thing I encounter and to myself deforms the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity
beyond recognition.We are better off without them, since they lend a false familiarity
to what is unfamiliar. Kant’s notion of “subjective universality” is an attempt at cap-
turing this dimension of poetic experience with received philosophical terms. Its un-
gainliness acknowledges what Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of
Judgment reveals, namely that in these judgments both subjectivity and universality
are profoundly altered by the experience. Is a subjectivity “not grounded in any in-
clination of the subject (nor in any other underlying interest)” (Kant 2000 [1790], 211)
still worthy of its name? And what about a universality so toothless that it can only
issue demands for assent without means of enforcing it? Kant has zeroed in on a re-
gion of experience, flagrant in the encounter with an aesthetic object, where the sub-
ject, by reaching a point that exceeds subjectivity, achieves a negative universality. It
is the same point Emerson has in view when he says of the poet that “the deeper he
dives into his privatest, secretest presentiment, to his wonder he finds this is the
most acceptable, most public and universally true” (Emerson 2001 [1837], 64). The
knot, then, does not lead us out of the dimness of subjectivity back into the daylight
of the objective world, but urges us further into knottiness, a place where I no longer
feel my known self, but, to my wonder, find something public and universally true.
30 Michel Chaouli
Making Freedom
The poetry that Schlegel has in mind, the poetry to be criticized and the poetry criti-
cizing, is not exhausted by markers of genre or convention, we have said, not con-
fined to lyrical or elevated language. It is a more general phenomenon. In one of
his lectures, Schlegel describes it as a kind of thinking. “There is […] a kind of think-
ing that produces something,” he notes. He calls this productive thinking “the mak-
ing of poetry [das Dichten],” which “creates its material itself” (Schlegel 1964 [1804–
1805], 371). Understood this way, the key characteristic of poetry is not beauty, not
truth, not pleasure, nor is it its ability to engage moral or political quandaries, but
a creativity in thinking. Creativity must then also be the mark of any form of criticiz-
ing that wishes to maintain its citizenship in the realm of art.
But why prize creativity? Why pursue it? What does creativity create? Suppose
you heed Schlegel’s word and find ways of responding to poetry poetically: what
does this response convey? When you learn to hear that you may speak, what do
you say? Well, many things. The themes, methods, and goals of criticism practiced
in Schlegel’s or Emerson’s vein are endlessly varied, as are its forms. Your speech
may be verbose or terse, highflying or modest. Or it may cease. What you hear
may so dumbfound you, that you fall into a stutter or muteness. Yet, however varied
content and form may be, your speech – your silence included – is a poetic act. That
may not sound like much, but if you manage to perform such an act, then – besides
whatever the “content” or the “message” of your act may be – you have enlarged the
space of what you allow yourself to say or to do. By venturing something new, you
surprise yourself. You do something that you did not know you knew how to do.
This bit of extra elbowroom gives you space for new ways of acting (towards others,
towards things, and also towards yourself), ways you could not have foreseen.
Now the world has become wider and deeper. This enlargement does not merely
augment the known world, but changes its very make-up. For you have done more
than to add this one new possibility of speaking and acting stimulated by a solicita-
tion; what has also been introduced is the very possibility of proliferating the possi-
bilities that the world affords. True, the quantum of new wiggle room may be minute
and in itself hardly momentous; in the grand scheme of things, how significant could
the words be that you utter in response to the fragment? Yet your actions betoken a
profound freedom. For with even the humblest poetic act you alter the very texture of
the world: it is no longer simply there as the sum total of what presses on you and
what must be administered. No longer are you limited to responding to demands is-
suing from the environment, the way animals do, or the way we imagine animals do.
The world turns out not to be exhausted by what is given, but is now immeasurably
enlarged to include what it could become, and become through your doing. It is true
that a poetic act – hence poetic criticism – cannot become a practice; it will never
entirely be governed by a theory or shoehorned into a method. There is something
in this way of doing that surpasses the capacities and competences of a subject.
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Still, poetic making is not counterfeit making, as Western philosophy keeps charg-
ing.⁵ Its way of making is as real as any action. In poetic acts, the world, and not
its semblance, is transformed. In this way, it reveals itself as something you can
form. (Or, if you are a Heideggerian, you might just say: it reveals itself.) Even if
you manage to vary its shape by only a small degree, bending a corner here and flex-
ing an edge there, you face a world whose physiognomy has softened: what was once
an unyielding arrangement of circumstances beyond your reach, you now find to be
pliable – something given, yes, but given to be made.
What is more, the freedom to make something of this world – the freedom to say
and do what you did not know could be said and done, which is the freedom to make
poetically – this freedom has not been ceded to you by some agency, nor does it rest
in you as a silent reserve (a “natural endowment”) into which you may tap, nor has it
fallen to you by chance. Rather, the freedom to speak and act poetically comes about
in the very saying and doing. In shaping the world in some way – putting together
words or sounds or gestures “in which life becomes manifest through its vivacity” –
you make not only some object but also the very freedom needed to make that object.
You may not be able to recount the steps exactly, but there is no doubt that it was you
who shaped the added elbowroom. This elbowroom was not there all along, a pocket
of vacant space of defined dimensions waiting to be occupied, but itself has come
into being thanks to an act of poetic making. When you speak poetically in the
face of poetry, the freedom you feel in your bones is not the freedom of speech
that a sovereign has bestowed on you; if challenged, it would not help holding up
a license you have been issued. Speaking poetically brings forth the freedom that en-
titles this speech. When you surprise yourself, you do so not just with what you say
(its propositional content), but with the fact of speaking: before doing it, you didn’t
know it was permitted or possible.
And that is not all. It can happen that when you manage to hear and to speak – if
you manage – others hear your words, and hear them that they may speak. So you
surprise not just yourself, but others too, me perhaps, spurring me to make my own
elbowroom, by my own lights and in my own way. My move might in turn rouse oth-
ers, you for example, to attempt their own moves, and before long the freedom to
make the world has spread like a contagion of fresh possibilities.
What communicates itself from utterance to utterance is not a message nor an
idea, but a way of relating to the world and to myself, and it is this that provides
the sharpest thrill. For only in the actions of others does it begin to dawn on me
that I myself have acted, and not because they “reflect back” to me what I have
done; if I found in others merely what I knew from myself, I would feel flattered,
no more. But what I find is that they have taken my act – my words – in their
 Even Theodor Adorno, as constant an advocate of the aesthetic sphere as one is likely to find
among philosophers, considers their “semblance character” to be an essential feature of works of
art (Adorno 1997 [1970], 103).
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own way rather than in mine, just as I used Schlegel’s words for my own purposes
rather than his. And if they hear in my words a voice that was alien to myself,
then it is in these departures from my own ways that I may see how, when I acted,
I too departed from my habitual ways and ventured – or just stumbled – into a
new situation. It is in acknowledging what is alien to me in what others have
done that I am apt to gain an intimacy with the stranger that I am to myself.
Responding to poetry with poetry; hearing that we may speak; feeling the vivacity of
language – these gnomic formulas reveal themselves as ways of reaching for the
same idea, embarrassing almost in its plainness: they urge me to say something
new, something that might startle me with its newness. And, again, this urgency
lies not mainly in the message they carry, in a request or exhortation, but in a lan-
guage charged with enough intensity that it throws off sparks, which, with luck, kin-
dle poetic acts in those gathered around them.We might put it this way: poetic acts
do not just bring forth products, which by convention we call works of art (though
who can say where the edges of this group of things run?); they are rather acts
that, in bringing forth products, bring forth other poetic acts. And poetic criticism
is not a mode of speaking and writing that makes assertions about objects; rather
it is a mode of speaking and writing that, in making assertions, engenders more criti-
cism. You know the feeling: you read an essay or just a fragment, and you feel en-
couraged – no, urged – to sit and write. You write not to play up or play down
what you have read, nor to amplify or object, but because something you read –
the twist in an idea or an adjective that had no business being there – woke some-
thing up in you.
“Books are the best of things, well used; abused, among the worst,” Emerson
writes in the essay we have been going back to. “What is the right use?” he asks,
and provides his own answer: “They are for nothing but to inspire.” And just as
we are getting comfortable with the thought, reaching for the pencil to mark it, he
adds: “I had better never see a book, than to be warped by its attraction clean out
of my own orbit, and made a satellite instead of a system” (Emerson 2001 [1837],
59). The pencil hesitates. Are we ready to undersign this last thought? Have we not
said that we go to books to lose our way and not to keep to the path? When reading
a book, do we know when we are satellite and when system? Do we when not reading
a book? But now we see that we have let Emerson’s line warp us clean of our orbit
and put us on a satellite’s course, even though he has just told us its right use. We
read to be inspired. If that is too mawkish, then we can say instead: we hear so
that we may speak. And if that sounds too oracular, then we can say: we read –
we look, we listen, we feel – to learn to do things we did not know we could or
would or should do. Or just: to act with more freedom.
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Years ago, I began to run into the claim that we are all storytellers.¹ Storytelling was
evidently a primal communal function for humanity. I was assured that we have been
telling each other stories since the beginning of time. I felt a churlish resistance to
these proclamations, possibly because one might decide that being human does
not mean one should subscribe, without discomfiture, to everything the human
race is collectively doing at any given point. Storytelling should not be guaranteed
an aura simply because humans have been at it from the beginning of history. Of
course, part of my unease emanated from the fact that the ‘beginning of history’ is
even more of a wishful invention than the ‘end of history’ is. It occurs to me that
we probably began to hear ‘we are all storytellers,’ as an utterance, from the late
1980s and early 90s onwards. From the moment one first heard this utterance, one
was told it had been made from the beginning of time. As with various things that
happened in the age of globalization, radical shifts in our understanding (of
value, for instance) quickly acquired an immemorial air. So, for example, it became
increasingly difficult to conceive of a period in history that valued things differently
from the way the free market does. Middle-class ideology may have concerned itself
with appropriating the universal; the ‘now’ of the free market appears to have been
more preoccupied with recruiting eternity. As a result, the popular-culture term ‘all
time’ gained a new meaning with globalization; like the assertion ‘We have always
been storytellers,’ ‘all-time’ lists and ‘all-time greats’ often go back over periods,
and are applied to categories (like rock guitarists), that are actually thirty years old.
The disciplinary shifts in the humanities privileging ‘storytelling’ are too numer-
ous to go into here: I will only give one example. A historian recently told me that she
asks her students to liberate themselves from the constraints of their pedagogy by
thinking of the novel and behaving like ‘storytellers.’ As I said to her, this interpre-
tation of the novel of course inadvertently makes imaginative writing, especially fic-
tion, synonymous with storytelling: it is as if looking outside the bounds of scholarly
work towards fiction or imaginative prose as a model for loosening constraints must
privilege narrative, rather than other aspects of fiction, as being constitutive of the
liberations of imaginative writing.
A surfeit of ‘We are all storytellers’ made me realize that this was not really a
primary utterance at all. The primary utterance, if there must be one, is praise or ac-
knowledgement of what makes stories and other things possible: existence; life. By
‘life’ I mean not what narrative is ‘about,’ but what lies on narrative’s periphery.
What the earliest texts seem to do is to attempt to find a language with which to
 This article was first published in the Los Angeles Review of Books (September 20, 2019). See here
for the online version: https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/storytelling-and-forgetfulness/.
OpenAccess. © 2021 Amit Chaudhuri, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110688719-004
both come to terms with and acknowledge – even celebrate – the contingency of the
fact of existence. The story, with the human or anthropomorphized animal at the cen-
ter, emerges in the aftermath of existence, but, paradoxically, has an air of being re-
counted and a priori, of already having happened. Existence is neither a priori nor
originary; it is a moment of possibility.
In the spirit of investigating whether we were always storytellers, I went back to a
canonical text. It is from the first millennium BC: the Kena Upanishad. It felt impor-
tant to go back to it because storytelling has been almost dutifully conflated with
non-Western cultures, which themselves are often conflated with orality. Writing
and inscription are, on the other hand, an Enlightenment project. Outside the
West, in the lap of orality, our mothers and grandmothers have been telling us stories
from when we were in the womb. Story, for us, has been an autochthonic method of
nutrition.While not denying any of this, it was important to check out a primary text
from an incorrigibly storytelling culture. ‘Kena’ in the Kena Upanishad means ‘why,’
connected to the whys and wherefores of the universe. This poetic statement is from
the brief opening section of this Upanishad (note that Brahman is not to be confused
with Brahma, Brahmin, or other similar-sounding words):
Who sends the mind to wander afar? Who first drives life to start on its journey? Who impels us
to utter these words? Who is the spirit [‘spirit,’ as the Sanskritist Heeraman Tiwari pointed out to
me, is a Judeo-Christian translation of what he calls, in his translation, an all-pervasive ‘ele-
ment’] behind the eye and the ear? […] What cannot be spoken with words, but that whereby
words are spoken, know that alone to be Brahman.
What cannot be thought with the mind, but that whereby the mind can think, know that alone to
be Brahman the spirit and not what people here adore. What cannot be seen with the eye, but
that whereby the eye can see – know that alone to be Brahman.What cannot be heard with the
ear, but that whereby the ear can hear; what cannot be withdrawn with breath, but that whereby
breath is withdrawn, know that alone to be Brahman. (The Upanishads 1965, 51)
This comes across not so much as a narrative of creation as an instance of self-reflex-
ivity that is at once curiously tortured and liberating. Its meaning cannot be para-
phrased, but it can be rephrased as a series of questions and replies. ‘What cannot
be thought with the mind? Whatever it is that makes the mind think.’ ‘What cannot
be seen with the eye? Whatever it is that makes the eye see.’ It is an account that
abjures progression on behalf of the self-reflexive, of the assertion that turns upon
itself.
Here is an excerpt from the third section:
The Brahman once won a victory for the Devas. Through that victory of the Brahman, the Devas
became elated. They thought, “This victory is ours. This glory is ours.” The Brahman perceived
this and appeared before them. They did not know what mysterious form it was.
They said to Fire: “O Jataveda (All-knowing)! Find out what mysterious spirit this is.” He said:
“Yes.”
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He ran towards it and He (Brahman) said to him: “Who art thou?” “I am Agni, I am Jataveda,” he
(the Fire-god) replied.
Brahman asked: “What power resides in thee?” Agni replied: “I can burn up all whatsoever ex-
ists on earth.”
Brahman placed a straw before him and said: “Burn this.” He (Agni) rushed towards it with all
speed, but was not able to burn it. So he returned from there and said (to the Devas): “I was not
able to find out what this great mystery is.”
Then they said to Vayu (the Air-god): “Vayu! Find out what mystery this is.” He said: “Yes.”
He ran towards it and He (Brahman) said to him: “Who art thou?” “I am Vayu, I am Matarisva
(traveller of Heaven),” he (Vayu) said.
Then the Brahman said: “What power is in thee?” Vayu replied: “I can blow away all whatsoever
exists on earth”
Brahman placed a straw before him and said: “Blow this away.” He (Vayu) rushed towards it
with all speed, but was not able to blow it away. So he returned from there and said (to the
Devas): “I was not able to find out what this great mystery is.” (52–53)
Although similar in shape and tone to Judeo-Christian parables about miraculous
strength, like the one about Samson bringing down the columns, this is really a para-
ble about delicacy. After all, what is at issue here is not moving mountains, but a
straw. You do not need strength to move a straw: what is it that you need, then? Del-
icacy is non-narrative; as with writing a poem, you cannot coerce its workings. Nar-
rative and story by themselves are neither the same thing as, nor a guarantee of,
movement; this is what writers, like the mystified Devas, need to learn quickly. Oth-
erwise the straw stays inert.
I never liked reading novels. My growing up was spent consuming comic books and
poems. I was eventually drawn to novels through exceptional paragraphs cited in es-
says: by my late teens, I was probably more likely to read a piece of criticism about a
work rather than the work itself. One such paragraph occurs in A House for Mr. Bis-
was by V.S. Naipaul, where Biswas in his early life takes a new job as a sign painter
after having been a bus conductor; I encountered it in my early twenties in a critical
piece about the book in an anthology on ‘commonwealth literature’. Biswas must re-
produce the edict, “IDLERS KEEP OUT BY ORDER.”
[H]is hand became surer, his strokes bolder, his feeling for letters finer. He thought R and S the
most beautiful of Roman letters; no letter could express so many moods as R, without losing its
beauty; and what could compare with the swing and rhythm of S? With a brush, large letters
were easier than small […]. (Naipaul 1969, 76)
I was transfixed by this paragraph, and felt it was a shame that I had have to read the
novel. I was content, instead, to reread the paragraph endlessly. This is because the
paragraph presented me with a possibility. The possibility was the novel. The novel I
was presented with was not the telling, the recounting, that I would purportedly have
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to read. That act of reading the narrative, the recounting, would, in a sense, diminish
the possibility generated by this encounter with the paragraph.Where, then, are we
likely to find this moment of possibility in a piece of writing; in, say (since we are
talking about storytelling), a work of narrative fiction? To me it seems it resides in
the sort of standalone paragraph such as the one I have quoted, which belongs to
a story but is also independent of it, in that it seems equally located in an irreducible
life and textuality outside that novel as it is in the life narrated and contained within
it.
The moment of possibility resides especially in the opening paragraphs of a work
of fiction, or any paragraph that has the irresolution, the air of open-endedness and
lifelikeness, the lack of recountedness, that opening paragraphs have. The para-
graphs in the first page of a novel (sometimes in the second and third pages too)
have not been bound yet by the telling, but are opening out on to something. My am-
bition, always, was to write novels composed entirely of opening paragraphs and
then to put them in some kind of order. The order would be a sequence that was part-
ly illusory. Of course, we are experts at creating an illusion of continuity, both as
readers and writers, and I believe that if you give somebody a text without any nar-
rative, they will impose continuity on it. My subterranean aim – so subterranean that
it is taken me two decades to see what I was up to – was to create an assemblage of
opening paragraphs, to expand as much as possible, without introducing a sense of
development, the vivid lack of resolution of the first three or four pages.
What kind of text is produced by an artist who does not want the moment of pos-
sibility to be closed down by the compulsion or the need to tell? Once you commit to
telling, the moment in the opening paragraph is over. We know for a fact that many
writers have wonderful opening pages whose magic is sacrificed to higher causes,
such as observances to do with the syntax of realism, and the responsibility of por-
traying the arc of the existence of certain human beings or ‘characters’: the novelist
“must / Become the whole of boredom itself,” says W.H. Auden, who was in awe of,
and slightly bewildered by, this voluntary taking on of the depiction of social milieu
almost as a form of social responsibility (Auden 1962). This loss of the abandon of the
opening pages is characteristic of the human compromise, the deep maturity, that
the novel represents, when the writer knowingly assents to being shackled by the
need for narrative and telling. Naipaul himself is a fundamental example of a writer
who sometimes begins with astonishing passages of lifelikeness, but then not so
much loses the plot, or loses himself to a plot, but takes on upon himself fetters
that are clearly unwanted. Joan Didion recognizes this and expands on the peculiar
sensory excitement of the first three pages of Naipaul’s Guerrillas, which she confess-
es to compulsively rereading, almost as if the rest of the novel did not really matter
(Als 2006). In the novella In A Free State, Naipaul translates, with extraordinary vi-
tality in the opening section, an intuition of possibility into a story about a European
man and woman who must journey urgently and impulsively out of an African coun-
try in the time of a coup (Naipaul 1971). Then, like his two characters, he seems not to
know what to do except see the journey through. As the syntax of narrative takes
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over, not only does the representation of the journey feel increasingly entrapping, but
– as is often the case with Naipaul when he feels unhappy – by most standards mo-
rally and politically peculiar, turgid, and alienating.
Something similar happens in his travelogue An Area of Darkness (Naipaul 1964).
Towards the beginning, a period of waiting is described: the ship, on its way to India,
has stopped at the port in Alexandria. Nothing happens; horse-drawn cabs are await-
ing fares. Few arrive, and melancholy settles in. This melancholy is a form of excite-
ment, just as the waiting-for-something-to-happen is a kind of energy unmatched by
the events later narrated in the book, the actual encounter with India, which is the
book’s legitimate subject. For Naipaul, as possibility recedes (and possibility, for
him, as the chapter on Alexandria shows, has little do with optimism), questionable
moral judgement begins to dominate: this is his response to the cost of succumbing
to narrative propriety – not so much ‘becoming the whole of boredom itself,’ but an
alienated chafing.
A House for Biswas opens with a short prologue, where everything is indetermi-
nate and proleptic. It begins, “Ten weeks before he died, Mr Mohun Biswas, a jour-
nalist of Sikkim Street, St James, Port of Spain, was sacked,” and then goes on to
dwell, for five pages, on Biswas’s house, a house that is “flawed” and “irretrievably
mortgaged”: “during these months of illness and despair he was struck again and
again by the wonder of being in his own house, the audacity of it” (Naipaul 1969,
7).We are suspended here, in the prologue, with Mr Biswas, between arrival and de-
parture. Naipaul manages to stay throughout with this sense of the possible, and he
does this by constantly returning to Biswas’s disbelieving conviction, even at the end
of the novel, that the house on Sikkim Street is a house he has just begun to live in:
“In the extra space Mr Biswas planted a laburnum tree” (583). In my edition, 583 of
590 pages have gone by when this sentence appears; and yet, despite all that has
ensued and is now finished, we are still absorbing the prologue’s “wonder” and “au-
dacity” (7) of arrival.
Arrival, like existence, and unlike story, lacks the air of the a priori and the nar-
rated. In The Enigma of Arrival, the ship that paused at harbor in An Area of Darkness
appears again, but this time in a de Chirico painting that gives both its title and its
atmosphere of lapsed expectancy to the book. Midway through the novel, the narra-
tor reflects that the painting is about a ship that sailed into a city, and a man who got
off at the port and intended to go back, but forgot to: “The antique ship has gone. The
traveler has lived out his life” (Naipaul 1987, 92). The inadvertent forgetting of the
matter of going back, rather than the creation of a new existence, becomes this per-
son’s story, as it does the narrator’s. Forgetting and possibility become, then, inter-
changeable; the life is never really recounted. It – the novel; the painting – does
not contain the tale of an immigrant; it represents an attempt at immersion in a be-
ginning, what Naipaul calls ‘arrival,’ involving an action endlessly postponed, which
the narrator encapsulates with the words, “The traveler has lived out his life.”
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How do we construct a page composed of opening paragraphs? One is reminded, of
course, of Walter Benjamin’s ambition to write a book composed entirely of quota-
tions. A quotation for him, as in his essays on Franz Kafka, is also a paragraph;
for my younger self, for reasons I mentioned earlier, and maybe for my present
self too, a paragraph is a quotation. A novel is an assemblage of paragraphs or quo-
tations, which both belong to the narrative and outside it. A quotation in an imagi-
native work – say, an essay – causes unsettlement. It is there not as evidence, to le-
gitimize a claim, as it might in a scholarly work, but to remind us that the narrator is
distracted, that they have made an association, and have been momentarily led from
the text to another text outside it. The quote is not wholly present in the narrative; it
is partly elsewhere. So the quote does not just further an argument; it leads to an
opening up. The paragraph, as I understand it, must have the same sense of not
being wholly present that the quotation, in Benjamin’s sense, does.When Benjamin
speaks of his ambition to write a book composed entirely of quotations, he is speak-
ing of a method of building that brings together units that belong, but also do not
wholly belong, to the argument or narrative. A quoted paragraph for him is a stand-
alone paragraph, because it comprises a possibility that makes recounting – that is,
the rest of the narrative – redundant. If the paragraph is at least doubly located in
fiction, then one location lies in fiction’s purported task, the recounting of a life;
the other lies outside it, in acknowledging what is more powerful than ‘story’ –
the present’s contingency.
I have not forgotten that this piece has to do with ‘forgetfulness and storytelling,’ for
which reason I wish to look at the opening section of Kafka’s Metamorphosis in Mi-
chael Hofmann’s translation:
When Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from troubled dreams, he found himself changed into a
monstrous cockroach in his bed. He lay on his tough, armoured back, and, raising his head a
little, managed to see – sectioned off by little crescent-shaped ridges into segments – the ex-
panse of his arched, brown belly, atop which the coverlet perched, forever on the point of slip-
ping off entirely.
“What’s the matter with me?” he thought. It was no dream. There, quietly between the four fa-
miliar walls, was his room, a normal human room, if always a little on the small side. Over the
table, on which an array of cloth samples was spread out – Samsa was a travelling salesman –
hung the picture he had only recently clipped from a magazine, and set in an attractive gilt
frame. It was a picture of a lady in a fur hat and stole, sitting bolt upright, holding in the direc-
tion of the onlooker a heavy muff into which she had thrust the whole of her forearm.
From there, Gregor’s gaze directed itself towards the window, and the drab weather outside –
raindrops could be heard plinking against the tin window ledges – made him quite melancholy.
“What if I went back to sleep for a while, and forgot about all this nonsense?” he thought, but
that proved quite impossible, because he was accustomed to sleeping on his right side, and in
his present state he was unable to find that position. […]
“Oh, my Lord!” he thought. “If only I didn’t have to follow such an exhausting profession! On the
road, day in, day out. The work is so much more strenuous than it would be in the head office,
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and then there’s the additional ordeal of travelling, worries about train connections, the irregu-
lar, bad meals, new people all the time, no continuity, no affection. Devil take it!” He felt a light
itch at the top of his belly […].
He slid back to his previous position. “All this getting up early,” he thought, “is bound to take its
effect. There are some other travelling salesmen I could mention who live like harem women. […]
If I didn’t have to exercise restraint for the sake of my parents, then I would have quit a long time
ago; I would have gone up to the director and told him exactly what I thought of him. He would
have fallen off his desk in surprise! That’s a peculiar way he has of sitting anyway, up on his
desk, and talking down to his staff from on high, making them step up to him very close because
he’s so hard of hearing […].” (Kafka 2007, 75–76)
What is striking is how both Gregor and the narrator have forgotten what the central
predicament and theme are, or are incapable of grasping their centrality. Gregor is
more concerned with the difficulty of turning on his side in his present state, a dif-
ficulty that impedes his plan to sleep a bit longer; he is made melancholy by the
sound of rain; he will soon become aware of the unfairness of train schedules; in
the meantime, he is incensed by the memory of his boss’s posture. Another writer,
a lesser writer, would not have permitted this losing sight, so early on, of the immen-
sity of what has happened. But the liberation of the opening pages of Metamorphosis
comes from their inability to be absolutely present, their vacillation between being in
the story of a man who has become a giant insect and their forgetting of this story
and their leakage into something outside it: the matter of living, with its timetables
and trains, which is supposed to feed its experiences into the story but also competes
with and is unconscious of it.
There is another kind of forgetfulness here: that of objects, or what in literary
works we call ‘detail’. The picture of the woman “sitting bolt upright”; the gilt
frame; the coverlet; the tin window ledges; the rain – these seem not to be fully con-
scious of being part, as background, of a story of a man who finds he is a giant in-
sect. Their role is not even ironical, as, according to Auden, the role of the animals
and humans in Breughel’s painting of Icarus’s fall into the ocean is: “how everything
turns away / Quite leisurely from the disaster” (Auden 2007, 87). In Metamorphosis,
detail is not so much indifferent to the disaster as it to being in a story about a dis-
aster; its location is both in the story and independent of it. So a narrative with an
easily paraphrasable centrality of focus becomes, instead, an example of multiple
and dispersed openings out. Its details have their counterpart not in Breughel’s Ica-
rus, or in realist fiction, or in period or genre cinema, but in Abbas Kiarostami’s mov-
ies,where non-professionals are often not playing characters but themselves, and are
not fully mindful that they are in a larger story. They are in the film and outside it.
The same can be said of animals, air, water, and trees in a Tarkovsky film, or in a film
like The New World by Terence Malick: that all these are non-professional actors un-
aware of playing the role of the characters ‘animal,’ ‘air,’ ‘water,’ and ‘trees’ respec-
tively, but are, inadvertently, themselves. They emanate, if you notice them, an innate
forgetfulness of the story they are in, as do the paragraphs I have mentioned. In this
regard, the details I am discussing are quite unlike those in period or sci-fi films,
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where objects, horses, elephants, and things exude, like the protagonist, an aware-
ness at every point of being either in history or in the future, two easily recognizable
categories that embody further modulations on the recounted air of storytelling.
Jean Paul Sartre was intrigued by the idea of the adventure. An adventure, of course,
is another name for story: for children, ‘adventure story’ is a tautology. Here is Sar-
tre’s narrator in Nausea:
[F]or the most banal event to become an adventure you must (and this is enough) begin to re-
count it. This is what fools people: a man is always a teller of tales, […] he sees everything that
happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if you were telling a story. But
you have to choose: live or tell. (Sartre 1964, 56)
In other words, we do not, cannot, know we are in an adventure or in a story. The
same can be said of history: no one is really aware of living in a historical epoch.
Conversations with people who have participated in historic situations, whether it
is a performance by John Coltrane or the partition of a country, confirm this unknow-
ingness: all they recall is what it was like to be present at that time. But forgetfulness
is absent from historical novels or films, as it is in films about the future; both the
past and future are assembled by bringing together markers of history – turbans,
togas, or forelocks – or the future: spaceships and space. Even space lacks forgetful-
ness in films like 2001: A Space Odyssey, whose story is already, a priori, being nar-
rated as the ‘future.’ Space, in Stanley Kubrick’s film, becomes a metaphor for the
‘homogenous empty time’ of history that Benjamin says makes the idea of man’s
progress possible: the historicism that imbues our notions of the futuristic and his-
torical is enacted succinctly in the film’s opening: an ape from a prehistoric epoch
flings a bone into the air which, ascending in ‘homogenous empty time,’ becomes
a spaceship.
Yet, both Kubrick in Barry Lyndon, and certainly Tarkovsky in historical films like
Andrey Rublov, or in his science fiction-based cinema, Stalker and Solaris, reject the
notion of the ‘adventure.’ The ‘background’ in these movies adheres, on one level, to
what Sartre calls “the most banal event”; for instance, one of the first signals we re-
ceive in Solaris of dissonance does not have to do with science fiction appurtenances,
but a horse wandering outside a block of sixties’ houses; the second signal, which
also comes early, occurs when a tunnel a man is driving through takes inordinately
long to end: the tunnel, a very recognizable urban feature (this bit, set in Russia, was
apparently shot in Japan, testimony to a certain kind of mid-century urbanization
available in various cultures), seems to loop in upon itself without in any other
way being remarkable. The horses, spaceships, horsemen, and stretches of grass
or space in Tarkovsky’s films, and in Barry Lyndon, possess not identifiable charac-
teristics that mark them out as futuristic or historical, but a disorganized banality, a
forgetfulness of the role they’re playing in the setting. As a result, both the past and
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the future are, in these movies, undifferentiated from the non-homogenous present
in which we live.
What is the relation between living and telling on the one hand, and between living
and writing on the other? The prevalent model for life’s relationship to telling is that
we live, gather material, and then pour or transform that material experience of liv-
ing into something that comes out of it: the story we consequently tell.
In my understanding, however, the moment of writing converges with living ran-
domly. There is no decision about transforming into a story material that has been
previously experienced or collected; instead, one arrives at a juncture at which
there is an unexpected sense of possibility for the writer: I include all of us when
I use that word. This sense of possibility comprises what I am calling ‘writing,’
which need not involve putting pen to paper or sitting down to write an inaugural
sentence – as the act is portrayed in Hollywood films, where the ‘writer’ might be
a fictional character or Hemingway or Fitzgerald, poised significantly at the typewrit-
er to start a novel. The physical act of writing, or making that break from life when
one sits down to commit oneself to embarking on a work is a reification, a reduction
of the actual intimation of a beginning, a possibility that writing actually continually
constitutes.
Let me give you an example of what I mean. You are looking at the cover of a
book and want to own it, to buy it. You study the cover, transfixed by it, and then
you do not read the book. You are transfixed not only because you want to read
what is contained within, but because you have begun in a sense to compose or
write what is within. The story that is given to you by the book has become secondary
to the story you have begun to write. This is the moment of writing. But you have not
written anything; you are arrested by what you see on the cover. You buy the book; in
fact, you buy many such books, transfixed by them for one reason or another – it
could be the jacket or title; it could be your reading, in the bookshop, of the first
page – and then you put them on the shelf, as a covert gesture towards the perpetual
imminence, the possibility, of writing. Your sense of ownership has to do with own-
ing the story, but the story is not to be reduced by recounting, by telling: the story is
always to be a possibility, which is why the books on our bookshelves that we do not
read outnumber the books that we do. Our bookshelves are largely made up of books
that we do not read. These are our ongoing moments of writing – a self-generated
accumulation of writing as possibility.
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Here is an invitation; or, to put it a little more suspiciously, an interpellation:
Come live with me and be my love,
And we will all the pleasures prove,
That valleys, groves, hills, and fields,
Woods, or steepy mountains yields. (England’s Helicon 1887, 229)¹
The words of the passionate shepherd, as he has come to be known, were first print-
ed in 1599 in a verse anthology attributed to William Shakespeare and titled The Pas-
sionate Pilgrim. They had already been sung in a play, Shakespeare’s Merry Wives of
Windsor, two years before, which may have encouraged the Pilgrim’s editor in his
fraud. (It was no honest mistake: the book is full of other poems Shakespeare
didn’t write, and would likely rather have died than write.) Much later, in 1653,
Izaak Walton’s meditative angler heard a milkmaid singing, and got the attribution
right, recognizing “that smooth song which was made by Kit. Marlow, now at
least fifty years ago” (Walton 2014, 58).² In between, the lines were transcribed
into countless commonplace books by admiring readers; transcribed, and often al-
tered, adapted, reimagined, under various names, or no name at all. In that first
printing, and also in the second, the anthology England’s Helicon, they are followed
by a poem in response:
If all the world and love were young,
And truth in every Shepherd’s tongue,
These pretty pleasures might me move,
To live with thee and be thy love. (England’s Helicon 1887, 231)
In Pilgrim, there are only these four lines; in Helicon, where Marlowe’s name first ap-
pears, the printer includes what is now usually given as the full text of both poems,
which acquire there the titles under which they have mostly traveled since, “The Pas-
sionate Shepherd to His Love” and “The Nymph’s Reply to the Shepherd.” Scholars
attribute the second to Sir Walter Raleigh, ten years older than Marlowe, a courtier
who had enjoyed, in the course of long service, both high favor and dangerous
scorn from Queen Elizabeth. His poem is a counterargument; whether to call it a cri-
tique is a question to which I will return. For the moment, I will observe that in mak-
 I quote both poems from England’s Helicon. For the texts in The Passionate Pilgrim, see Shake-
speare 2002, 365–366.
 Walton’s transcription includes a sixth stanza added to the second edition which, as his editor Mar-
jorie Swann relates, “otherwise survives only in the Thornborough Commonplace Book and a broad-
side in the Roxburghe Collection” (Walton 2014, 249–250).
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ing his answer, Raleigh follows his original closely: he adopts the form of Marlowe’s
tetrameter couplets, and he echoes the language, the constellations of words and
also phrases, especially “live with me and be my love.” His poem is an answer,
and also an imitation.
In carrying over such phrases, Raleigh anticipates Schlegel’s advice to the poetic
critic in the review of Wilhelm Meister that has given the present discussion its basic
terms:
The poet and artist […] will want to represent the representation anew, and form once more what
has already been formed; he will add to the work, restore it, shape it afresh. He will only divide
the whole into articulated parts and masses [Glieder und Massen], not break it down into its orig-
inal constituents, which in respect of the work are dead things, because their elements are no
longer of the same nature as the whole […]. (Schlegel 2002d, 281; Schlegel 1967, 140)
As I understand Schlegel, a phrase like “poetic critique” can stand for any number of
tense antitheses that animate his philosophy – I am not sure we should call them
dialectical; probably better to say, as he would, ironic, meaning that each term
stands off slightly from the other and sees it from a certain distance, even as they
are compounded in a single concept. “Irony is the form of paradox,” he claims in
his Critical Fragments, and adds, with characteristic enthusiasm for the topic, “para-
dox is everything simultaneously good and great” (Schlegel 2002a, 241).³ Another
such tense pairing is that of part and whole. “In poetry too,” he writes in his Critical
Fragments, “every whole can be a part and every part really a whole” (239). Part and
whole are perspectives, and to perceive both simultaneously is to attain to a “clear
consciousness of eternal agility, of an infinitely teeming chaos” (Schlegel 2002c,
264). The ironic multiplication of perspectives is an opening onto the infinite. Such
claims do not exactly amount to a method, but the Meister essay has a practical rec-
ommendation for splitting the difference. The poetic critic should divide the whole
into “articulated parts and masses.” Not, however, all the way down to its original,
simplest constituents; into molecules, we might say, but not into atoms. What is at
stake is the survival of the original in the text that critiques it. Cut a work into its sim-
ples, and you “destroy his living unity” (Schlegel 2002d, 281), which is exactly what
the ordinary, scalpel-happy critic habitually does. The poetic critic, by contrast, will
work with parts large enough, articulated enough – parts with parts – that the design
of the original, the voice, the style, the genius, remains alive and active. In writing
about the object of his criticism the poetic critic is willing to be like it, to admit its
principles of organization, its mustering of parts, into his own making.
Perhaps such an account captures something of Walter Raleigh’s relation to
Christopher Marlowe. But I do not want to read Marlowe and Raleigh from the stand-
 I refrain from calling Schlegel’s antitheses dialectical because though the terms provide perspec-
tive on each other, and the result is an increasingly comprehensive understanding, that relation does
not develop in the specifically historical way that Hegel would describe.
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point of Schlegel; my project here is to read Schlegel, and to read us, Schlegel’s in-
heritors, from the standpoint of Marlowe and Raleigh. That will mean taking up that
early modern, rhetorical concept of imitation, which is alien to Schlegel’s philosoph-
ical poetry – alien because imitation is the practice basic to the rhetorical regime that
Schlegel’s Romanticism rejected; and to some extent, alien to contemporary literary
studies, too.⁴ Marlowe and Raleigh were exceptionally gifted students under that hu-
manist regime, in the version that prevailed in Elizabeth’s England. Both learned, at
grammar school and at university, to write an oration like Cicero and to write verse
like Horace, or Ovid. To study was always to study models, the practice known as imi-
tatio. The analytic technology of rhetorical theory was at their fingertips, but the cri-
teria of success were, first, sounding like your original (not standing back from it,
stylistically or analytically), and second, and ultimately, turning the rhetorical free-
dom such study cultivates to the work of persuasion – whether in academic dispu-
tation or, if you found favor there, at court.⁵
So, imitation: this mode of composition after models, pedagogical and makerly: what
way of writing, what way of knowing, is it? In a moment, I will return to the passion-
ate shepherd, but let me make some very general proposals first. The most funda-
mental is from Aristotle, that a human being is an imitative animal, and “learns
first by imitation.”⁶ Imitation is basic to us. Present-day neuroscientists make the
point on their own terms, describing the circuit of our mirror neurons, which fire
sympathetically when we observe the actions of others, as though we were perform-
ing those actions ourselves.⁷ To understand, on such accounts, is to imitate. This kind
 Stephen Halliwell discusses the “undoubtedly widespread Romantic rejection of mimesis” in The
Aesthetics of Mimesis (Halliwell 2002, 360); though he gives a subtle account of how the concept was
preserved, at the expense of its technical, skilled aspect, distinguishing, as Schegel’s brother August
Wilhelm did, between “‘imitation’ [Nachahmung] as external ‘aping’ [nachäffen] and, on the other
hand, imitation, in a less than transparent formulation, as the adoption or appropriation of the prin-
ciples of human action” (Halliwell 2002, 361). The classic study of the problem in English poetry is
M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition. See also note
8 below.
 The classic essay on imitatio remains G.W. Pigman’s “Versions of Imitation in the Renaissance.”
David Riggs gives an excellent description of what this training meant for schoolboys in The World
of Christopher Marlowe (Riggs 2004, 25–77). See also my own Scenes of Instruction in Renaissance Ro-
mance (Dolven 2007, 15–64).
 According to Aristotle, imitation is “natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the
lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns first by imi-
tation” (Aristotle 1984, 1448b5).
 There is an active scientific debate about the role of mirror neurons in social life, especially their
relation to empathetic understanding, but evidence is clear that some neurons fire both in action and
when in observing the same action in someone else. Mark Johnson discusses the humanistic possi-
bilities of the idea that “understanding requires simulation” in The Meaning of the Body (Johnson
2007, 164). Alfred Gell, in his Art and Agency, approaches the same question as an anthropologist.
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of understanding – and there is a long, sturdy tradition stretching between Aristotle
and the MRI – is not the product of an adjustment of range, as in close or distant
reading, analysis or overview.⁸ It is an identification, adopting the actions, the behav-
ior of another, discovering the how of it by doing it. Not a question of far and near,
but of outside and inside; and so much of the outside is inside, already imitated, al-
ready in our bodies, before we begin to reflect upon it.Which is to say that imitation
is not always, or even primarily, deliberate. The rhetorical discipline of imitatio can
therefore be understood as an effort both to exploit and to regulate an imitative ap-
petite for the ways of others. Imitation, in writing, is mediated for the student of rhet-
oric by the terms of art that crowd the field of rhetoric, but the model, and its cha-
risma, are still foremost. Imitation is a feedback loop, in which the maker is
constantly adjusting the made thing according to the criterion of the object, conform-
ing the text she makes to the text she reads. What she makes is an imitation of the
maker, too, one made out of herself.
The dangers of such a model of knowledge are obvious enough, in a critical age:
is this not a pedagogy of conformity? If imitation requires immersion, absorption, ar-
guably submission, what becomes of critical distance? Is such a thing as critical imi-
tation possible? In making an answer, let me turn back to Marlowe and Raleigh, and
then to John Donne,who is one of many poets to continue the little tradition Marlowe
started. The original poem is a charming pastoral enticement. It is also, it should be
said, already self-skeptical. It piles gift on gift, a generous, rustic copia – but the gifts
tend toward manufacture, starting with a bed of roses and a cap of straw and ending
up with gold buckles and amber studs. Innocence turns gradually to artifice. The
poem has a peculiar double ending, too, bringing the first line back to close the pe-
nultimate stanza, then doing it again, as though against some implicit resistance:
A belt of straw and ivy buds,
With coral clasps and Amber studs;
And if these pleasures may thee move,
Come live with me, and be my love.
The shepherd swains shall dance and sing
For thy delights each May morning:
“To see (or to know) is to be sensuously filled with what is perceived, yielding to it, mirroring it – and
hence imitating it bodily” (Gell 1998, 100).
 Walter Benjamin is a twentieth-century touchstone, and he takes a long retrospect: the imitative
faculty, he argues, is something modernity has eroded; the analytic power to recognize similarity
is “nothing but a rudiment of the once powerful compulsion to become similar and to behave mim-
etically. There is perhaps not a single one of his higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does
not play a decisive role” (Benjamin 2004–2006, 2.720). Michael Taussig’s Mimesis and Alterity is an
influential recent account of how “the practice of mimesis in our day” is “inseparable from imaging
and thinking itself” (Taussig 1992, 70). I discuss the basis of style in imitation, and its relation to a
history of maker’s knowledge, in my Senses of Style (Dolven 2018, 110–121).
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If these delights thy mind may move,
Then live with me, and be my love. (England’s Helicon 1887, 230)
Has she said no, the first time? There is a subtle hardening of his stance from invi-
tation, “if […] come,” to a more strenuous, not to say coercive logic, “if […] then.” In
this internal doubling, or tripling, the poem anticipates its successors, returning to
that pristine original invitation under increasing suspicion. Is it therefore already
self-critical? An instance already of poetic critique? Self-imitation does open up a dis-
tance inside the poem, when the reader measures ending against beginning, the dif-
ference between imitation and mere repetition. But for a university man like Mar-
lowe, such a subtle show of cynicism, and still subtler threat, would find a ready
audience among his sophisticated peers. The poem stands only so far away from it-
self.
Raleigh’s response is closely studious of its model. It tracks Marlowe’s list-mak-
ing, his syntax, the structure of his argument, including the double ending. The work
it wants to do, it does from the inside. His intervention – the objection of his nymph –
is to point out that the shepherd has forgotten about the passage of time. I have al-
ways wondered if Raleigh’s nymph does not hear the clock ticking even in Marlowe’s
first line, “Come live with me and be my love,” where the transit from “live” to “love”
is almost a conjugation, from present to past, as ‘drive’ to ‘drove,’ or even ‘tick’ to
‘tock.’ Be that as it may, the imitation makes the problem explicit. Notice the beau-
tiful diminuendo of the fourth stanza:
Thy gowns, thy shoes, thy beds of roses,
Thy cap, thy kirtle, and thy posies,
Soon break, soon wither, soon forgotten,
In folly ripe, in reason rotten. (231)
Six gifts become three verbs of damage and loss, resolving finally to the two halves of
an open-and-shut maxim. It is a wonderfully artful undercutting of Marlowe’s sea-
sonless bounty, one that unsettles the more because it accepts so many of the
terms of its original. Is this, then, poetic critique? The likenesses are indexes of dif-
ference, measured from the inside looking out, rather than the outside looking in.
That said, such revenges against the carpe diem tradition are their own kind,
which Raleigh inhabits as a matter of conventional counter-convention. He inquires
somewhat less into the motives of his nymph than Marlowe does of his shepherd.
What then of John Donne? Here is “The Bait,” in its entirety:
Come live with me, and be my love,
And we will some new pleasures prove
Of golden sands, and crystal brooks,
With silken lines and silver hooks.
There will the river whispering run,
Warmed by thy eyes, more than the Sun;
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And there th’enamoured fish will stay,
Begging themselves they may betray.
When thou wilt swim in that live bath,
Each fish which every channel hath,
Will amorously to thee swim,
Gladder to catch thee, than thou him.
If thou to be so seen be’st loth,
By Sun or Moon, thou dark’nest both,
And, if my heart have leave to see,
I need not their light, having thee.
Let others freeze with angling-reeds,
And cut their legs with shells and weeds,
Or treach’rously poor fish beset,
With strangling snare or windowy net.
Let coarse, bold hands from slimy nest
The bedded fish in banks out-wrest,
Or, curious traitors, sleeve-silk flies
Bewitch poor fishes’ wand’ring eyes:
For thee, thou need’st no such deceit,
For thou thyself art thine own bait;
That fish that is not caught thereby,
Alas, is wiser far than I. (Donne 2010, 134– 136)
Donne likely wrote this poem during his miscellaneous years as a personal secretary
and minor official in London, in the very late sixteenth, perhaps early seventeenth
centuries; he must have seen its predecessors in manuscript, or he read a copy of
England’s Helicon. He takes up Marlowe’s opening lines, but already with a small
perversity: the modulation from meadow to brookside, and the barb of the silver
hook dangling at the end of the last line. (That pun on “line” is active throughout.)
The tetrameter and the rhyme scheme are inherited, and handled with equal skill.
The catalogue of gifts is inherited, too, but altered, not just, as in Raleigh, negated.
Donne’s speaker lists not objects, but features of the waterscape flattering to the ad-
dressee, how her eyes will warm the cold water, and how the fish will come to pay
amorous tribute. (Forsaking their freedom as they come: Donne admires the latitude
of a fish, that “every channel hath” in the three-dimensional meadow of deep water;
it is this freedom they will give up for her.) If she is reluctant to be seen, fear not, her
beauty will so outshine sun and moon that they will be darkened by the contrast,
and he will see her by her own radiance. Flattery, flattery, flattery, even as the invi-
tation has shifted, from “come live with me,” to “strip and bathe for me.” Raleigh’s
time-lesson has been learned by someone.
But only tacitly.With the fifth stanza, Donne changes tack. (Perhaps because his
line of persuasion is not working? – the labile rhetoric of the poem invites us to imag-
ine it as an act of seduction in real time, adapting to its target throughout.) “Let oth-
ers freeze with angling reeds,” he says; let those other fishermen injure themselves in
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the chase, deceiving the fish with snares and nets and lures. “For thee, thou need’st
no such deceit, / For thou thyself art thine own bait.” The passionate fisherman’s ar-
gument has been pointing toward this moral, if “moral” is the word, as he tangles
his own admiration with that of the amorous fish – the fish that correspond with
the shepherd’s sheep in the original, yes? – and it feels like a natural conclusion,
a final act of flattery decorously transposed out of pastoral for sheer variety’s
sake. But a little tug on those lines draws up the snare. What does it mean, to be
your own bait? This woman, to whom he is speaking – she must be a fisherman
too, but one who needs no lure, needs no mediation; who need neither labor, nor
lie; her beauty perfects her agency. Then again, recall that she is the object of the
fishes’ attention, too, each fish “Gladder to catch thee, than thou him”; and of
course, it is she for whom the speaker is fishing, perhaps with the bait of the
poem. If she is the catch, and also her own bait – how is that different from the de-
sirability of the object of desire? Is not beauty always its own bait? Donne’s bait and
switch, if you like, has dangled the promise of a fisherman’s agency before his catch,
but the poem catches the flickering light we read by like a fly tied from a silken
sleeve.
You could say, in the language of twentieth-century critical theory, that Donne’s
poem is an exercise in immanent, rather than transcendent, critique; it is involved
with the language of its object, used as leverage against itself; it looks for no fulcrum
elsewhere. As Adorno puts it, in his essay “Cultural Criticism and Society”: “A suc-
cessful work, according to immanent criticism, is not one which resolves objective
contradictions in a spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of harmony
negatively by embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its inner-
most structure” (Adorno 1997, 31). A good poem, that is, is critical by being complicit.
For Adorno, this is true of the object of study (the poem), and it will necessarily be
true of the study itself. Donne’s study establishes between itself and its predecessors
a set of analogies – shepherd to fisherman, sheep to fish, nymph to both; analogies,
not to say complicities – in order to examine the contradictions that emerge. There is
the collapsing triangulation of the nymph as her own bait; and the more stubborn
triangulation with the other fisherman, who are her competitors, or are they his?
(At all events they, not she, would seem to be the audience for the mock-abjection
of the final lines.) Such ingenious permutations make for a skeptical anatomy of
the tradition into which “The Bait” is entered, as a critical intervention of exceptional
rigor and determination. The question is, what is the gain of imitation, imitatio – of
the specific skill by means of which Donne makes his entry?
There is something to be learned from comparison with a much later contribu-
tion to the chain of replies, William Carlos Williams’ “Raleigh Was Right”:
We cannot go to the country
for the country will bring us
no peace
What can the small violets tell us
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that grow on furry stems in
the long grass among lance-shaped
leaves?
Though you praise us
and call to mind the poets
who sung of our loveliness
it was long ago!
long ago! when country people
would plow and sow with
flowering minds and pockets
at ease—
if ever this were true.
Not now. Love itself a flower
with roots in a parched ground.
Empty pockets make empty heads.
Cure it if you can but
do not believe that we can live
today in the country
for the country will bring us
no peace. (Williams 1991, 2.88–2.89)
Williams’ poem may be an answer – or a taking sides – but it is no imitation; not
rhythmically, not in diction, not even in the “Come live” tag that is the poem’s second
name.⁹ And though its own anti-pastoral sentiments are sympathetic, it stands far
enough outside its original that it has little power to critique its tradition. There is
no real feeling for what the genre meant, nor how it might have been transmuted,
over time, nor for the specificity of Raleigh’s response; and though the poem betrays
a certain obdurate longing,Williams’ speaker acknowledges no complicity, no entan-
glement. It is historically symptomatic of its own moment – how could it not be – but
it does not attempt historical understanding; and if there is some pathos in its rejec-
tion of history (“long ago!”), still, the rejection itself is largely successful.
Perhaps Williams’ poem is something like an instance in poetry of what for
Schlegel would be ordinary critique; the kind of critique Adorno might call transcen-
dental, for standing apart from its object, setting up criteria that are removed, un-
compromised. It has resolved its object into primitive parts for analysis that carry
with them no risk of contamination. Imitation is an alternative to such transcenden-
tal detachment. Still, it is not, in fact, the alternative that Schlegel has to offer, and I
 Though John Beer, who heard me present this paper at the Poetic Critique conference, observed
afterward that the lines “but do not believe / that we can live today” reprise Marlowe’s live/love con-
jugation, and that Williams might be taken to be exploring something like the seductions of disen-
chantment; the speaker is enjoining his own listener to a shared cynicism that the poem wants to
expose, rather than endorse. So read, the poem is still no imitation, but takes a critical attitude to-
wards its anti-pastoral attitude (and the title, “Raleigh Was Right,” comes to seem calculatedly, ex-
aggeratedly peremptory and defensive).
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want to conclude by sharpening that difference, in order to suggest that there is a
specific critical power in imitation that is not to be derived from the post-Romantic
critical tradition; a distinct version of poetic critique that Schlegel may glimpse, but
cannot follow. I said earlier that imitation, as a basic practice, was alien to him. Here
he is, in the Athenaeum Fragments of the same year, discussing the translation of the
Classics.
393. In order to translate perfectly from the classics into a modern language, the translator
would have to be so expert in his language that, if need be, he could make everything modern;
but at the same time he would have to understand antiquity so well that he would be able not
just to imitate it but, if necessary, recreate it [zugleich aber das Antike so verstehn, daß ers nicht
bloß nachmachen, sondern allenfalls wiederschaffen könnte]. (Schlegel 2002b, 257; Schlegel 1967,
239)
That re-creation recalls his sense of the poetic critic’s power to “add to the work, re-
store it, shape it afresh.” Translation sounds a good deal like imitation. But it is im-
portant that understanding, verstehen, and imitation, nachmachen, come in that
order, both in his sentence, and in the career of the translator.¹⁰ “Where we should
exercise to know,we exercise as having known” (Sidney 1973, 112), says Philip Sidney
in 1580, in his great Defense of Poetry. By exercise, he means imitate, and it is natural
to him to think of imitation and translation as modes of coming to know, from which
understanding should be derived. That is not how Schlegel thinks, nor is it native to
the critical tradition, poetic or otherwise. So, while his poetic critic refuses the de-
tachment of analysis – “Why,” he asks, “should we not both breathe in the perfume
of a flower and at the same time, entirely absorbed in the observation, contemplate
in its infinite ramifications the vein-system of a single leaf?” (Schlegel 2002d, 273) –
the perfume and the vein-diagram are both modulations of a receptive sensibility.
They are not maker’s knowledge, let alone impersonation. They are interdicted
from imitation.
But here is Schlegel again, just a year later, in his Critical Fragments:
55. A really free and cultivated person ought to be able to attune [stimmen] himself at will to
being philosophical or philological, critical or poetical, historical or rhetorical, ancient or mod-
 Schlegel makes the same point, insisting on the same priority of understanding to imitation, in
his On the Study of Greek Poetry, which he wrote in 1795: “Only he who thoroughly knows [ganz kennt]
Greek poetry can imitate [nachahmen] it” (Schlegel 2001, 77; Schlegel 1979, 331), he says, and again:
“One cannot properly imitate [nicht richtig nachahmen] Greek poetry as long as one does not actually
understand [gar nicht versteht] it” (Schlegel 2001, 84; Schlegel 1979, 347). Schlegel’s attitude in that
text toward imitation is complicated, but his references to imitation as a technical skill, to “slavishly
imitative artists who only imitate the particular” (Schlegel 2001, 58), are unfailingly disparaging. His
ideal of imitation is directed not at the work but at the spirit it conveys: the genius does not allow
himself “to be restricted by the peculiarity that the outward form, the husk of the universal spirit,
may still yet carry with it” (Schlegel 2001, 47). Halliwell discusses this attitude in The Aesthetics of
Mimesis (Halliwell 2002, 360–363).
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ern: quite arbitrarily, just as one tunes an instrument, at any time and to any degree. (Schlegel
2002a, 242; Schlegel 1967, 154)
Attunement is not imitation. But there is something in this ideal person of the rhet-
orician’s versatility, the cultivated skill of the imitator, the student who can tune what
she makes to the objects of her study. If Schlegel denounces the “countless legions of
derivative imitators [nachahmende Echokünstler]” (Schlegel 2001, 30; Schlegel 1979,
239) in his own moment, he shares some of the humanists’ ideals of attunement.
There is a great and, at the present moment, neglected pedagogical power in the ex-
ercises that build that capacity; one might say, coopting Schlegel’s argument, that
imitation, in taking over contiguous words and thoughts, might keep the original
alive in the hand and mouth of the student. That is no small thing in itself, at a mo-
ment when the humanities are struggling for enrollments. (And when creative writing
is thriving.) There is a special critical potential in imitation, too. Donne manipulates
lyric structures from the inside, immanently, exposing otherwise invisible contradic-
tions. Imitation has a power to open up the difference from the original as an exem-
plary contradiction, by its variances, and by its exaggerations, the strategic hypertro-
phy of the imitator’s skill. (Hal Foster has discussed a strain of contemporary art that
practices critique by “mimetic exacerbation” [Foster 2017, Ch. 3]; John Donne might
find himself in good company there.) And that is a skill that comes only by its prac-
tice.
And then again – with all that said, there is, in the provisional self-surrender of
the imitator, in that absorbing feedback between maker and model, something that
resists assimilation to post-Romantic critique; at least, to that variety of critique that
depends for its power on strict difference from its object. It is a resistance that makes
imitation a more provocative alternative to such critique than description, say, or sur-
face reading, the critical opposites for which so much contemporary literary argu-
ment has reached, in its search for other ways of reading.¹¹ “Come live with me
and be my love” is an ideal test of imitation’s powers and its risks, for it is just
what we are afraid of: that the poem will interpellate us into its form of life; that
in loving it we will lose our ability to think freely, objectively. But to be a truly
free and cultivated person – and here, let “cultivated” refer to the practical, learnable
skills of poem-making; skills anyone can learn – to be a truly free and cultivated per-
son means you can choose when to imitate, when to step back, and not demand that
the contradiction be reconciled in advance.
 It strikes me as a contemporary blind spot that critics discontent with critique as a mode of en-
gagement have not looked to the long pedagogical tradition of imitation; it speaks to the institutional
separations between faculties of creative writing and literature. The touchstones for the current de-
bate in the United States are Rita Felski’s The Limits of Critique (2015), and the series of responses
to it published in PMLA; also influential has been Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, “Surface Read-
ing: An Introduction” (2009).
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If one asks: what is poetic critique, or criticism, can one then avoid raising a further
question, namely: why should there be such a thing as poetic critique, or criticism, in
the first place? Perhaps it is only by trying to answer this question, and in so doing
echoing the answer to the initial question before it is given, that one will find the
grounds on which to provide an idea of poetic critique, or criticism. Only if one
can feel the urgency of poetic critique, or criticism, the urgency, the need, perhaps
even the necessity, and communicate this feeling to others in a persuasive manner,
can one develop a convincing idea of such critique, one that proves less vulnerable
to the objections of arbitrariness and abstraction, futility and gratuitousness.
It may be helpful in this context to restrict oneself to the domain of art rather
than attempt a universal justification. Indeed one could argue that in the case of
art the critique or criticism that elucidates it, or some of its aspects, requires the qual-
ification that the adjective ‘poetic’ supplies, simply because without it there is a risk
of missing something important about art, namely and trivially its resistance to prop-
ositional speech or communicative discourse. For as long as there is art and we wish
to engage with it, no matter how unlikely its existence may seem or precisely because
its existence seems so rather unlikely, what calls for some kind of poetic critique, or
criticism, is the enigmatic nature or the enigmaticalness of artworks, that which can-
not be rendered intelligible and comprehensible by way of a series of propositions
about art, or about the artwork as a given object. In other words, unless one takes
art to be enigmatic in a sense to be established, poetic critique will hardly be
more than a fanciful endeavor for aesthetes, or a diversion for academics not so
keen on being treated as serious professionals.
It is art itself, whose enigmaticalness extends into the unlikeliness of its own ex-
istence, it is the artwork as the enigmatic and enigmatically unlikely result of an in-
tentional activity, that generates the need for poetic critique and at the same time
suggests what it is that such critique must achieve. Art, a product of the mind and
the body and not a fact of nature, to put it in old-fashioned terminology, must appeal
to the mind, to spirit, on the basis of its enigmaticalness, which perhaps exceeds the
very distinction between art and nature. This appeal gives birth to poetic critique or
criticism and begins to clarify its idea.
Poetic critique or criticism must partake in art; it must echo the artwork, by
showing the limits and limitations, the insufficiency of propositional speech, or com-
municative discourse. Of course this demonstration has to be inseparable from the
performance itself. To call critique poetic, to say that it must partake in art and its
engimaticalness, means to acknowledge the inseparability of demonstration and per-
formance that is brought about by the artwork itself. It is by performing a poetic cri-
tique of art that the limits and limitations, the insufficiency of propositional speech
or communicative discourse are highlighted, not by demonstrating them in the ab-
OpenAccess. © 2021 Alexander García Düttmann, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
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stract or in a merely conceptual manner. Insisting on the performative aspect of po-
etic critique means that such highlighting cannot take place in propositional speech
or communicative discourse. The idea of poetic critique as a critique of art is the idea
of a participation in an enigmaticalness that binds together inextricably performance
and demonstration, existence and non-existence, as if each echoed the other. Poetic
critique does not proceed to solve the riddle so as to relieve the artwork’s beholder of
the burden enigmaticalness places upon him.
It is the idea of a semblance: in critique demonstration, conceptual elucidation is
meant to prevail, and the poetic is supposed to serve it, to serve propositional speech
or communicative discourse. In truth, however, the performance of poetic critique
renders the demonstration just as enigmatic as it appears to be in the work of art.
One may be tempted to assert that this cannot be so in the instance of poetic critique
because of its reliance on the concept and the critical powers it bears. Yet is it not
often the case that artworks seem bereft of enigmaticalness only because one expects
them to stage some subtle or ostentatious mystification which critique is meant to
strip away, laying bare what they are all about?
But surely poetic critique’s acknowledgement of the inextricability of perfor-
mance and demonstration, existence and non-existence, to be found in art, is not
the same as the inextricability itself? It flags a difference that is often considered
to indicate a self-reflexivity of art. Art becomes self-reflective when elevated to, or
taken up by, poetic critique. Poetic critique awakens art to an awareness of itself,
a cognitive awareness that determines, sublates, potentiates it above and beyond
its own limits. And if poetic critique is to participate in art when cognizing it, then
either art must come to an end, reveal a conceptual nature that eventually allows cri-
tique to shed the poetic guise it has to adopt, or it must inscribe itself in a both re-
ceptive and productive connectedness, in a continuity of ever higher, more reflected
formations that it helps to establish and that will carry art to the absolute.
Yet ultimately enigmaticalness and reflexivity must remain incompatible with
each other since nothing truly enigmatic can become aware of itself, grow sufficient-
ly self-aware for cognition to solve the enigma in the course of an absolute, or infin-
ite, reflection. The difference between art and poetic critique – between, on the one
hand, the inextricability of performance and demonstration, of existence and non-ex-
istence, and, on the other hand, its acknowledgment – is the uncertain difference
that lies in an echoing. For it belongs to the definition of an echo that its effect can-
not be reduced to passivity, and that its passive and active moments can never be
told apart. An echo that does not fool the one who hears its sound or its voice, an
echo that is not a reminder of something more powerful, of a reverberating other-
ness, an echo that does not double the simulacrum it produces, ceases to be an
echo. Jacques Derrida, a contemporary master of poetic critique, though perhaps
one who would have had reservations about using this expression, repeatedly stress-
es the otherness of echoing. When referring to the myth or legend of Echo and Nar-
cissus in the Metamorphoses, he speaks of echoing as a “junction” (Derrida 2003a,
10; translation A.G.D.) where repetition encounters the “unforeseeable.” He also pla-
58 Alexander García Düttmann
ces the otherness of echoing at the very core of one’s relationship to oneself, as an
otherness that complicates the alleged sameness of this relationship, and the narcis-
sism inherent in it (Derrida 2003b, 204; translation A.G.D.).
In the wake of such remarks, one could speculate that the idea of poetic critique
entails a similar complication. It affects the work of art’s self-sufficiency from within,
as it were. For is the work of art not an achievement that seeks to be self-sufficient? If
so, then it generates more than just one kind of enigmaticalness, the enigmaticalness
of an echoing of performance and demonstration that keeps disrupting its unity and
that calls for poetic critique. It does so to the extent that self-sufficiency must always
come across as enigmatic.
The otherness of poetic critique is, then, not to be sought in its conceptual scope
or in its critical powers, in what its judgement may reveal about the work of art,
about its truth or its worth, but in its own undecidable echoing of the undecidability
that the artwork’s echo establishes between performance and demonstration. Doubt-
less poetic critique creates its echoing with other means than the work of art. It cre-
ates it with the means of concepts that accomplish critical work. In poetic critique,
however, the otherness of means remains subservient to the otherness of an undecid-
able echoing that, as such, must defy conceptuality.
The idea of poetic critique is the idea of an echoing that captures and reproduces
an echoing. Performance and demonstration, existence and non-existence keep
echoing each other undecidably in the artwork, and it is this strange echoing, the
echoing of conflicting tasks – the task of performance and the task of demonstration
– and the echoing of nothing – the nothingness of non-existence – that is echoed in
poetic critique. As an echoing of an echoing, the idea of poetic critique becomes also
perfectly superfluous. Paradoxically, then, poetic critique is all the more superfluous
the more the need for it makes itself felt.
It would fade away if the otherness of the artwork’s echo, of the echoing of per-
formance and demonstration that produces what is perceived as essentially enigmat-
ic about an artwork, let itself be captured and reproduced. And it would fade away if,
conversely, the otherness of poetic critique’s echo could not surprise the artwork in
its turn. However, such surprise is only to be had if poetic critique admits its super-
fluousness.
The enigmaticalness of artworks is due to the inextricability of performance and
demonstration that resists propositional speech and communicative discourse. It is
due to a radical finitude that makes art hover between existence and non-existence,
as if its intrinsic reluctance to identification and instrumentalization, its enormous
difficulty and disarming simplicity, kept it constantly emerging from, and receding
back into, non-existence. But the enigmaticalness of artworks is also due to the
need art creates for poetic critique, for participating critically and poetically in the
artwork, and to the sensation of shame that must overcome whoever experiences
such need, as if touching upon the enigmaticalness of the artwork were a symptom
of incontinence, a comportment utterly alien to art. One cannot feel the need for po-
etic critique without feeling that it is a superfluous and possibly harmful undertak-
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ing, an intrusion that will prove unable to participate in the artwork and, as a con-
sequence, will precipitate its destruction. Shame delays the satisfaction of the need
for poetic critique but also protects it against a compulsive denial of the fact that,
with each creation of an artwork, spirit, Geist, accomplishes something, independ-
ently of how enigmatic and unlikely this accomplishment may be.
A short passage from Adorno’s posthumously published Aesthetic Theory¹ can
put to the test the idea of poetic critique developed so far, especially since it places
some emphasis on the effect of echoing. This passage, the only one in the book in
which the author quotes an entire poem and comments upon it, opens with a rejec-
tion of the conventional distinction between hermetic and non-hermetic artworks,
which is then, with a gesture characteristic of Adorno’s thought, reintroduced in a
radicalized fashion. The hermeticism of so-called hermetic artworks, artworks that
are deemed almost incomprehensible, is only an indication of the enigmaticalness
that defines art in general, Adorno states. Hermetic artworks are, comparatively
speaking, more comprehensible than artworks that are traditionally and commonly
considered to be easily accessible and that under closer scrutiny turn out to be pro-
hibitively intricate. Hidden “behind their galvanized surface” (Adorno 1970, 186), a
surface of universally shared opinion that is meant to preserve them, they withdraw
into themselves and will not come out again. The echo has stopped resounding. To
stress enigmaticalness by creating a purposefully hermetic work of art is an attempt
to tame the enigma’s intractability. But to conjure it away by relating to a work of art
as if it had been understood once and for all is unmistakable evidence of the enigma
remaining as intractable as it must be. If, consequently, hermetic art can never attain
the same hermeticism to which non-hermetic art aspires, then there is perhaps al-
ways something slightly disappointing about it, something that does not quite mea-
sure up to art’s challenge and worth, something that misses the enigmaticalness of
art. Adorno does not say this in so many words, yet his observations on the dynamics
of hermetic and non-hermetic art seem to point to such a conclusion.
He then gives a first account of the enigmaticalness of art, of its irreducible
though not unvarying hermeticism. It is supposed to result from the transformation
concepts undergo when they enter art’s domain. Adorno resorts to an example and
asks: what happens when Georg Trakl uses the word “sonata” in his poems? His an-
swer to this question is startling because it seems to imply that the transformation
the concept of “sonata” undergoes when it enters the domain of art, of poetry, of
Trakl’s poems,when it ceases to function in “communicative discourse” (187) and be-
gins to contribute to art’s constitutive enigmaticalness, is that it is no longer used in
the same manner in which it is used in technical musical language. Surely a musi-
cologist’s discourse is a rather special instance of “communicative discourse.” Surely
the word “sonata,” as rare as its usage in ordinary speech may be, tends to be em-
 In the following, I will refer to the page numbers of the German edition of Ästhetische Theorie,
while using – and from time to time modifying – the English translation (see Adorno 1997, 122– 124).
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ployed in a much vaguer fashion when it is not a specialist who is speaking. In fact,
it tends to be employed quite similarly to the manner in which it is used in the poem,
so that this example proves a strange one for the linguistic transformation, the trans-
formative “borrowing” of terms art is supposed to accomplish, a “borrowing” that
renders enigmatic what seemed comprehensible in the first place. In the poem, Ador-
no observes, sonata no longer designates an “entity,” a “construct,” or a “formation”
that is “highly articulated, motivically and thematically wrought, and internally dy-
namic.” (186) It no longer designates a musical “entity” whose “unity is a clearly dif-
ferentiated manifold, with development and recapitulation.” Rather the concept
turns into an evocative name, as if “sonata” in the poem came much closer to reveal-
ing its essence than in the discourse of the musicologist, fulfilling a communicative
function rather than fostering the enigmaticalness of art – unless, of course, it is self-
evidence that is truly enigmatic in the end. But what transpires from the musical ex-
ample and also from the other examples given in the text, is that the work of art op-
erates a sort of deactivation of unambiguous or obvious meaning. The semantic force
that the usage of the word “sonata” obtains in Trakl’s poems derives from the impos-
sibility of saying exactly what it means. It is this force that must be regarded as enig-
matic. At times it has a stabilizing effect, creating a powerful “imago” (186), a com-
memorative or unconscious representation endowed with a certain autonomy that
summons, deepens, and intensifies comprehension. But it can also have a destabiliz-
ing effect, making meaning in an artwork, and the meaning of the artwork itself, un-
certain and ambiguous, ungraspable in terms of a proposition or a constative utter-
ance. Thus, the poetic usage of the copula “is” may draw it near to its own negation
despite a negative particle not being added to it. The copula acquires an enigmatic
force that stems from the undecidability as to whether it is actually used affirmative-
ly, as a positive “existential judgement.” This force produces “pale afterimage[s]”
(187) that let the initial meaning turn into its very opposite, or dither between the
original and the simulacrum, as if its echo infused it with otherness. Perhaps one
could say that it is the force of a trace, a trace that is never a presence or an absence.
Before quoting Mörike’s “Mousetrap Rhyme” (Mausfallen-Sprüchlein), a poem
that is a sort of spell since it acts as a mousetrap, Adorno points out the similarity
and the dissimilarity between an artwork and a judgement. He speaks of an analogy:
artworks and judgements are similar in that they are both determined by a synthesiz-
ing power. While a judgement attributes a predicate to a subject, brings subject and
predicate together conceptually, or cognitively, by identifying them, a work of art
gathers all its different and heterogeneous elements mimetically so that they can
be recognized as belonging to it. Yet works of art do not judge; they do not state
something or carry a message that would convey their meaning. They are, as it
were, judgements without judgement, judgements that have been deactivated but
not erased, judgements that preserve their form and at the same time remain
empty. Adorno writes, “[w]hat works of art amount to, that which establishes their
unity, cannot be formulated as a judgement, not even as one that they may contain,
that they issue explicitly or state in words and sentences” (187; trans. modified). That
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critique, art criticism, must be poetic in view of art’s enigmaticalness, means, as can
be gauged from Adorno’s argument about the transformation that elements, linguis-
tic elements, undergo when art appropriates them, that it needs to pay attention to
the echoing such appropriation causes. It needs to prolong and reinvent an echoing
that can consist in a “yes” reverberating as a “no,” or a “no” reverberating as a “yes,”
without, however, affirmation simply collapsing into negation, or, conversely, nega-
tion into affirmation.
The “discursive content” of the “Mousetrap Rhyme” reproduced in the passage
on the hermeticism, the enigmaticalness, the transformative force of art, restricts
the poem, as Adorno remarks, to a “sadistic identification with what civilized custom
has done to animals disdained as parasites” (187, trans. modified). In truth, this con-
tent, the meaning of the child’s enticing and taunting of the mouse, with whom it
wishes to perform a dance after dinner, in the moonlight, a dance in which its old
cat is supposed to join, is suspended at the very moment the poem enounces it.
So rather than celebrating a ritual of liquidation, the poem is said to denounce it,
and to do so by keeping the gist of a deadly ritual, by following its rules and
never exiting the “gapless immanence” of the celebration. Subordination does not
confirm this “abominable” and “socially conditioned ritual” (188) but transcends
it through its unflinching linguistic reflection, or repetition, as if art consisted in
turning the “gesture” that takes something for granted against itself. “Sadistic iden-
tification” no longer has “the last word” in a poem that seems to be entirely consti-
tuted by it, that does not simply refer to a preceding social condition but that creates
this condition within itself, performance and demonstration being inseparable
though not identical: “Form, which shapes verse into the reverberation of a mythical
spell, suspends its disposition” (187).
Yet, having reached this insight into the enigmaticalness of art, the reader of Aes-
thetic Theorymay well wonder about two claims that pertain to the argument Adorno
puts forward. For could the poem ever produce its echoing effect, could it ever link
performance and demonstration in an inextricable and undecidable manner, if it did
not partake in “sadistic identification” at all, in the staging of a ritual that does not
simply exist outside it, regardless of how much this ritual is “socially conditioned”?
Must the force needed to overcome “sadistic identification” not be broached from the
identificatory force itself, at least if a logic of repetition, of echoing, is to be at work
in the poem Adorno examines? Is there not an irreducible ambiguity to echoing in-
asmuch as art “borrows” from reality, or better still from “communicative discourse,”
and thus cannot avoid recreating reality and drawing on “communicative discourse?”
And if it is precisely art’s abstention from judgement that results in judgement, in an
act of holding court and indicting, as Adorno maintains, is one statement not then
replaced by another, a statement that contradicts it but a statement nonetheless,
no matter how tacit the critical denunciation remains? Does the inverting repetition
of statements not submit the echoing effect to “communicative discourse” and re-
duce art to one of its manifestations, a manifestation bereft of enigmaticalness?
Can the blinding “mythical” spell that identification perpetuates, “sadistic identifica-
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tion” and the identification distinctive of judgements, ever be broken by a discourse
of critique, or negativity?
At the exact juncture in the text where these questions arise for the reader, Ador-
no inserts a gnomic phrase: “Echo reconciles.” (188) How does one read this phrase?
How does one listen to it? Can the reconciliatory force that Adorno bestows upon
Echo, upon the echoing effect, reconcile the conflict that traverses and disrupts it,
the conflict between echoing as standardized, as deceptive, as evidence of a spell,
all forms of echoing to be found in the work of the philosopher, and echoing in
art, echoing as that which prompts reconciliation, brings consolation, and defines
love? “There is no love that is not an echo” (Adorno 1980, 248/217), Adorno writes
in his Minima Moralia. If one takes echoing to be standardized, deceptive, or evi-
dence of a spell, one will probably hear the gnomic phrase “Echo reconciles” as
an apodictic statement, a statement that does not allow for any kind of objection
or appeal, hesitation or uncertainty. One will hear it as a statement that does not
mean what it says. If, however, one takes echoing to be an effect indistinguishable
from a cause and capable of prompting reconciliation, bringing consolation, and de-
fining love, then one will probably here the same phrase differently, as an infinitely
discrete, tenuous and receding utterance.
In his reading of Mörike’s poem, Adorno recalls the “involuntarily friendly image
of child, cat, and mouse dancing, the two animals on their hind legs” (Adorno 1970,
188). Reconciliation lies here in the divergence between what is willed, “sadistic
identification,” and what is suggested, “friendliness.” It is as if the reconciliatory
force of echoing, of the echoing that takes place between two images that exist
only as and in one single poem, that are the same and yet different, that have
both reinforcing and releasing qualities, depended upon a deactivation of the will
because reconciliation is not something that can be willfully sought. The reconcilia-
tion Echo, or echoing, achieves has nothing to do with a voluntary process. Echo’s
otherness, the otherness of a noun that might be a proper name, is not the otherness
of an intention aiming at reconciliation rather than at identification, whether in the
sense of an identification with violence or in the sense of a violent identification of a
subject. Adorno’s reading of Mörike’s poem is a piece of poetic critique inasmuch as
the gnomic phrase “Echo reconciles,” this phrase whose succinctness functions as
an author’s signature and whose elliptical reservedness escapes authorship altogeth-
er, echoes the echoing of performance and demonstration in the “Mousetrap
Rhyme.”
Nothing and no one can guarantee that a performative force of reconciliation
emerges from the artwork, from its echoing of performance and demonstration,
least of all the artist, the author, the poet. Hence it is reconciliation as a performative
force that makes art fundamentally enigmatic. The difficulty of poetic critique called
forth by the enigmaticalness of art is the difficulty of love that Adorno emphasizes in
Minima Moralia: “All is over if what one finds for the other [was man für ihn findet]
no longer reaches him” (Adorno 1980, 248/217). Inasmuch as what love finds to give
to the other is always an echo that comes from the other, poetic critique that can no
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longer reach the artwork, the artwork’s otherness, has lost its feel for the echoing ef-
fect, its ability to love. It looks for meanings or messages conveyed by the artwork,
ignoring the fact that the artwork has absorbed and transformed them, and that they
are not essential but accidental features of art. It misses out on the “infinite” (Adorno
1970, 188) that artworks harbor within themselves, the true “infinity” that Echo and
echoing alone disclose.
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Jonathan Elmer
On Not Forcing the Question: Criticism and
Playing Along
1
Critics are contemptible. How else can we explain the stream of taunts and mockeries
directed at them? Critics are, first of all, wannabes: they wish they were artists, but
they aren’t. This leads to a pervasive envy, captured well in Susan Sontag’s summary
judgment: “Interpretation is the revenge of the intellectual upon the artist” (Sontag
1990 [1966], 7). Critics wish to share in the glory of the artist, but they don’t: “I have
been all over the world and I have never seen a statue of a critic.” (This gibe is var-
iously attributed to Jean Sibelius or Leonard Bernstein.) The more exorbitant the ar-
tistic ambition, it seems, the greater the contempt for those who merely interpret.
Gustave Flaubert, a man with ambitions, implies that the creative defect in critics
is analogous to the moral defect of spies: people “write criticism because they are
unable to be artists, just as a man unfit to bear arms becomes a police spy” (Flaubert
1979, xv). Elsewhere, Flaubert makes his moral point differently: “Criticism occupies
the lowest place in the literary hierarchy; as regards form, almost always; and as re-
gards ‘moral value,’ incontestably. It comes after rhyming games and acrostics,which
at least require a certain inventiveness.” (xv)
Incompetent, resentful, underhand, policing – such is the standard litany of the
critic’s faults. In these attacks, the critic is always in a derivative relation to the artist
and the artwork; he is a parasite, a kind of tick. This attitude toward critics is neither
new nor rare; I certainly could have chosen other examples.What I want to empha-
size is the intensity of feeling that animates this current of thought, and the grandi-
osity of its terms. A statue for the artist! Greatness lies with the artist, paltriness with
the spying critic. The whole relationship seems colored by very basic, even primitive,
experiences and fantasies, as if “His Majesty, the Baby (Artist)” felt constantly hem-
med in, controlled, misunderstood, or disciplined by some witnessing or surveilling
presence – the critic as a never “good-enough” minder.
In any case, that is the direction I want to travel in this essay. I wish to consider
the problem of ‘poetic critique’ as encompassed in this scenario of a creative actor
and a witnessing other. The twinning of creator and witness is, in one sense, existen-
tial: every human act, creative or otherwise, is born into a world in which others have
come before. The witnessing other may enable this creative act, like oxygen helping
the spark to flame, or might disable it, a wet blanket thrown over that spark too soon.
But as is signaled by my riffing above on psychoanalytic mottos – “His Majesty, the
Baby” (Freud) and “good enough mother” (Winnicott) – I also take psychoanalysis to
be a privileged discourse for any inquiry into the question of poetic critique. That is
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because the work of analysis is always a joint production of patient and analyst.
What is brought forth through the complex weave of unconscious materials, transfer-
ence effects, and interpretation is new meaning that is also always old: it is both poi-
esis and critique. The psychoanalytic situation suggests that while the creative and
the interpretive are necessarily co-present dimensions, they are not co-incident –
just two names for the same thing – nor, for that matter, are they fully separable.
I will argue, in fact, that the question of the relation of the creative and the critical,
of that which brings newness into the world – poiesis – and that which works on
what is found in the world, may benefit from not being broached at all.
My warrant for such an approach is the work of psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott.
Here is perhaps the best-known statement of his influential ideas about the transi-
tional object, about illusion and play, and the witnessing presence necessary to
such play:
The transitional object and the transitional phenomena start each human being off with what
will always be important for them, i.e. a neutral area of experience which will not be challenged.
Of the transitional object it can be said that it is a matter of agreement between us and the baby
that we will never ask the question: ‘Did you conceive of this or was it presented to you from with-
out?’ The important point is that no decision on this point is expected. The question is not to be
formulated. (Winnicott 1991 [1971], 12)
Winnicott remains focused on this “neutral” or “intermediate” (11, 13, 105) area of
experience for his entire career. It is, he believes, the very ground of creative “expe-
riencing” (2, 6, 14) in all of life (he often uses this odd gerund to keep our eye on proc-
ess rather than product). If this passage through the “experiencing” of a zone of “il-
lusion” (3, 11) – the word illusion, we should point out, derives from in-ludere, in
play; – if this zone is not happily traversed, it is likely the child will have troubles
in life, will find it hard to consider life meaningful. These transitional phenomena
in which the relation between subjective and objective is not broached are,Winnicott
believes, essential for human being in its totality:
It is assumed here that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no human being is
free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided
by an intermediate area of experience which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.). This inter-
mediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is ‘lost’ in play. (13)
The swiftness and the unobtrusiveness with which Winnicott jumps from the minu-
tiae of child analysis to the furthest reaches of “culture” can make it hard to grasp
the claim he is making. The child “lost” in play, the child with whom the interpreting
other has a tacit agreement not to force certain questions, is in “direct continuity”
with any grown person participating in the aesthetic and religious dimensions of
life.What we learn from child psychoanalysis, in other words, may be fruitfully trans-
posed to analyses of the arts. This is hardly a new idea. Psychoanalysis has never
shied away from extending its interpretive domain beyond the consulting room;
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Freud himself was very interested in using the tools of psychoanalysis to interpret
artists, artworks, and aesthetic experience more generally. But there is something
in Winnicott’s work – in his style of presentation as much as in the content of his
ideas – that is unique in the psychoanalytic canon, and that suggests other lessons
than Freud’s might be available.
Adam Phillips argues that the “genre of simplicity in which Winnicott writes, a
wry version of pastoral, is in fact a kind of elusiveness. But the shrewd ingenuous-
ness of his writing, unprecedented in the psychoanalytic tradition, is consistent with
one of his therapeutic aims: to protect the privacy of the self in the making of person-
al sense and, by the same token, personal non-sense” (Phillips 1988, 14). This seems
right, and also complicated: on the one hand, the explanatory reach claimed by Win-
nicott’s idea of this unforced “neutral zone” – “arts, religion, etc.” [emphasis mine] –
is exorbitant, and Winnicott might thereby be said to display some of the grandiosity
I was flagging above. On the other hand, this grandiosity is displayed in such a re-
cessive and “elusive” manner that it is hard to know if one has understood it correct-
ly. Some of this is due to Winnicott’s strong predilection for the passive voice: “Of the
transitional object it can be said”; “The important point is that no decision on this
point is expected”; “The question is not to be formulated.” Passivity is so charged
for Winnicott that, as Barbara Johnson has remarked, objects themselves are invested
with agency so that their own pathos can be registered: the transitional object’s “fate
is to be gradually allowed to be decathected […] It is not forgotten and it is not
mourned. It loses meaning” (Johnson 2008, 100). When Phillips writes that Winni-
cott’s style “is consistent” with his “therapeutic aim” to “protect the privacy of the
self,” it is both the patient’s self and his own that Winnicott has in mind: “The
need of the self to be both intelligible and hidden that he found in his patients is
reflected in his style.” (Phillips 1988, 14)
At the same time, Winnicott’s elusiveness, his desire to remain hidden, is curi-
ously vulnerable and exposed.¹ It is this simultaneously recessive and vulnerable
posture toward the work of psychoanalytic interpretation that sets Winnicott apart.
In one paper, he invokes the proverbial armchair philosopher only to suggest that
if the philosopher gets out of his chair and on the floor with the playing child things
would look different.Winnicott’s elusiveness is deployed from a position on the floor,
as it were. Compare this to Freud in his famous analysis of the child’s game of fort-da
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Doing everything he can to keep a distance from the
context of his observation, Freud refers to his grandson drily as a “little boy of one
and a half” (Freud 1961 [1920], 8); and perhaps to keep at bay any worries that his
family relationship to the child has led him to impute cleverness where there is
none, Freud makes clear that the “child was not at all precocious in his intellectual
development” (8). How, finally, does Freud come to understand that the “loud, long-
drawn-out o-o-o-o” is in fact the word “fort”? He does not tell us; he merely reports
 On the importance of “self-exposure” in criticism, see Chaouli 2013.
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that the child’s “mother and the writer of the present account were agreed in think-
ing” (9) that it was so. Reading this passage with Winnicott in mind, we might re-
mark that here, too,we have a kind of exhibition of hiddenness. But there is a crucial
difference: in Freud’s case the several layers of recessiveness – an obscured family
relation, avoidance of the I, passive voice – are in service to analytic power rather
than the kind of “vulnerability” we find in Winnicott. “One day I made an observa-
tion that confirmed my view” (9), Freud writes, and goes on to describe the famous
play with the spool. “The interpretation of the game then became obvious” (9). Case
closed.
Child analysis was never a central concern of Freud’s, even as his forays into this
practice (think of “Little Hans”) foreshadowed important developments in the psy-
choanalytic tradition. Winnicott was a pediatrician before he was an analyst, but
even if he had not been, he might well have steered toward the interpretation of chil-
dren, since the two dominant schools of psychoanalysis in Britain, those of Anna
Freud and Melanie Klein, relied so fundamentally on child analysis. Winnicott was
a major figure in what has come to be called the “Third Way,” along with Marion Mil-
ner, Masud Khan, and others. In “Playing: A Theoretical Statement,” Winnicott sig-
nals his divergence from Klein, in particular: “in so far as she was concerned with
play,” it was “almost entirely with the use of play” (Winnicott 1991 [1971], 39). She
moves too efficiently, Winnicott suggests, from observation to interpretation, as
Freud for example moves from the fort-da game to the “obvious” interpretation
that this game meant “mastery.” The “psychoanalyst has been too busy using play
content to look at the playing child,” Winnicott writes, “and to write about playing
as a thing in itself. It is obvious that I am making a significant distinction between
the meanings of the noun ‘play’ and the verbal noun ‘playing.’” (40)
What, exactly, is Winnicott’s disagreement with Klein? What’s the difference be-
tween “play” and “playing”? Klein’s clinical acumen was much celebrated, and her
innovations in the technique of child analysis were widely influential. It is also true
that Klein took an extremely active interpretive posture, something that, from her
earliest papers, she argued was necessary:
As soon as the small patient has given some sort of insight into his complexes – whether through
his games or his drawings or phantasies – I consider that interpretation can and should begin.
This does not run counter to the well-tried rule that the analyst should wait till the transference
is there before he begins interpreting, because with children the transference takes place imme-
diately. (Klein 1949 [1932], 47)
With small children, Klein explains, separation between conscious and unconscious
behavior is only tenuously in place,with the result that many defenses (such as those
inhibiting transference) are not present. At the same time, anxiety is much more dis-
abling in many children than in many older patients. This anxiety also calls for early
intervention. A girl of three that Klein calls Trude “exhibited […] much anxiety at her
very first coming.” Klein tells us that “in such patients prompt interpretation was the
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only means of lessening anxiety” (53). Children present special problems calling for
swift and vigorous interpretive intervention.
Reading Klein can be a harrowing experience, not only because the clinical ma-
terial from small children is so often violent and florid, but also because her own in-
terpretive vigilance is so unrelenting. Klein’s last publication was a detailed case
study of a ten-year-old boy, Richard, whom she treated during the war. Here is a
taste of what it is like:
Richard […] often feared that a nasty man – a kind of tramp – would come and kidnap Mummy
during the night, […].
Mrs K. asked how he thought the tramp would get into Mummy’s room.
Richard said (after some resistance) that he might get in through the window: perhaps he would
break in.
Mrs K. asked if he also wondered whether the tramp would hurt Mummy.
Richard (reluctantly) answered that he thought the man might hurt her, but he, Richard, would
go to her rescue.
Mrs K. suggested that the tramp who would hurt Mummy at night seemed to him very much like
Hitler who frightened Cook in the air-raid and ill-treated the Austrians. Richard knew that Mrs K.
was Austrian, and so she too would be ill-treated. At night he might have been afraid that when
his parents went to bed something could happen between them with their genitals that would
injure Mummy.
Richard looked surprised and frightened. (Klein 1961, 20–21)
This exchange comes from the first session. The analysis continues in this vein for
another four hundred pages.
At ten years of age, Richard is more verbally fluent than many of Klein’s younger
patients. But play with toys is as swiftly reduced to its unconscious meaning as Ri-
chard’s verbal material: “[I]n the first hour,” Klein writes of Peter, not quite four years
old, “his knocking together of the two carriages and horses had been followed by his
remarking that he had got a new little brother. So I continued my interpretation and
said: ‘You thought to yourself that Daddy and Mummy bumped their thingummies
together and that made your brother Fritz be born’” (Klein 1949, 42). Whatever the
efficacy of Klein’s clinical work – and there seems to be lots of evidence that she
helped her young patients very much – her interpretive method cannot help seeming
aggressive. There is, in the end, a known code to which fantasies can, and must, be
reduced: the code of oedipal feelings, primal scenes, the entire Freudian armory that
is unquestioningly invoked even as it is constantly being revised and reshaped by
Klein’s clinical experience. Toys bumping = thingummies bumping. “In so far as
she was concerned with play,” Winnicott had remarked about Klein, it was “almost
entirely with the use of play” (Winnicott 1991 [1971], 39). The child’s use of play, and
hers. The idea that play, as an act of creativity, would express the “need of the self to
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be both intelligible and hidden [emphasis mine]” (Phillips 1988, 14), is not a concern
of Klein’s.
I noted earlier Winnicott’s strange preference for “experiencing” where we might
expect “experience,” and his choice of “playing” over play comes from the same dis-
position: namely, to avoid relapsing, for as long as feasible, into interpretive abstrac-
tion – “play” (abstraction) serves or means “mastery” (abstraction); or, toys bumping
means thingummies bumping. But interpretive abstraction can also lead to over-es-
timation of the objective dimension itself, of the toy, game, or creation, understood
as separate from, even if revealing, the secrets of the child. This version of interpre-
tive abstraction loses sight of the mystery of creativity itself: “When psycho-analysis
has attempted to tackle the subject of creativity it has to a large extent lost sight of
the main theme,” Winnicott writes in “Creativity and Its Origins.” “It is possible to
take Leonardo Da Vinci and make very important and interesting comments on
the relationship between his work and certain events that took place in his infancy”
(Winnicott 1991 [1971], 69). But:
It is inevitable that such studies of great men tend to irritate artists and creative people in gen-
eral. It could be that these studies […] are irritating because they look as if they are getting some-
where, as if they will soon be able to explain why this man was great and that woman achieved
much, but the direction of inquiry is wrong. The main theme is being circumvented, that of the
creative impulse itself. The creation stands between the observer and the artist’s creativity. (69)
Let me pause here and gather up some threads. I began with the tradition of spleen
directed at the critic.Winnicott understands such rage, though he calls it, more mild-
ly, “irritation,” and suggests it might be due to interpretation (or what I am also call-
ing criticism) “looking like it is getting somewhere.” Interpreters might “get some-
where” by recourse to a code, but also – and this is more strange – by letting “the
creation [stand] between the observer and the artist’s creativity.” Critical methods
that over-invest the object in this latter way are in fact over-investing their method,
they are eager to “get somewhere,” to basically take over control of the playing. But
what would it mean to stay focused on the artist’s creativity, not ignoring the crea-
tions but understanding them as emblems of a process that should be allowed to
be ongoing, not swiftly resolved into meaning? This is where Winnicott’s insistence
on “not forcing the question” becomes his central technical contribution. To force the
question – to require an answer to the question of whether this object is made up or
found – is, finally, to over-value the object. It is to ossify it to the extent that it be-
comes an object in the interpreter’s own itinerary, like a baton being passed. But
if the child or artist has passed the baton, he or she is no longer playing. In worrying
about the ontological status of the object, play is suspended, or ruined.
70 Jonathan Elmer
2
I want now to pull the focus out from child analysis to ask some questions about in-
terpretation and aesthetic experience more broadly construed. What Winnicott is so
intent upon – not forcing the question, leaving the intermediate space unchallenged,
its paradoxes unresolved – can sometimes look familiar, and sometimes strange.
Granting for the moment the possibility of “direct” continuity between infantile
play and “arts, religion, etc.,” we could argue that the tacit compact between creative
behavior and its witness (who might now, in our wider focus, be a reader, or theater-
goer) not to ask certain questions goes by some familiar names: the “suspension of
disbelief,” for example. Here is Bill Watterson, the creator of the Calvin and Hobbes
comic strip, on this topic:
The so-called ‘gimmick’ of my strip – the two versions of Hobbes – is sometimes misunderstood.
I don’t think Hobbes as a doll miraculously comes to life when Calvin’s around. Neither do I
think of Hobbes as the product of Calvin’s imagination. The nature of Hobbes’s reality doesn’t
interest me, and each story goes out of its way to avoid resolving the issue. (qtd. in Groensteen
2013 [2011], 129)
This is satisfyingly Winnicottian in its staging: a choice is there – animated stuffed
tiger, or imaginary projection? – and that choice is refused. “The nature of Hobbes’
reality doesn’t interest” Watterson, and if we are reading the strip in a Winnicottian
spirit, it won’t interest us either.We’d be nincompoops if we worried too much about
Hobbes’ reality, just as we would be if we worried the problem of Hamlet’s reality
when we go to the theater. If Watterson was playing with a real child named Calvin,
then this readiness not to ask a question would be in service of continued play. Cal-
vin is not real of course, but Watterson’s treatment of the Calvin/Hobbes relationship
works as if he is, and in any case is in service of keeping the play proceeding, and the
strip open-ended: “each story goes out of its way to avoid resolving the issue.”
This interest in keeping play proceeding, what Winnicott calls an interest in
“playing” rather than merely “play,” is one result of not forcing the question. One
way in which creator and interpreting witness come together to produce something
that we might call “poetic critique,” is by understanding the playing involved as part
of a process that both precedes and succeeds the objects created and interpreted.
There are some kinds of “playing along” that have, strictly speaking, no beginning
or ending, merely a series of resting-places and way-stations. Socratic dialogue, a
special kind of “play,” often has this feeling; and perhaps philosophy, concerned
as it is with fundamental problems that hide their origins and ends, has a special
closeness to our problem of playing along. (If so, it is not without paradox: not forc-
ing the question by forcing a multitude of questions!) In the intricate final movement
of Stanley Cavell’s The Claim of Reason, there are a few curious pages on dolls. Cavell
has been asking questions about identity, about bodies, about our idea that bodies
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are living, and so on. He has just finished ruminating on the relationship between a
statue and the stone of which it is made. Suddenly, a new theme is introduced:
A statue has aspects. By walking around it, by the changing light, in your changing mood, the
figure can be seen as vulnerable, as indomitable, as in repose, as if in readiness. A doll has oc-
casions. I am thinking of a rag doll. It can be happy or sad, fed or punished. In repose it has
aspects, for example it can be seen as sleeping or dead or sun-bathing. But only if you do
not know which is true. (Cavell 1979, 401)
The distinction between “aspects” and “occasions” Cavell develops here points to
two different kinds of life we are prepared to impute to non-living things. Aspects
are, as it were, snapshots of the “life” of the statue, always traceable to our changing
visions: “the figure can be seen [emphasis mine] as vulnerable,” etc. “Occasions,” by
contrast, imply an ongoingness, an insertion of the figure in a history that deter-
mines the “truth” that only your not knowing would allow you to see the doll as
merely a matter of aspects – as “sleeping or dead or sun-bathing.” But where does
this “truth” beyond aspects come from?
The simple answer is this: “There is only one who knows which is true, the one
whose doll it is” (401). We’re back at the relation between the one who knows – the
child – and the one who wishes to know, the observer, the player-along, here the phi-
losopher. (Of course, in the psychoanalytic version, the child both knows and does
not know.) Cavell describes a series of exchanges about the doll between its
“owner” – he questions that word too – and the observer. The point of these ex-
changes is that even if the observer defers – “At some point my say comes to an
end. I defer to the one whose doll it is” (402) – the “truth” of the doll’s “occasion”
is nevertheless a joint production.
There are criteria in terms of which I settle judgments about the (other’s) doll. To know whether
a concept applies I have to look – at the doll. I have to determine if I can see it in this way, get
that occasion for it to dawn for me. Otherwise I am only humoring the one whose doll it is. Per-
haps I am tired, or have a head-ache. I cannot in any case experience the meaning of the words
about the doll. The doll seems rags. I still know what a doll is; but at the moment I am doll-
blind. (401–402)
The fact that you can know what a doll is and be doll-blind says something about the
kind of knowledge we are dealing with. This knowledge of what a doll is does not
help us see the doll, does not help us overcome doll-blindness,when it hits. Knowing
what a doll is does not help us “enter into its history, achieve the spirit in which con-
cepts of life are applied to it” (403). To “enter into its history,” if I understand correct-
ly, is neither to deny the doll – to say it is just rags – nor merely to defer to the one
whose doll it is; it is to “get that occasion to dawn for me.” Notice here that Cavell is
describing a situation in which too restricted a focus on the object – on “what a doll
is” – will fail in understanding the reliance of that object on a process, an “occa-
sion,” that exceeds it. Getting an “occasion to dawn for me” is a kind of imaginative
72 Jonathan Elmer
investment that is neither “poetic” nor “critical,” or rather is both, but neither at the
expense of the other.
Such imaginative investment extends the “history” of the doll in the way we
might hope sensitive criticism allows its “occasions” to continue their histories. It
does not, in any case, make too much of the form, or “reality,” of the doll, knowing
that its life does not exist there. It does not hijack its history either. Toward the end of
these penetrating pages on the “occasions” of the doll’s life, Cavell forwards his own
unforced question: “What is the doll? (I would like to answer that question because I
feel I know everything there is to know about dolls. But I would like not to have to
answer it since of course I know absolutely nothing about dolls that others do not
know)” (404). Some questions, the answers to which everyone knows but no one
knows differently, are better left unanswered. Cavell’s method – at once poetic
and critical – tacks between the urgency of answering and the urgency of not answer-
ing; his genius is in his ability to ask questions for which such tacking is the best
response. It is not incidental that child’s play – with an other, since there always
is an other, one hopefully fending off “doll-blindness” – provides such a powerful
occasion to turn away from the too-quick answer in favor of open sailing on a sea
of questions. It is child’s play, in any case, that here provides Cavell with an “occa-
sion” to exercise and exemplify his unique method of poetic critique, a method for
which, as his book’s epigraph from Ralph Waldo Emerson has it, “it is not instruc-
tion, but provocation, that I can receive from another soul” (iii).
3
The English literary critic William Empson was well acquainted with the contempt in
which critics were held: “Critics, as ‘barking dogs,’ […] are of two sorts: those who
merely relieve themselves against the flower of beauty, and those, less continent,
who afterwards scratch it up” (Empson 1947, 9). But he remains unfazed:
I myself, I must confess, aspire to the second of these classes; unexplained beauty arouses an
irritation in me, a sense that this would be a good place to scratch; the reasons that make a line
of verse to give pleasure, I believe, are like the reasons for anything else; one can reason about
them; and while it may be true that the roots of beauty ought not to be violated, it seems to me
very arrogant of the appreciative critic to think that he could do this, if he chose, by a little
scratching. (9)
At first blush, the “appreciative” critic, who eschews scratching like a barking dog,
might seem more Winnicottian in his interpretive restraint than Empson. But it
has never been a question of not asking questions at all; Winnicott’s concern is
with the kind of digging that looks too much “like it is getting somewhere,” as if it
really were possible to get fully at the root of things (about which Empson is skep-
tical). Like Cavell, Empson practices poetic critique as a kind of interpretive errancy,
getting all kinds of places but perhaps nowhere in particular.
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Empson’s first book was Seven Types of Ambiguity, a work about which one could
well ask why it begins where it does or ends where it does. In the Preface to the sec-
ond 1947 edition of his book, Empson considers some of the criticisms he received
after the publication of the first edition. The prevailing mood of the critics seems
to have been exasperation. And it is an understandable response: Empson’s ‘meth-
od,’ if it is one, is to unspool a variety of meanings from a piece of verse like a ped-
dler unpacking his wares for visual effect; to consider how these shades of meaning
might unite to produce the power of the poetry; to briefly admire the array again; and
then move on to another example. In reply, Empson focuses his response on one re-
view by James Smith, who had argued that Empson fails miserably in what is the
“first business” of the critic, namely “the passing of a judgment on value” (xii). Emp-
son admits that Smith is correct in this charge: “Even in the fuller examples, where I
hope I have made clear what I feel about the poem as a whole, I don’t try to ‘make
out a case’ for my opinion of its value” (xiii). This is because Empson understands
the role of judgment to be not some one-off conclusion or ruling, but rather a struc-
tural assumption of the work of interpretation itself: “The judgment indeed comes
either earlier or later than the process which I was trying to examine. You think
the poem is worth the trouble before you choose to go into it carefully, and you
know more about what it is worth when you have done so” (xiii). The judgment of
value is implied in the work of interpretation itself, in other words; it both precedes
it as the notion that interpretation is worth undertaking right here, with this poem,
and extends beyond any delimited act of practical criticism: you then know more
about “what it is worth,” but not perhaps everything.
The question of value judgments gets entangled, through Empson’s generous
quotation of Smith’s negative review, with a version of the Winnicottian question
that must not be forced. Winnicott had written that “it is a matter of agreement be-
tween us and the baby that we will never ask the question: ‘Did you conceive of this
or was it presented to you from without?’” (Winnicott 1991 [1971], 12) In the present
context, we might paraphrase this as follows: “Is this poem a thing in the mind or
a thing in the world?” Mr. James Smith has decided in advance how he answers
this question, as it regards the ambiguities analyzed by Empson:
Is the ambiguity referred to that of life – is it a bundle of diverse forces, bound together only by
their co-existence? Or is it that of a literary device – of the allusion, conceit, or pun, in one of
their more or less conscious forms? If the first, then Mr. Empson’s thesis is wholly mistaken; for a
poem is not a mere fragment of life; it is a fragment that has been detached, considered, and
judged by a mind. A poem is a noumenon rather than a phenomenon. If the second, then at
least we can say that Mr. Empson’s thesis is exaggerated. (qtd. in Empson 1947, xii)
“A poem is a noumenon rather than a phenomenon,” a thing in the mind, detached
from the world by the mind, which also makes a judgment about it. This is Smith’s
position. Empson is less sure. He brings up the widely shared position that an artist’s
judgment about his or her own work “may be wrong” (Empson 1947, xiv).
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As I remember, one of the best-known short poems by Blake is actually crossed out in the note-
book which is the only source of it. This has no bearing on any ‘conflict’ theory; it is only part of
the difficulty as to knowing whether a poem is a noumenon or a phenomenon. Critics have long
been allowed to say that a poem may be something inspired which meant more than the poet
knew. (xiv)
The “difficulty” here is that the poem is both a noumenon and a phenomenon, or
neither only one or the other. It is not irrelevant to an interpretation of the poem
that Blake crossed it out; it is just that the poem is also a thing in the world, larger
and more lasting than Blake’s judgment of its merits. Others have come along and
judged it quite good, and for them, too, the poem is both noumenon and phenomen-
on, a fact that makes their “judgment” in Smith’s sense just as relevant and just as
revisable as Blake’s. Practical criticism takes place in the space in which judgments
are deferred: “the point I am trying to make is that this final ‘judgment’ is a thing
which must be indefinitely postponed” (xv). After the example from Blake, Empson
brings up an exhibition of Constable then showing in which a ‘study’ that Constable
clearly considered inferior to his finished canvas is in fact the more prized work at
that moment. “Would Mr. James Smith say that the ‘study’, which is now more ad-
mired than the finished work, was a noumenon or a phenomenon? I do not see
any way out of the dilemma which would leave the profound truths he was express-
ing much importance for a practical decision” (xv). Profound truths without much
importance for the practicalities of interpretation: it is from this perspective that it
seems not just desirable, but necessary, to leave a question unbroached and unan-
swered, “indefinitely.”
I conclude with another snippet from Empson, this one from Some Versions of
Pastoral, first published in 1935. Adam Phillips had seen Winnicott’s approach to an-
alytic interpretation as answering the “need of the self to be both intelligible and hid-
den” (Phillips 1988, 14). And when he came to describe how that stance toward the
self showed up in Winnicott’s style, he reached for the “pastoral”: “the genre of sim-
plicity in which Winnicott writes, a wry version of pastoral, is in fact a kind of elu-
siveness. But the shrewd ingenuousness of his writing […] is consistent with one of
his therapeutic aims: to protect the privacy of the self in the making of personal
sense and, by the same token, personal non-sense” (14). Interpretation here is the
vehicle of an ethics, one seeking understanding but respecting firm limits to it.
But what does this have to do with “pastoral”? Empson suggests an answer:
The feeling that life is essentially inadequate to the human spirit, and yet that a good life must
avoid saying so, is naturally at home with most versions of pastoral; in pastoral you take a lim-
ited life and pretend it is the full and normal one, and a suggestion that one must do this with all
life, because the normal is itself limited, is easily put into the trick though not necessary to its
power. Conversely any expression of the idea that all life is limited may be regarded as only a
trick of pastoral, perhaps chiefly intended to hold all our attention and sympathy for some lim-
ited life, though again this is not necessary to it either on grounds of truth or beauty; in fact the
suggestion of pastoral may be only a protection for the idea which must at last be taken alone.
The business of interpretation is obviously very complicated. Literary uses of the problem of
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free-will and necessity, for example, may be noticed to give curiously bad arguments and I
should think get their strength from keeping you in doubt between the two methods. Thus
Hardy is fond of showing us an unusually stupid person subjected to very unusually bad
luck, and then a moral is drawn, not merely by inference but by solemn assertion, that we
are all in the same boat as this person whose story is striking precisely because it is unusual.
The effect may be very grand, but to make an otherwise logical reader accept the process
must depend on giving him obscure reasons for wishing it so. It is clear at any rate that this
grand notion of the inadequacy of life, so various in its means of expression, needs to be count-
ed as a possible territory of the pastoral. (Empson 1974, 114–115)
Reading this extraordinary passage, one cannot help agreeing that “the business of
interpretation is obviously very complicated.” There are, I think, two intersecting
problems or levels: the question of “the inadequacy of life” and the question of
how pastoral works. Taking the example of Hardy is perhaps the easiest way in: Har-
dy’s grim texts are pastoral, thinks Empson, because the story of “an unusually stu-
pid person subjected to very unusually bad luck” is somehow made to suggest that
“we are all in the same boat as this person whose story is striking precisely because it
is unusual.”We can see how it works – Empson likes to call it the “trick” of pastoral –
but we cannot really say why it works: there must be “obscure reasons” in the reader
“for wishing it so.” And Empson’s hunch is that those reasons are obscure, are made
to remain obscure, because they touch on the “feeling that life is inadequate to the
human spirit,” that our own puny, mortal life is hopelessly “limited” with respect to
all that our spirit may encompass. We are all living a “limited life” pretending to be
“the full and normal one.” Pastoral, it turns out, is a tried-and-true method for simul-
taneously expressing and hiding a self that is both limited and unlimited. Life is “es-
sentially inadequate to the human spirit” but “a good life must avoid saying so” [em-
phasis mine]. It is this circumspection, this essential reserve, that pastoral addresses
by offering “reasons” that remain “obscure.” Interpretation here proceeds through a
syncopation of expression and opacity. The individual both knows and does not say
that life is inadequate to his spirit. The pastoral writer both knows, and does not say,
that his audience has “obscure reasons for wishing it so.” The literary critic both un-
derstands and remains puzzled by the “trick” of pastoral. All this succeeds only if
certain questions are not forced. A good life must avoid saying certain things. The
business of interpretation is obviously very complicated.
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No, I won’t leave the world – I’ll enter a
lunatic asylum and see if the profundity of
insanity reveals to me the riddles of life.
(Kierkegaard: Journal 1836–1837)
Shadow Plays
What is a chambre poétique? First, an allusion to Roland Barthes’ La chambre claire.
Notes sur la photographie and its reference to the camera lucida. Let’s follow this
trace.
A camera lucida is an auxiliary instrument for drawing. Using a prism that is at-
tached to a drawing board with a tripod, the artist can sight the object through an
eyehole and also see a prismatic projection of the same object directly on the
paper. But it is not a purely technical achievement that makes this divided view pos-
sible. The camera lucida is, in a figurative sense, a mediation between an external
object of perception, the projected appearance on the paper, the mental imagination,
and the somatic recording process. In the gaze, the external object translates itself
into a pictorial reflection on the object whose appearance the artist’s hand captures
as an outline.
We remember the myth of the origin of painting: skiagraphy. Pliny reports that
the daughter of the sculptor Butades, to capture the image of her beloved, framed
his shadow in lines on a wall by the light of a lamp (Plinius Hist. Nat. XXXV 151).
The shadow is a testimony of a person, paradoxically, both present and absent, a
genuine expression of ephemerality. The draftswoman looks at a faint echo, the
shadow, and translates it to another level of presence, the silhouette drawn on the
wall. Within the contours, the picture is empty, merely a dark surface like a sheet
of paper not yet written on.
For Barthes, the photographic projection of light guarantees a reference that is
somehow present in the picture, yet without by any means losing its intangible na-
ture. The object is there – without it there would be no projection – but it is equally
absent. Each picture offers a momentary record that extracts something from the
flow of time and captures it photo-graphically, i.e., as a light drawing. Photography
brings something to light: it is an art of light and shadow, it creates a pictorial sphere
of appearances. But what of a human being can be experienced through a picture? In
his phenomenological observations on photography, Barthes starts from an experi-
ence of loss. It is a sadness (chagrin) that is evoked by the image, like a fleeting shad-
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ow from another world. The external picture can thus almost evoke a desire, a deep
love, or cause pain. It tears open a wound in the self-reflection of the viewer.¹
The relationship between interior and exterior views, their translation into a pro-
jective, poetic room of reflection, and the material representations shall guide us in
the following to room situations. In the figurative as well as in the literal sense: to
poetic chambers as places of a shadow theater and thus to a specific form of poetic
imagery, self-reflection, and criticism.
But can images – those in language, painterly, photographic or performative –
communicate something of the inner life of a singular person?
Poetic Shadow Casting
It is Søren Kierkegaard who, using shadow silhouettes (Skyggerids), considers the
possibility of depicting the interior. There are movements of the soul that take
place on the surface: they are written on the face, as we say. For instance, moods
such as joy or immediate sadness might be read off the facial features and included
in a picture.² Kierkegaard, however, is concerned with invisible, existential forces
hidden deeply in the abyss of the soul, something which he calls ‘reflective sorrow’
(reflekterede Sorg).³ The I is aware of this inner sorrow but is unable to completely
understand it and therefore constantly struggles with itself. These inner struggles
do not manifest themselves to the outside world and remain under cover.
The ‘reflective sorrow’ is constantly in motion and does not understand the rea-
son for its sadness, and thus wanders around searching. It refuses a direct depicta-
bility.⁴ This irreducible obscurity is one dimension of poetic critique. It is directed
against physiognomic character studies that claim to analyze the interior of the soul.
Barthes has emphasized that the evidence of the photographic image, as far as
human beings are concerned, is always accompanied by a genuine enigmaticalness,
an ambiguous présence-absence (Maurice Blanchot). For even if the photographic
image certifies the existence of a person, a “croyance fondamentale” (Barthes
1980, 44, 165), some inaccessibility remains nevertheless. And this is where the shad-
ows come into play. What emerges in the representation is a mode of expression
 “I wanted to explore it not as a question (a theme) but as a wound: I see, I feel, hence I notice, I
observe, and I think.” (Barthes 2006, 8, 30)
 Kierkegaard knew the Physiognomic Fragments of Lavater, who illustrated his studies with silhou-
ettes (see Liessmann 2017, 133).
 The Danish term sorg has a wide range of meanings, including sorrow, grief,worrying about, caring
for (omsorg), and thus loving attention. We can interpret sorg here as an existential restlessness in
relation to another person or challenging circumstances of life.
 “The exterior pallor [ydre Bleghed] is, as it were, the interior’s good-bye, and thought and imagi-
nation [Tanken og Phantasien] hurry after the fugitive, which hides in the secret recesses.” (Kierke-
gaard 1988, 169; Kierkegaard 1920, 170)
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(“air”), or, to put it more accurately, a unique aura⁵: “The air (air) is not a schematic,
intellectual datum, the way a silhouette is. Nor is the air a simple analogy (analogie)
[…]. No, the air is that exorbitant thing (cette chose exorbitante), which induces from
body to soul – animula, little individual soul […]. Thus the air is the luminous shad-
ow (L’air est ainsi l’ombre lumineuse) which accompanies the body; and if the photo-
graph fails to show this air, then the body moves without a shadow,” i.e., if the pho-
tograph is not able to “supply the transparent soul its bright shadow (donner à l’âme
transparente son ombre claire), the subject dies forever” (Barthes 2006, 45, 109– 110;
Barthes 1980, 45, 167– 170).
Kierkegaard’s reflective sorrow is a constant back and forth, like the restless up
and down in the smallest of spaces. It is not written on the face but only hints at it-
self. It gives a wink (Vink) or lays a trace (Spor). Because of its restlessness it is a con-
stant becoming (bestandig i Vorden). There is no fixed state that could be labeled with
a word and so the reflective sorrow is left to poetic or psychological treatment (“po-
etiske eller psychologiske Behandling” [Kierkegaard 1920, 173]).
We will follow Kierkegaard’s poetic path, which may stand for the reflection on a
blind spot of the self, confronting itself with shadows cast by itself. The dynamics of
reflective sorrow make an artistic representation impossible. Nevertheless, it is poetic
images that by means of spatialization and temporalization lay a trace.
Like a squirrel in its cage, it turns around in itself, yet not as uniformly as does that animal, but
with a continual alternation in the combination of the interior elements of sorrow (i Combina-
tionen af Sorgens indre Momenter). […] Just as the patient in his pain tosses from one side to
the other, so reflective sorrow is tossed about in order to find its object and its expression (Ud-
tryk). (Kierkegaard 1988, 170; Kierkegaard 1920, 170)
It seems as if this ineffable sadness has closed up within itself and retreated against
the outside world into an enclosure, the existence of which only a careful observer
would even suspect. Kierkegaard creates poetic images that involve the reflection
of the reader, who is quite familiar with such scenarios of the troubled self. The re-
flective sorrow almost rushes inwards, withdraws into the invisible.
By withdrawing inward in this way, it finally finds an inclosure (Indelukke), an innermost re-
treat, where it thinks it can remain, and now it begins its uniform movement. Like the pendulum
in a clock, it swings back and forth and cannot find rest. It continually begins from the begin-
ning and deliberates anew, interrogates the witnesses, checks and examines the various state-
ments, something it has already done hundreds of times, but it never finished. In the course
of time, the uniformity has something anesthetizing about it. Just as […] the monotonous
sound of a man pacing back and forth with measured steps on the floor above […] and deep
within, in its little nook, grief (Sorg) lives like a well-guarded prisoner in an underground prison
 In French, air (wind, breath) refers also to a look, a facial expression of grace or charisma, and
thus to something immaterial, something added, an aura, so to speak (ancient Greek: αὔρα, in the
sense of a breath of air), the je ne sais quoi in relation to an unmistakable person.
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[…], walking to and fro in his cubbyhole (Aflukke), never weary of traveling the long or short road
of sorrow. (Kierkegaard 1988, 170–171; Kierkegaard 1920, 171)
This may sound like total seclusion, but this wandering in reflections (vandre frem og
tilbage i Reflexionen) is poetically expressed in pictures (Billeder). Kierkegaard calls
them shadow cuts (Skyggerids).
On the one hand, these silhouettes are something that comes from the dark side
of life; they are, as it were, shadows that lie on the soul, whose dark reasons cannot
be expressed in language, like a trauma that appears in shadows in reflection (Kier-
kegaard 1920, 172– 173). On the other hand, these poetic shadow cuts are like outline
drawings taken from the depths of the soul, in analogy to material silhouettes, like a
scissor cut from black paper. But to bear witness to the subtle interior picture (det
fine indere Billede) of the soul, the silhouette must first be brought to light. It must
become visible in the medium of a projection. Here, the poetic mediation in spatial
scenarios of inner movement becomes relevant (Kierkegaard 1920, 174).
If I pick up a silhouette, I have no impression of it, cannot arrive at an actual conception of it;
only when I hold it up toward the wall and do not look at it directly but at what appears on the
wall, only then do I see it. So it is also with the picture I want to show here, an interior picture
that does not become perceptible until I see through the exterior. (Kierkegaard 1988, 173)
The soul’s constant turmoil is transferred into the spatial movement of silhouettes
that can be imagined cinematographically, like a shadow theater.We move into a per-
formance. The light of reflection, i.e., the interaction between the poet or the poetic
language and the reader stages the shadows and lets them act as if they were alive.
The way of looking and the mediation through light are decisive for the silhou-
ettes in poetic words. Only when they are set in motion and held against the light so
as to create a projection on the wall does something become perceptible or at least
foreshadowed. This, however, only succeeds for those who have sympathy for the
sorrow in its secrecy (Sympathien nemlig med Sorgens Hemmelighed), because it in-
deed lurks about the world in secret (Kierkegaard 1920, 174).
It is dialectical correlations of pictorial expression, external perceptions, and no-
tions of the interior that Kierkegaard addresses, and here the manner of poetic rep-
resentation and the interpretation of the reader play a constitutive role.
One walks down the street; one house looks like the other. Only the experienced observer sus-
pects (prøvede Iagttager ahner) that in this particular house things are quite otherwise at the
midnight hour; then an unhappy person paces about, one who found no rest; he goes up the
stairs, and his footsteps echo in the stillness of the night. People pass one another in the street;
one person looks just like the next, and the next one is like almost everyone else. Only the ex-
perienced observer suspects that deep within that one’s head resides a lodger [Indsidder] who
has nothing to do with the world but lives out his solitary life in quiet home-industry work. (Kier-
kegaard 1988, 174; Kierkegaard 1920, 175)
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The uniformity of the streets, buildings, people – as it were, a typeface of external life
and its standardization in an era of urbanization, industrialization – the monotony of
life’s rhythms, the anonymity of the individual in the masses, the indifference to-
wards one another, and the apparent silence of a night that seems to absorb every-
thing individual, all this is only facade (lat. facies), i.e., the outwardly turned face of
inner life. For the sympathizers of secrecy, only such messages of the hidden (e)mo-
tion deep down become perceptible. If we look at the world with the gaze of poetic
sensibility, then what echoes outwardly, i.e., poetic picture-writing, is able to convey
tuneful written or pictorial signals from a distance, like a ‘tele-graphic message’ (“tel-
egraphisk Esterretning” [Kierkegaard 1920, 175]).
Poetry as telegraphy. These material telegraphies are always also ways of critically
reflecting on that which sorrow has forced into its lonely cell.
Kierkegaard’s chamber plays of the soul are not simply stagings of inwardness as
a retreat from the world in locked rooms. Although Theodor W. Adorno criticizes
Kierkegaard’s interiors as expressions of an objectless inwardness, he also points
out a negative aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s poetic language (Adorno 1979, 57). As we
will see, the chamber scenes are not simply a refuge in the face of a world of social
alienation and massification, or an exclusion of real-world events under the illusion
that one can withdraw into oneself unaffected by exterior influences. Indeed, the
world is always inscribed in the intérieur.
We encounter here neither places of longing for intimacy, nor retreats of a bour-
geoisie into the shells of privacy (Benjamin), nor enclaves of an inspired artistic ex-
istence. However, Kierkegaard plays with all these implications. But broken projec-
tive spaces are the result, stagings of tough processes of reflection, overshadowed
by fleeting time and the dark voids of the soul. He goes to court with the illusionary
stages of the private sphere.
Indirectly, the poetic reflections on the discord of the self are indicators of the
conditions of the outside world as experienced. The poetic-philosophical treatment
of all the inner staging takes up a literary topos (Becker 1990; Lange 2007; Schür-
mann 2015; Stiegler 2010) to poetically reformulate and criticize it, not least with
a view to romantic approaches. By means of these translations, Kierkegaard performs
poetic criticism in the sense of Schlegel, because “poetry can only be criticized
through poetry. An art judgment which is not itself a work of art, either in the mate-
rial, as a representation of the necessary impression in its becoming, or through a
beautiful form, and a liberal tone in the spirit of the old Roman satire, has no
civil right at all in the realm of art” (Schlegel 1967 [1797], 162 [fr. 117]).⁶
Let us try to see how the poetic chambers create, as it were, light-writings of both
a reference to the self and the world, and recall Kierkegaard’s fine indere Billede,
which casts vivid shadows only in poetic representation – not in fixed silhouettes,
 Throughout the text, all translations of Schlegel’s texts are my own.
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but by making an appearance in its movement and giving us a glimpse of the inner
life of the soul. What is needed is a light that brings the shadow to life by throwing
them against the wall. This happens in the medium of poetry.
Emigration of imagination, so that the legs can
never come along⁷
Kierkegaard subjects Schlegel’s concept of a romantic universal poetry and the aes-
thetic way of life to rigid criticism. He shares the romantic impetus against the nar-
row-mindedness and conventions of a philistine bourgeoisie.⁸ But he confronts with
existential questions the romantic liberation of the poetic spirit and the idealization
of an independent practice of freedom. Romantic poetry appears to him as an escape
from the world, an “emigration from reality,”⁹ and as the illusion of poetic art as-
cending to a realm of fantastic infinity, thereby losing sight of the ground of reality
under the feet of finite life.
Kierkegaard counters such forgetfulness of the self and the world, including a
lack of historical awareness, with an ethical paradox. The individual is confronted
with existential challenges, struggling with contradictions and the intricacies of free-
dom, which always bear the risk of failure. This does not mean that the aesthetic ap-
proach is obsolete, but it should not simply be a flight of fancy. It has to be trans-
posed into the realm of ethics, i.e., poetical language has to be reconnected with
‘real life’ in order to fight the constant battle between finitude and infinite possibil-
ities, temporality and eternity. Attempts to suspend these existential tensions by
making reference to idealized worlds or the support of philosophical systems¹⁰ ap-
pear as deceptions, which do not hold true from the perspective of the “doghouse.”¹¹
The leap of faith promises the only moment of hope for the desperate. For Kier-
kegaard, we cannot survive the paradox of our fragile, worldly existence without be-
lieving in an event of grace, that is, an a priori certainty of God and of reconciliation.
 Kierkegaard 1905, 177.
 Kierkegaard has no primary socio-critical concern. But the invectives against the conventions of
the bourgeoisie, the strategies of escape through business and routines, and finally the doctrinaire
paralysis of Christianity – all this forms the background of his thematization of the individual that
exists in the tension between the finite and the infinite, being confronted with decisions that cannot
be met with literary escapades. Implicitly, this is always a critique of socio-historical realities.
 See Schreiber 2014, 402.
 This is also directed against Hegel’s idea of a “self-reconciliation of the spirit” (Glöckner 1998,
143– 144).
 “A thinker erects a huge building, a system, a system embracing the whole of existence, world
history, etc. and if his personal life is considered, to our amazement the appalling and ludicrous dis-
covery is made that he himself does not personally live in this huge, domed palace but in a shed
alongside it, or in a doghouse, or at best in the janitor’s quarters.” (Kierkegaard 2013, 43–44)
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Let us consider the leap, beyond theological reassurance: Freedom requires de-
cision-making and has to constantly deal with strong affections, impulses of the will,
and agonizing existential doubts. It dwells with all the hesitation and indecision, fur-
nishes itself with the fear of taking guilt upon itself. Can such a dare of life hope for a
changeability of the world? What can take the place of reconciliation under the aus-
pices of loss or doubt of transcendental shelter in the 20th century?
Here, what needs to be introduced is Kierkegaard’s poetic telegraphy, which aims
to return to life such indissoluble questions, placing them as actors in a poetic echo
chamber.
Hiking on the Wallpaper – actiones in distans
In Kierkegaard’s diaries, we are taught that the poetic imagination can try to escape
from the soul’s wearying home. But the effort to leave the gloomy state behind can
lead to a loss of self-relationship. The self is not at home with itself; it is almost on
the run.
Between my melancholy and my intimate ‘Thou’ there lay a whole world of fantasy. The world it
is that I have partly exhausted in my pseudonyms. Just like a person who hasn’t a happy home
spends as much time away from it as possible and would prefer to be rid of it, so my melancholy
has kept me away from my own self while I, making discoveries and poetical experiences, trav-
eled through a world of fantasy. […] [T]hat is how I behaved in melancholy towards possibility.
(Kierkegaard 1938, JP, No. 641)
But when poetic imagination tempts us to free the self from grueling emotions and to
embark on fantastic journeys, this can cause a feeling of terrible worldlessness.
Yet, while speaking in many tongues, this very self simultaneously discovers and
experiences itself poetically. This points us to another dimension of poetry. It is the
indirect poetic telegraphs, i.e., the speaking in pseudonyms or divided roles and epi-
sodes – elements of Romantic poetry – that become the medium of a poetic critique
in voiced shadows.
The poetic polyphony evokes pictorial scenarios which, like a shadow theater,
give an inkling of the fine inner image of the soul and the unspeakable sorrow.
Like an aesthetic game of hide-and-seek, it brings the reader out of his shell, con-
fronting him with modes of self-deception. Poetry stages self-questioning that does
not provide an agenda, but engages a sympathetic reader who knows about the shal-
lows of the soul. The ethical challenge of existence appears on a poetic stage or in a
rehearsal room of decision (see Feger 2007, 543).
Prototypically, this is played out in Repetition, and, here too, the crystallization
of poetic criticism is reflected in a room scene.
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Fig. 1: Etienne de Jouy: L’Hermite de la Chaussée-d’Antin, ou Observations sur les mœurs et les
usages parisiens au commencement du XIXe siècle. Paris 1814.
The book’s frontispiece shows the scholar in a library, his hand holding the pen on the side table
rather casually set up for writing, seated reclined in the armchair, completely concentrated on in-
tently gazing through a lorgnette, which here projects the light of the imagination like a lens onto
a curtain that covers the window of the darkroom. The inner event of the imagination is shown in
a circle of light, which makes a busy street scene visible. Just as if one could look out through
the window, the interior extends perspectively into the imagined exterior space. It is like a cinema
situation. Yet, this is not a matter of a fantasy world but of contemplating reality as it is experi-
enced: “My chamber is like a camera obscura, in which the external objects can retrace their
traces” (Ma cellule est comme une chambre obscure où viennent se retracer les objets extérieurs).
A paradox draws attention to the way in which inner imagination and perception staged externally
are here intertwined: The light of the imagination, which is laid on the curtain like a circular open-
ing, is projected back into the scholar’s room, where it creates shadows. Walter Benjamin refers
to this title engraving in his Arcades Project [Passagen-Werk] (see Haug 2017, 42‒43).
Let us imagine a traveler returning to a city and staying exactly in the same boarding
house and the same room, just as he did on a previous trip. An attempt to repeat a
happily remembered experience. Let us say it is Berlin on the Day of Prayer and Re-
pentance and the whole city seems to lie under a thick layer of dust, seeming to bear
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witness to ashes to ashes, dust to dust, being thus overshadowed by a grey veil of
transience. And now to the room:
When a fellow has settled himself cosily and comfortably in his quarters, when he has a fixed
point (fast Punkt) like this from which he can rush out, a safe hiding place to which he can re-
treat and devour his booty in solitude (for i Eensomhed at fortrære sit Bytte) – something I es-
pecially appreciate, since, like certain beasts of prey, I cannot eat when anyone is looking
on – then he familiarizes himself with whatever notable sights there may be in the city. (Kierke-
gaard 1983, 153)
A carnivore cave of poetic reflection. A starting point to capture booty in the world, to
hide and disembowel it. The room may now be the point of departure for taking
walks through the city or at least for hearing about it, or a fixed point for embarking
on imaginary journeys and for only imagining possible experiences. Either way, the
self runs away from itself.
In any case, these are scenarios in which the explored possibilities turn out to be
a phantasm. They do not become active decisions but remain mere eventualities. The
booty will always be captured from reality, depending on the interest or attention
with which someone wanders through the streets, hurries, promenades, or strides
purposefully. It is the poetic imagination that brings the booty to life. Let us imagine
the poetic room like a theater stage of the imagining self, a shadow theater.
It is like in a real theater performance where especially a young person will be
enraptured by the magic of the “artificial actuality in order like a double to see
and hear himself and to split himself up into every possible variation of himself,
and nevertheless in such a way that every variation is still himself” (Kierkegaard
1983, 154). A dissociation and multiplication of the self: While the body rests, the
imagination experiences a multitude of facets of the self, which are not only visible
but become audible as voiced shadows and sounds (lydende Skygge). These may now
be mere fantasies, as they come over a young person who, on the threshold of awak-
ening, is dreaming about his personality. Kierkegaard designs a shadow theater in
which the ego meets poetic refractions of itself.
In such a self-vision of the imagination, the individual is not an actual shape but a shadow, or,
more correctly, the actual shape is invisibly present and therefore is not satisfied to cast one
shadow, but the individual has a variety of shadows (men Individet har en Mangfoldighed af Sky-
gger), all of which resemble him and which momentarily have equal status as being himself.
(Kierkegaard 1983, 154)
Kierkegaard uses romantic motifs – we may think of the doppelganger in E.T.A. Hoff-
mann or the shadow of Peter Schlemihl, of night scenes and dream visions. But he
focuses on a pre-reflexive, dreamlike consciousness of the self, which stages its pos-
sibilities. The consciousness is not yet awake, it wanders between its possibilities.
But these possibilities must be given shape and voice so that the dreaming I can be-
come aware of them. “Each of its possibilities is an audible shadow (Enhver dets Mu-
lighed er derfor en lydende Skygge)” (Kierkegaard 1983, 155). The dreaming soul is still
La Chambre Poétique 87
hovering over the abyss, not wanting to disentangle the crush of inner voices of fear,
lament, anxiety, exuberance, not wanting to decide. And before one knows it, the
individual has woken up from this dream state again and the voices of the night
fall silent (Nattestemmerne forstumme).
If the voices do not fade, then there is another strategy, to flee from the challenge
of freedom and to dance in sheer possibilities. “The stage is that kind of setting, and
therefore it is particularly suitable for the Schattenspiel [shadow play] of the hidden
individual (En saadan Omgivelse er den sceniske, som derfor netop egner sig for det
krypte Individs Schattenspiel)” (Kierkegaard 1983, 156).
Now shadows move onto the stage, acting in different roles, in whose voices the
individual rediscovers its own voice, as in a mirror image (“spellbinding”) or echo
chamber, and perhaps the individual puts itself in the role of a robber captain and
goes through wild adventures (156). We are still in the chamber, but the imagination
is drawing wider circles, has expanded into a theater space. It is a poetic means of
demonstrating the existential questioning of the self and bringing it back into the
world from the sleep of reason, which sometimes gives birth to monsters.
What is audibly and visibly staged in dreamlike imaginations of the youthful,
childlike consciousness is the foil of a reflection into which the mature conscious-
ness can dive, though not in weightless reverie, but when the soul at a mature age
gathers itself in earnest, i.e., concentrates (157). A poetic undergoing of ethical chal-
lenges. To experience this, the reflective soul must look at things as if it were a
child.¹²
Therefore, the “more mature individuality who satiates himself on the strong
food of actuality (Virkelighedens stærke Føde)” (158) does not turn to high art,
such as painting, in particular, but to everyday art, the picture sheet, proceeding
like a child who, in cutting out something concrete, revitalizes with this piece of
paper a general existential question with a dizzying intensity. Again, it is about im-
ages that set the imagination free, silhouettes or cut-out pictures that come to life
instantly and reflect something general in very concrete detail – and in this concrete-
ness reach a depth of questioning that rejects all conventions, something which only
the unbiased, and at the same time deeply serious, gaze can do.
In the days of childhood,we had such enormous categories that they now almost make us dizzy,
we clipped out of a piece of paper a man and a woman who were man and woman in general in
a more rigorous sense than Adam and Eve were. (Kierkegaard 1983, 158)
 Kierkegaard here also alludes to a romantic motif of childhood, i.e. a sometimes mythologically
idealized interpretation of childhood as a pre-rational and supra-rational stage that is characterized
by the soul’s inclination to dream and miraculous or almost prophetic insights into the future (for
instance in Wackenroder or Novalis). But Kierkegaard does not romanticize a retrojected childlike fe-
licity in terms of a mythological golden age. Rather, he focuses on the pre-conscious abilities of the
child’s playful soul, which resurfaces in the psyche of the adult, i.e. a foreboding memory of past
suffering or an intuition or sentiment of pain and loss that foreshadow a future.
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The cut-out picture’s reduction of objects to a very simple, popular form (as in the
picture sheets of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) raises fundamental ques-
tions arising from the outlines of these pictures that call up memories or collective
worldviews and carry them into the present. It is the gaze of the child that, beyond
conventions, uncovers this deep questioning.¹³ Perhaps the words from Kierkegaard’s
Diapsalmata now become more lucid.
My sorrow is my baronial castle, which lies like an eagle’s nest high up on the mountain peak
among the clouds. No one can take it by storm. From it I swoop down into actuality and snatch
my prey, but I do not stay down there. I bring my booty home, and this booty is a picture I weave
into the tapestries at my castle. Then I live as one already dead. Everything I have experienced I
immerse in a baptism of oblivion unto an eternity of recollection. Everything temporal and for-
tuitous is forgotten and blotted out. Then I sit like an old gray-haired man, pensive, and explain
the pictures in a soft voice, almost whispering, and beside me sits a child, listening, although he
remembers everything before I tell it. (Kierkegaard 1988, 42)
This can be read as a poetic procedure that transposes experiences of reality into im-
ages that cover the space of consciousness like wallpaper, a sheet of pictures that
clad the walls. Whereas early (oriental) wallpapers were woven carpets, and then
hand-painted or printed paper coverings of the walls, industrialization (around
1830) introduced a process of printing wallpapers with serial patterns on paper
webs. But despite industrial production, connecting points and a certain unevenness
in the print always remain visible. The wallpaper is, as it were, a montage. It covers
the chamber with paper webs on which ornamental segments join together to form
recurring patterns of pictorial writing. These are often stylizations of the floral world,
such as abstractions of tendrils and plants. But it is precisely this translation into re-
petitive patterns that opens up a specific variability of forms for the imagination, that
comes alive for the poetic spirit. The eye may follow the seams, can look for breaks
and fractures; it knows each particular irregularity and, like a child, brings the pat-
terns to life, sets them in motion, and thereby allows them to grow.
In Berliner Kindheit, Walter Benjamin describes how the bed rest prescribed by the
doctor leads the fevered child to move from the bed to the interior: “Just as a man
in a frenzy sometimes calculates and thinks, just to see: he can still do it, I counted
the circles of sunlight that swayed on the ceiling of my room, and I arranged the loz-
enges of the wallpaper into ever new bundles.” (Benjamin 1972, GS IV, 272)
 With reference to the childlike power of imagination in dealing with sheets of pictures, i.e., pop-
ular single-sheet prints whose pictorial motifs have been collected, cut out and pasted in,Walter Ben-
jamin highlights the way in which traces of a cultural-historical worldview manifest themselves in
simple outlines and break into the present. See Benjamin 1972, GS IV, 280–282 (“Das Pult”) and
115 (“Unordentliches Kind”). In “Ich packe meine Bibliothek aus” (GS IV, 389–390), he emphasizes
that the childlike nature of collecting is constitutive for the aged collector, too. Children are able to
achieve a renewal of the given: they paint objects, cut them out, take them off, develop a scale of
revivifications.
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For Kierkegaard, it is about questions of memory and renewal, about breaking
out of the regimes of visibility and breaking up experience, which is translated
into poetic imaginations. The child and the old man can do this, but all of this is
not an internalization that is alien to the world. On the contrary, it starts with the
experience of the world, extracts something from the empirical, i.e., focuses on de-
tails, reformulates these extracts into literary imagery, and the images learn to walk
and pose questions for reflection.
And does this not require a distanced perspective or literary procedures that
Kierkegaard calls actiones in distans?¹⁴ In these literary forms abstracted (subtracted)
from the realm of life, the reader is confronted with challenges that life abandons.
The poetic shadow play puts these questions at a reflective distance.
In “Das Fieber,”Walter Benjamin tells of the childlike tendency to see everything
as if it were coming towards him from far away (Benjamin 1972, GS IV, 269). Silhou-
ettes are projected onto the wall. They only appear lively from a distance. They come
towards the self or, like a reflection or vocal echo, come back to it. An actio in distans
that opens a space for reflection. Thus, it is the child who, in the evening, by the light
of a lamp,with the play of its fingers, projects shadow figures on the walls and brings
stories to life.
I used my tranquility and the proximity of the wall I had in my bed to welcome the light with
shadowy images. Now all those games that I had let my fingers play came back on the wallpa-
per. “Instead of being afraid of the shadows of the evening”, as says my playbook, “funny chil-
dren rather use it to have fun.” (Benjamin 1972, GS IV, 272)
The bodily gestures and finger plays create a shadow theater, a distanced observa-
tion of one’s own body and mental movements, which now run across the wallpaper
as shadow figures and become the object of observation in the poetic room.¹⁵
What interests us here is not the childlike play that projects figures onto the
walls, but in a figurative sense, the literary process that Kierkegaard develops with
the shadow plays.
We are investigating procedures of a poetic actio in distans, which does not rep-
resent empirical reality, but rather brings it to life telegraphically, i.e., in projective
narrative forms, figures, and gestures, and allows them to act as shadows in a poetic
space, so that the producer, as well as the readers, become spectators and interpret-
ers of the poetic staging.
Did not Schlegel emphasize this invigorating power of poetic criticism?
 Kierkegaard 1988, 311. The actio in distans adapts as a literary method a scientific theory of the
remote effect of forces (e.g., magnetism, gravity), according to which bodies can trigger an effect,
change movement etc. without touching each other (see Tajafuerce 2000 and Blumenberg 2007).
 Benjamin refers to ‘Spielbücher’ of the nineteenth century, here Leske 1914. See Brüggemann
2007, 49–67.
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On the wings of poetic reflection hovering in the
middle
For Friedrich Schlegel, poetic representation articulates not only an aesthetic refer-
ence to the world and the self but also a critical reflection on the prerequisites of po-
etic articulation. The role of the poet and his mode of representation, and, ultimately,
the role of the sympathetic reader, are intertwined in a material, artistic language:
“every [art and science] that does not find its essence in the words of language
has an invisible spirit, and that is poetry” (Schlegel 1967 [1800], 304).¹⁶
The movement of the poetic spirit, according to this programmatic claim, bears
witness to an artistic individual, manifests itself as a mirror of the world, or rather, of
the age and its respective spirit, and continually relates itself to the surroundings.
Fig. 2: Illustriertes Spielbuch für Mädchen. Ed. Marie Leske (1914), 99 (detail).
Fig. 3: Illustriertes Spielbuch für Mädchen. Ed. Marie Leske (1914), 102 (detail).
 Concerning language as the prototype of all artistic media, see Chaouli 2004, 138.
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Nevertheless, poetry “can hover most between the portrayed and the depicting, free
of all real and ideal interest, on the wings of poetic reflection in the middle, poten-
tiating this reflection again and again and multiplying it as in an endless series of
mirrors.” Here too, poetry is conceived as an optical projection of repetition and var-
iation in multiplication. It is a process that takes place in an interplay not only “from
within, but also from without,” as a continuous becoming (Schlegel 1967 [1798a], 182
[fr. 116]).
We may recall Kierkegaard’s figure of the ceaseless movement of the weary self.
The romantic ideal of mediation of all disciplines and the concept of mediating art
and life are reversed in a radically existentialist turn of this hovering, which is
hence subsequently modeled on the poetic room. It functions as a projection
space of iterative reflections and moving image scenes, poetically interweaving
inner and outer worlds and thus simultaneously addressing the status of poetry.
But while Schlegel is concerned with “indulg[ing] oneself completely to the impres-
sion of a poem, letting the artist do with us what he wants,” and, above all, with
“be[ing] able to abstract from all the individual, to grasp the general in a suspended
state,” with Kierkegaard it becomes a task not to rely on this high “sense of the uni-
verse” or “to be able to rise above our own love and to destroy what we worship in
our thoughts” (Schlegel 1967 [1798b], 130– 131). Rather, this romantic soaring is to be
poetically criticized and reflected in terms of the concrete dizziness of the self in in-
dividual everyday life.
Kierkegaard takes up approaches of poetic criticism and turns them against what
he considers to be a world-forgotten understanding of poetry. According to Schlegel,
poetry as an art can only be critically assessed by poetry itself. Its realm is thus a
cosmopolitan one, where citizenship is attained by sympoets and symphilosophers.¹⁷
Poetic critique crucially involves the role of reading or readership, i.e., the participa-
tion of a lively and resistant counterpart. It unfolds in a dynamic of interaction and
inventions that set in motion a process of becoming. As poetic poetics (Schlegel 1967
[1798a], 170 [fr. 28]), it is a critique that is presented in a poetic way. Why? Because
“every excellent work, of whatever kind, knows more than it says, and wants more
than it knows” (Schlegel 1967 [1798b], 140), thus holding potentials that are unspo-
ken and yet effective as implicit knowledge. In addition, there are those that cannot
be gathered by the poet himself and yet are driven by a subliminal will. This requires
an engagement with poetic texts that give ample reason for assumptions, interpreta-
tions, readings, and ways of understanding. But poetic criticism does not produce
meanings in order to state, like “a mere inscription, only what the thing actually
is, where it stands and should stand in the world” (Schlegel 1967 [1798b], 140).
The poet and artist is at the same time a poetic and critical reader, i.e., ‘translator,’
 The synthetic writer creates a counteractive (entgegenwirkend) reader (see Schlegel 1967 [1797], 161
[fr. 112]).
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philosopher, rhetorician, and philologist. These readings and translations give new
life to historical forms of representation and expressions.
Kierkegaard takes up procedures of romantic, poetic criticism, but it is the individ-
ual that is to be brought into focus, without abandoning the existing reality. It is nec-
essary to win over the readers as sympathizers or symphilosophers and sympoets to
lead them to the intimate stages of the self by means of indirect aesthetic transmission.
These are stagings in which the struggle with reality is poetically articulated.
The reader must have sympathy for sorrow in its secrecy. Then a shadow theater
staging the broken self within its worldly circumstances is created. It theatrically re-
flects existence in a world that cannot be reconciled poetically. But in these refrac-
tions – whether in terms of the illusory character of the promises of happiness, or
of the stagings of tristesse, desire, or doubt, i.e., in negative aesthetics – a longing
is expressed. It refuses any conciliatory tone and thus points dialectically to the un-
redeemed.¹⁸
Let us take up this poetology of self-mirroring and critical growth, as well as the
demand for a revitalizing language.We enter a reflective, poetological cabinet of mir-
rors with a wealth of material refractions and turn to interior scenes in various media
of poetic image formation to exemplify how they become the site, or Schauplatz (Ben-
jamin), of poetic criticism.
“Poems are painted window panes”
(J.W. v. Goethe)
We are looking at two paintings by Vilhelm Hammershøi (1864– 1916), among a large
number of interior paintings by the Danish artist. They provide insights into his pri-
vate rooms in Copenhagen. The chamber scenes are held in color nuances of grey
and white, which vary in soft bluish, ochre, and greenish color values. Particular fur-
nishings or objects are given a haptic emphasis in the colors of their material (wood,
glass, porcelain). The objects frequently appear entangled in an interplay between
light and shadow as well as mirror reflections. The frugality of the indoor situations
evokes the atmosphere of an extended period of temporal persistence as well as of a
peculiar abandonment. However, the paralysis disappears when the viewer contin-
ues to contemplate the paintings. A subtle play of movements becomes evident, re-
acting to the outside, in momentary shots of the incoming light, which, despite the
apparent standstill, points to the passing of time. The interiors manifest themselves
as very sparsely furnished, almost empty, but not uninhabited. Often they are desert-
ed like Hammershøi’s landscape and cityscape paintings, which are mostly without
people.
 See Feger 2007, 543. On the dialectics of the fainting longing, see Adorno 1970, 199.
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Repeatedly, a female figure can be seen in the interiors, for which the painter’s
wife often acted as a model, always in a black floor-length dress, her hair tied in a
knot, almost like a black silhouette. If we want to speak here of silence, then in the
sense of taciturnity, which seems to exclude the hectic noise of the world. In the
sparse rooms, traces of everyday life appear with the greatest sobriety.
The outside world appears as sunlight that causes a reverberation of shadows,
light projections, and reflections. On many paintings, windows – some of which
are shown open, others closed and subdivided – draw attention to the exterior of
the interior. Light breaks in through the window crosses or the multiply framed
panes; panels of light and crosses of shadow thus fall into the room. But the win-
dows do not afford the gaze a plain view or any clear sight of the vastness of the
sky, which is at best seen rather vaguely. If we are able to see what is happening out-
side the windows at all, this requires, for example, that we look at the window fronts
of the opposite facades. Here, no (romantic) view into the open is granted. Rather,
framed interior and exterior views intersect as a palimpsest of window crosses or
framings in the gaze (fig. 5).
An inner courtyard view: The depiction of windows and framings always carries
an allusion to painting or framed pictures, which exhibit themselves (Hemkendreis
2016). Beyond that, windows suggest a threshold or opening between inside and out-
Fig. 4: Vilhelm Hammershøi, Interior. “The Four Rooms”, 1914 (Oil on canvas,33 1/2 × 27 4/5 inch;
85 × 70.5 cm), Ordrupgaard, Kopenhagen
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side. The series of windows running across a corner here points to something behind
it, but the windows do not allow a deeper insight; they indicate shaded rooms or cor-
ridors, absorbed in darkness, but there are also light projections that fall into the in-
terior.
Some of the windowpanes remain opaque and reject the spectator’s view. Then
again, they become mirror surfaces on which architectural elements and a piece of
the sky are reflected. A ray of sunlight falls into this courtyard area and hits an
open window wing on the first floor. The interweaving of reflections, framings,
and architectural elements constitutes a transition area between interior and exterior
worlds, reflecting, in both the literal and figurative sense, how exterior and interior
areas are seen blending into one another. The courtyard area enclosed by windows
becomes itself an interior space, the impression of a sort of ‘caged world,’ a Gehäuse-
Welt (Simmel).
Repetitions, series of framing structures, light projections, shadows, and reflec-
tions come into view. This blending of framings or openings that do not lead into the
open, of reflections and light effects that create projections in the interior through a
Fig. 5: Vilhelm Hammershøi, Courtyard. Strandgade 30, 1899 (Oil on canvas, 65,7 × 47,03 cm),
Toldeo Museum of Art. Ohio
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window, and of the iteration of structures is impressively staged in Four Rooms
(fig. 4). We look into a suite of four rooms. They are obviously high-ceiling rooms,
but they can only be seen in a cut-off view. A door leaf stands out into the room,
the outermost edge of the door touches the edge of the painting and divides the
space of the picture. Light is reflected on the door and enters from the left through
a window, which is not visible but is hinted at by a light curtain. Behind the door, in
its slipstream, a small side table can be seen, on which stands an empty bowl with
light reflections. Above it on the wall, there is a dark-framed mirror in which a reflec-
tion is visible, too, even though it is located in the shadow. It draws the eye into a
perspectival depth of space – as if it were reflecting an opposite window, though
it seems to mirror the door.
Like a small window in the wall, the mirror creates the impression that it leads
outside. It strangely corresponds with what can be seen through the large open door:
a suite of rooms. The incidence of light is always accentuated by shading and the
prominence of the white lacquered doors. One might also think of mirror cabinets
in baroque castles, which work with such optical illusions.
The successive rooms are separated from each other by door frames, thresholds,
and differently angled doors. Thick wooden planks draw perspective lines to the last
room, but always with slight misalignments, and lead to a dark canapée and a paint-
ing on the wall, which is again cut off.
Time and again, it is cut framings that dominate this parkours of iteration and
alteration. Already in the room in the foreground, this is pointed to by the opened
door. A cut profile on the door leaf draws attention to the back of the door, which,
if closed, would fit into a half-height wooden paneling. And the dark-framed mirror
also hangs on a framing board. The interlocking of borders and cut framings deter-
mines the perception of the suite of rooms. It becomes a cabinet of mirrors or a nest-
ing of rooms.
Hammershøi owned some writings by Kierkegaard.¹⁹ His paintings, like Kierke-
gaard’s room scenes of poetic criticism, involve the viewer in multiple perspectives,
operating with iterations, reflections, refractions of light, and situation variations.
Let us recall Kierkegaard’s actiones in distans, i.e., a poetic, image-generating pro-
cess that lets us envision a spectrum of different situations which are being played
through. The impression of the realistic representation is captivating, but the painter
operates with compositional shifts and reflections. Objects are varied, figures are
placed differently, thus modifying the viewer’s perspective of view. Poetic reflection
and micrological investigations of reality enter into a dialectical relationship. The
room as a private retreat and expression of an attitude towards life is shown in dif-
fering compartments and framings, i.e., from prismatically varying perspectives.
Repetition, recurring situations, and, again and again, edgings and framings
stand out. Time seems to have come to a standstill in these frames, even when the
 See Alsdorf 2016, 269.
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suite of rooms is serially extended, allowing the gaze to wander into the depths of
the room, or when the incidence of light refers to an external time determined by
the changing position of the sun, or when figures in unchanging poses testify to se-
quences of former movement. Hammershøi’s staging of rooms may be interpreted as
poetic reflection chambers, as spaces of painterly poetry and criticism. But at best,
they give a hint or lay a trace. Is the world dense and, as it appears, timelessly frozen
in the face of the raging monotony of industrial capitalist seriality? Does it deny both
the past and the future? As unfathomable as the lines of the room is the “doubling of
the room,which appears to be mirrored without being mirrored: like these rooms, all
the appearances of history may perhaps resemble each other, as long as they them-
selves, in bondage to nature, persist in appearances” (Adorno 1979, 69; trans. A.E.).
Is this an implicit critique of a collective consciousness that neglects the past,
because everything or the ever new that happens passes, as it were, as a constant
repetition? Does the experience of time standing still critically testify to an ahistori-
cal perception of the world of modernity and to the perpetual recurrence of the same,
which makes of modernity a Kafkaesque hell of eternity, as Benjamin states, so that
the perception of space (or of a room) in which this experience of time is expressed
constitutes a transparency of penetration, overlaying and covering? (Benjamin 1982,
GS V.2, 676 [S 1,5]; 678‒679 [S 2,1]) All this may be alluded to here.
Let us return to another episode of Kierkegaard’s Repetition, where precisely the
impossibility of stealing out of time becomes the object of poetic criticism. And in-
deed, models of the perception of time here correspond with the representation of
a parkours of interiors and suites of rooms.
One climbs the stairs to the first floor in a gas-illuminated building, opens a little door, and
stands in the entry. To the left is a glass door leading to a room. Straight ahead is an anteroom.
Beyond are two entirely identical rooms, identically furnished, so that one sees the room double
in the mirror. The inner room (inderste Værelse) is tastefully illuminated. A candelabra stands on
a writing table; a gracefully designed armchair upholstered in a red velvet stands before the
desk. The first room is not illuminated. Here the pale light of the moon blends with the strong
light from the inner room (indre Værelse). Sitting in a chair by the window, one looks out on the
great square, sees the shadows of passersby hurrying along the walls (Forbigaaendes Skygger ile
hen over Murene); everything is transformed into a stage setting (scenisk Decoration). A dream
world glimmers in the background of the soul. (Kierkegaard 1983, 151– 152)
But here, too, the comfort of a retreat concealed in the moonlight is deceptive. The
dreamy hope “as if the end of the world had already come” (152),²⁰ the attempt to
approach the world in a dreamily distanced way like a “scenisk Decoration,” and
the endeavor to find distraction in (actual) theater performances prove more and
more illusory for the protagonist – and in the end, he wishes to shatter to pieces
the backdrops of the bourgeois world and the props of the writing room (“I almost
 This ambiguously alludes to the end of earthly time, that is, in theological terms, the time of ful-
fillment and redemption, but also the time of final judgment.
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smashed it to pieces”). “Half-awake, half-dreaming,” the red velvet chair becomes a
foreign object in a home that has become uncanny and the chair is thrown forcefully
into a corner. “My home had become dismal to me simply because it was a repetition
of the wrong kind.” The repetition of a romanticized remembrance proves to be just
as impossible as the escape into an open future. “There is no repetition at all.” (Kier-
kegaard 1983, 169)
It is again poetic telegraphs that Kierkegaard makes literarily effective. For in-
stance, when in Sickness unto Death he tells us the story of a murderer, who tries
to escape the scene of his crime by train (a sequence of chambers on rails, one
might say), but as circumstances dictate, a telegraph is active in one of the cabins
and reports that the criminal is on board. Thus, when the wanted man arrives at
the next station, he brings the news of his conviction himself.²¹ Adorno has referred
to this episode as a parable of civilization in the sense of a reality of the court, which
dissolves, and at the same time fulfills, deceptive appearances (Adorno 1979, 67–68).
There is no escape from one’s personal life. The individual past, as a crystalliza-
tion point of a collective history, accompanies us every single moment, even when we
take a train in order to escape. This is not fatalism, and it does not interest us here in
the theological sense of a higher justice or judgment.What it represents, however, is
the problematization of a deceptive sense of security. The attempt to escape from the
world and from one’s own personal and collective history by seeking to settle down
in the caves of private comfort fails, because this very historical world is present ev-
erywhere and always surrounding us. As Adorno has often stated with regard to cin-
ematic fiction: The scene is speeding towards us like an express train.²²
As a topos of consciousness or self-awareness – Nietzsche’s chamber of con-
sciousness that we never enter but are only able to see through a small gap – a scenic
world is revealed in these inward chambers. In them, however, modes of subjection
to an overpowering outer world are perpetuated. And this becomes even more insist-
ent in the twentieth century.
All these poetic chambers operate with a language of furnishing (Einrichtung),
which is interwoven with the experience of the social world. Yet, this visual language
entails a poetic enigmaticalness, i.e., a poetic criticism that is articulated in paradoxical
figures.We do not escape the noise of a threatening outside world by entrenching our-
selves. On the contrary, it becomes even louder. Let us listen to a passage from Kafka,
whose intense, ambiguous involvement with Kierkegaard has been widely discussed.
Everyone carries a room about inside him. The fact can even be proved by means of the sense of
hearing. If someone walks fast and one pricks up one’s ears and listens, say in the night, when
 See Müller 1995, 67–75.
 As Adorno emphasizes with regard to Kafka, aesthetic distance has become impossible – some-
thing which is prototypical for modernism. The contemplative comfort of the reader is shattered, be-
cause the catastrophic world does not allow for an uninvolved spectator (see Adorno 2009 [NS], IV,
418).
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everything round about is quiet, one hears, for instance, the rattling of a mirror not quite firmly
fastened to the wall. (Kafka 1991, 1)
A night scene – and we do not know where this supposed encounter between the one
hurrying through the night and the one hearing the sounds of a wall mirror in the
silence takes place. The poetic staging alludes to an inner self-reflection, a clattering
self-reflection which has turned into a discordant state and which is betraying its in-
stability through movement; at the same time, it also alludes to a bourgeois interior
with wall mirrors, furniture, and social conventions. Listening to the silence within
oneself, to the echo space of the inner telegraphs, may remind us of Kierkegaard’s
sounding shadows. The world seems locked-out, and yet it echoes in the imaginative
space of poetic writing, virtually crowding into consciousness and undermining any
possible calm.
The poetic chamber is by no means objectless. In its indifference to world events,
it suspends any direct relation to the sphere of empirical activities. It negates purpos-
es of self-preservation belonging to lived routines and thus indirectly reflects upon
the (im)possibility of another practice. But this happens in aesthetic idioms of distor-
tion, interruption, deformation. Poetic procedures make us susceptible to being at
the mercy of the living world at an aesthetic distance. But this distance requires mo-
bility, paradoxical actions, i.e., actiones in distans as a restless back and forth be-
tween inside and outside.
The poetic chamber becomes a stage on which the world in its absurd constitu-
tion begins to resound. In his reflections on the musical-erotic, Kierkegaard has de-
scribed the deep layers of the soul’s movement as an underlying urge, be it painful or
rapturous. This urge ties itself to any everyday experience, is an indicator of the ego’s
experience of the world, and it requires silence to listen to this interweaving of expe-
rience and memory. Can silence, in particular, not bring along an immense volume?
Does not the roar of the world sometimes reveal itself through enervating signals or a
deafening silence? Will it be the noise of an inner telegraphy, disturbed from the
slumber of ignorance? Let us listen to Kafka again:
It is not necessary for you to leave the house. Stay at your table and listen. Don’t even listen, just
wait. Don’t even wait, be completely quiet and alone. The world will offer itself to you to be un-
masked, it can’t do otherwise, in raptures it will writhe before you. (Kafka 2012, 200; NSF II 140)²³
Separated from the individual’s restless activity, the historical context and the exter-
nal social world push themselves even more intensely into the enclave of the ego,
infiltrating its inner voices and becoming a crystallization point of critical reflection.
As we have already seen and heard: poetic rooms do not offer vantage points for
comfortable contemplations. They do not allow us to lean back in pleasurable, unin-
volved self-reflection, as in a red velvet armchair. Instead, they draw the reader into a
 See also Kleinwort 2004, 224–225.
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maelstrom and do not leave the sympathizer of secrecy alone, but expose him to in-
dissolubility.
Where reality has taken on the character of hostility, rejection, and inhumanity,
or the appearance of an irrational totality, a retreat into inwardness is precisely that
which cannot guarantee liberation. Rather, it becomes a prison. The chamber scenes
discussed earlier make this unmistakably clear with all their features of abandon-
ment, loneliness, rebellion, and the destructive parody of everyday worlds. They
also mirror modes of domestication, a subjection of the self to the norms and habits
of bourgeois life: indoor situations thus mirror the outdoor world. This also happens
in ambivalent stagings. The following scene will perhaps (at first) evoke the impres-
sion of happy fantasy journeys under the father’s care.²⁴
When at times Johannes asked permission to go out, his request was usually refused; but occasion-
ally his father, by way of compensation, offered to take his hand and go for a walk up and down the
floor […]. They walked through the city gate to the country palace nearby or to the seashore or
about the streets – according to Johannes’s wish, for his father was capable of everything. While
they walked up and down the floor, his father would tell about everything they saw. They greeted
the passers-by; the carriages rumbled past, drowning out his father’s voice; the pastry woman’s
fruits were more tempting than ever. […] If the path was unfamiliar to Johannes, he made associ-
ations,while his father’s omnipotent imagination was able to fashion everything, to use every child-
ish wish as an ingredient in the drama that was taking place. (Kierkegaard 1985, 120)
This scene has often been read biographically. But the promenade through the room,
which transposes structures of the outside world into the illusory world of the inside,
can not only be read as a protected flânerie at the father’s hand. Kierkegaard’s inte-
riors are neither comfortable nor always inviting. It is the aesthetic form – the antag-
onism of moments, repetitions, and paradoxical situations – that strives against illu-
sionary arrangements and allows for both the experience of life’s destructive forces
and an awareness of the deceptive illusion of comfortable inwardness. The poetical
chamber, i.e., the furniture of aesthetic language, makes these distortions tangible.
You must push your head through the wall. It is not difficult to push it through because it is
made of thin paper. But what is difficult is not to let yourself be deceived by the fact that
there is already an extremely deceptive painting on the wall showing you pushing through
the wall. It tempts you to say: Don’t I push it through all the time? (Kafka 1954, 303)
We take up here only some flashlights from Kafka leading us to a poetic chamber of
the late twentieth century. We are now in a video installation by the artist Gary Hill.
The audience has to enter a darkened room, a black cube, within which it is confront-
ed with a video projection on one of the walls, a projection that repeatedly pops up
 Implicitly, we can again think here of the entanglement of the imaginative roles of child and aged
man. This might prompt us to think about standardized images of reality that are, literally, cut out
here.
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and then disappears again, cut-off, exhibiting only shattered sequences: a cinemato-
graphic shadow play. With the flashing light constantly flickering, we can see for a
moment a male figure that seems to throw itself against a wall, as if seeking to
break through it. At the same time the projected figure on the wall seems to jump
against this imaginary borderline time and again, we can listen to the chanting of
a poetic text that is just as shattered, as breathlessly flashing as the light reflections –
a never-ending loop.
Aword is worth .001 pictures. To be transfixed is no longer an option. I am in a way blind. I live
time through a succession of pictures I’ve known since when. But it’s precisely this when that
haunts – it eats out the looking cavities and smiles inward like a Cheshire cat. What I might
name as “the immediate surroundings” has all but vanished. I have no place. No feet. I’ve
lost the vague idea of limbs. Legs feel more like logs arranged for a fire. I remember a dream
of holding the other’s heart in my hand; for a moment I live the pulse of another being. […]
This is not me. I’m not accountable. It wasn’t thought out. It has no relation to thought. This
is that hole that everything must pass through. […] It burrows itself in, blows up and begins
again plural—–Points. Cells.²⁵
An inversion of the borderlines between inside and outside. Cabin, cell, prison – or
blasting cap of language? The paradoxical inside-out and the endless attempt to es-
cape one’s shattered self-perception may be seen as a radical staging of poetic criti-
cism. We leave the last words to Kafka:
Der Kampf mit der Zellenwand
_________________________
Unentschieden
(Kafka, NSF II, 383)²⁶
Fig. 6: Gary Hill. Wall Piece, 2000. Single-channel video/sound installation
 http://garyhill.com/work/mixed_media_installation/wall-piece.html
 “The war with the cell wall” – “Undecided” (qtd. in Corngold 2011, 14).
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The Silence of the Concepts (in Meillassoux’s
After Finitude and Gottlob Frege)
The confidence that truth can be found
through thinking is the inevitable precondition for
all investigating. (Hermann Lotze)
The call for the conference on which the present volume is based invites reflection on
poetic critique ‒ on criticism that would also be poetic. Citing Schlegel, it advances
the notion that such critique might also be art, that criticism would add its own art to
the work of art.Without wishing to disavow this possibility, a book project I have just
finished suggests that the relation between criticism and art is a two-way street: not
only may criticism be poetic, roughly in Schlegel’s sense, but, as Schlegel himself al-
ready suggested, literature, including poetry, would already be critical – by which I
intend that literature, too, would have a subject matter, be about something, and
strive for insight, understanding, or truth, albeit not always on the assertoric terms
that usually frame these accomplishments.¹
To be clear, so changing the equation and reinflecting our conception of what
literature and criticism are would not entail that literature ceases to be fanciful
and becomes a sequence of veiled assertions or statements; nor, however, has this
ever really been true of interpretation, criticism, or thinking. In fact, “the silence
of the concepts” names a new view concerning what happens when we read or
write any text. On this account, the understanding of what we say, our expressions’
meaningfulness and references, comes to pass in an operation that unfolds across
time, taking in stretches of discourse necessarily larger than the word and even
the isolated sentence. Such an event of understanding is not graspable in terms of
any pre-existing frameworks ‒ givens, such as words, language, signifiers, forms, ge-
neric rules. Instead, what is at issue in writing and speech ‒ what they have to say,
and what they talk about, as well as how they say it ‒ would recur to a single, every-
where identical operation, occupying a heretofore neglected middle ground: a region
greater than the word or single sentence, yet smaller than those formations thought
to combine discourse and its objects en bloc, such as, on some views, genres, or Witt-
genstein’s language games. To be sure, open-ended habits or practices, informed by
what I call traditionalities or historicities, would still shape our expectations when
 For this project, see my A New Philosophy of Discourse: Language Unbound (Kates 2020). Moreover,
see Yi-Ping Ong’s “Poetic Criticism and the Work of Fiction: Goethe, Joyce, and Coetzee” in this vol-
ume for a nice exploration of the possibility indicated by Schlegel of literary works commenting on
(or “critiquing”) other works.
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approaching different sorts of discourse, or “talk!,” as I term it.² Confronting shop-
ping lists, for instance, different uses are anticipated than when regarding the peri-
odic table. Nevertheless, nothing fundamental or structural separates any of these
instances; hybrids or variants are always possible, specimens such as “shopping
lists of the stars” ‒ shopping lists not thrown away, but preserved, like the periodic
table ‒ or Ben Lerner’s novel, 10:04, which is also an exercise in art criticism.
In the present essay, this middle ground will be fleshed out, and what is at stake
in it indicated, by using Quentin Meillassoux’s work as springboard and provocation.
Meillassoux’s speculative realism, and other recent initiatives with which it is often
allied (such as Graham Harman’s, Bruno Latour’s or Karen Barad’s) share a concern
that animates the present work, while being marked by a major difference in how
that concern is addressed. An anxiety about science, which may also take the
form of a fascination with it, arguably motivates these programs. The resurgence
of humanistic (geisteswissenschaftliche) practices afforded by the New Criticism,
structuralism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction in the post-WWII era having
collapsed, what this moment had held at bay – namely, the apparently unparalleled
power and authority of modern scientific discourse with its power to reshape exis-
tence – now returns to the fore.
The approach I am mapping here, to be clear, also entails the rejection of godlike
structures of knowledge, arguably pushing still further that ontological flattening
that marks Action Network Theory (ANT) or Barad’s work, as well as surface reading,
though seemingly not Meillassoux’s endeavor.³ The denial of scientific discourse’s
exceptionality, however, by no means discredits its claims to truth, which, often,
though not always, are compelling when examined in their specificity. Truth’s pur-
view is instead broadened and diversified. Truth, on my account, pertains to all
talk!, to all discourse, including criticism and literature, as well as political theory,
law and, at moments, philosophy. Every discourse, as discourse, speaks, comments,
describes, articulates, or in some other manner latches on to something other than
itself and articulates something concerning it, albeit on different terms and often
with respect to different types of subject matters.
To propose that all discourse touches on the world and may be capable of insight
necessitates that all talk!, every discourse, has reference points, topics, and subjects,
concerning which it tenders such apprehensions. In respect to this possibility, the
present project registers its most significant difference from the ones previously men-
tioned, although this difference, too, varies in degree. The above-named endeavors,
especially when it comes to theorizing their matters of concern, but also more gen-
erally, devalue, even while incorporating, a hermeneutic dimension. Their own dis-
course, both in respect to how they present their subject matter, as well as how
 I prefer the neologism “talk!” to “discourse,” since the latter is too associated with the program of
expanding language’s rule-bound character to language in use, as in “discourse theory” or John
Searle’s version of speech-act theory.
 On such “flattening” as a general trend in the contemporary humanities, see Bennett 2010, 254.
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that matter takes shape, recurs to a relatively straightforward style of theorizing and
argumentation, of which Meillassoux offers perhaps the most extreme example. In
contrast to some phases of poststructuralism, the hermeneutic and the theoretical
moment come asunder in these works.
By contrast, in the present undertaking, because this middle ground’s operation
entails the appurtenance of even a single sentence to others in implicit series, it re-
tains both insight into some subject matter and a hermeneutic axis. The interpretative
register, implicitly everywhere at work, but explicitly so in humanistic contexts, is
foregrounded in the present instance, though this by no means cancels these or
the present undertakings’ ability to refer and to render insights or truths. Indeed,
in every instance, along with our expressions or related stretches of talk!, ultimately
something non-verbal, different from talk!, remains up for grabs, which can come to
the fore on different terms than talk! or discourse, in part because terms themselves
here are never fixed once and for all nor function in isolation. Instead, both what
talk! says and the disclosure of those non-talk!-matters it engages take shape as
events, along a continuum of familiarity and novelty, with some topics and some ex-
pressions ‒ for example, in certain contexts, “pass the salt” ‒ being more readily
parsed than others, such as the first chapter of Das Kapital.Yet, all instances remain
eventful, both in their production and their reception; their expression and under-
standing take place on occasions and in contexts and are never preprogrammed
nor signify autonomously.
Nevertheless, at this moment, “in walks Quentin,” as jazz aficionados might put
it, since for Meillassoux and many of his readers any retention of a hermeneutic di-
mension will seem a version of his great bugbear, “correlationism,” the term with
which his thinking today is most often associated, albeit for his attack on it. Accord-
ingly, for the remainder of the present discussion what I propose to do is to sketch
Meillassoux’s positioning in After Finitude, with one eye on the thinking of Gottlob
Frege, to clarify correlationism both in my own work and in Meillassoux’s. So pro-
ceeding, I will set out the middle ground here in question, contrasting it with Meil-
lassoux’s way of working, while also exemplifying this region’s operation in practice.
The consequences of this middle ground for literary studies then will be briefly dis-
cussed by way of conclusion.
1 The Middle Ground’s Lower Bound
The middle ground here conceived operates neither on the great scale of genres nor
the more minute one of words. The former, genres and other such totalities that
would at once prescribe what talk! says, and the objects it talks about, such as Fou-
cault’s epistemes or Niklas Luhmann’s systems, instantiate the upper reach of this
middle region. Words, concepts, signs, and other subsentential units, furnish the
middle ground’s lower bound. Neither of these, I am about to suggest, function as
their proponents imagine; neither close on themselves and neither can be effectively
The Silence of the Concepts (in Meillassoux’s After Finitude and Gottlob Frege) 107
traced nor affirmed, as supplying conditions for expression, understanding, and in-
sight. Revealing Meillassoux’s thought’s limits in light of Frege, and then Frege’s
theory’s own shortcomings, exhibits why this is so, and thus how this middle ground
actually takes shape, as well as ultimately how this middle ground avoids correla-
tionism, by dint of the real’s role in it. The real as here understood, in turn, grants
leeway for literature, criticism, and the other humanities to consort with truth on
their own terms.
Why the lower bounds of this middle zone lack closure, and thus why words or
signs as such effectively play no role in literary or any other expression and their un-
derstanding, may be grasped by examining correlationism itself ‒ the term, or word,
or sign “correlationism” ‒ and its fate in Meillassoux’s own thinking. As we are about
to see, one striking paradox or irony in Meillassoux’s writing is that while his specific
arguments, of which there are many in After Finitude, conform to Aristotle’s older syl-
logistic logic of subject and predicate, Meillassoux’s presentation as a whole deviates
markedly from this format. His is not an extended deductive exposition even in the
very loose style of Kant’s first Critique. Instead, Meillassoux’s aims repeatedly alter,
and, with that, what each of his terms say or mean changes, especially “correlation-
ism.” What befalls “correlationism,” upon its introduction in After Finitude, thus it-
self, perhaps unintentionally, exhibits this middle ground’s functioning.
That logic, essentially Aristotle’s, to which Meillassoux has recourse, is likely fa-
miliar to most. For it, words or terms and their definition are key. This logic’s unit,
more specifically, is the syllogism, such things as: “All women are mortal; Cleopatra
is a woman; Cleopatra is mortal.” The crucial moment in this figure of the syllogism,
called Barbara ‒ there are others ‒ is the second clause, where the grammatical sub-
ject Cleopatra turns out to have a property and fall under a predicate, treated univer-
sally in the first: here, “being a woman.” This second step, the so-called “minor
premise,” lets the other property and predicate in question, mortality, be transferred
on to Cleopatra, thereby arriving at the assertion expressed in the conclusion: “Cleo-
patra is mortal.”
In Aristotelian logic, consequently, terms and their definitions are decisive.What
women are; their definition; whether being mortal is part of it; who or what Cleopatra
is ‒ all must be clear and previously known for this or any instance of syllogistic rea-
soning to operate.
Meillassoux, who also proceeds syllogistically or, as it is sometimes put, deduc-
tively, early on in After Finitude offers the following definition of correlationism. Cor-
relationism consists in the claim that “we only ever have access to the correlation
between thinking and being, and never to either term apart from the other” (Meillas-
soux 2008, 5). Correlationists assert no being without thinking, no thinking without
being. Shortly, at what more this definition aims will become clearer. At the moment,
it can be noted that this formulation arguably is already controversial, since it ap-
pears to be a version of Parmenides’ famous saying about thinking and being,
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voein and einai, being the same, to auto.Yet Meillassoux deems correlationism a spe-
cifically modern development.⁴
Meillassoux, in any case, almost immediately transforms this notion in a manner
that, though not in line with Aristotle’s template, is at least not excluded by Frege’s.
Frege’s logic, it must be underscored, is not syllogistic but propositional. For Frege,
the statement or assertion ‒ the judgment, not the term ‒ is the unit of expression
and of whatever truth it may access. Hence, early on in his career, Frege counseled
against seeking definitions and advised instead to look toward the use of words in
statements, where alone what the words express may be grasped. This injunction,
“never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a prop-
osition,” came to be known as Frege’s context principle (Frege 1980, x).
Owing to Frege’s context principle, concepts, terms, and words begin to slough
off their grammatical, but also their ontological and categorial, identities. Concepts
are neither properties nor predicates; they cannot be identified with any single word,
nor can they even be defined directly or grasped as such. Concepts are essentially
incomplete or unsaturated portions of statements and may be identified only by
way of their extension: the different objects to which any given concept applies or
that the concept “takes.”
Frege, more specifically, came to understand concepts as functions, which per-
form operations on arguments, the objects that fill them in. Their definition by
way of their extensions entails that the concept or function, as, for example, ex-
pressed by “…is a horse” is identified thanks to all the different instances when “x
is a horse” turns out to be true: “Secretariat is a horse,” “Bucephalus is a horse,”
and on so on. Yet, even the workaround just employed is not really satisfactory; a
different concept, for Frege, would be expressed in the lyrics from the old TV
show Mr. Ed, which seems to possess the same verbal schema: “a horse is a
horse…of course of course.” Here “…is a horse,” despite possessing what seem to
be the same words and format, expresses a different concept owing to the different
work it performs in the context of the present sentence, namely, that of expressing
an identity.
Frege’s scheme, it should be noted, harbors the profound possibility that there
can be both speech and truth about a given subject matter ‒ “Secretariat is a
horse” ‒ without that subject matter, or the terms that capture this truth, being trans-
parent or known in any final way. Talk! in this respect operates in precise contrast to
 Moreover, as so expressed, it actually does not apply to Kant’s program in his first Critique, though
this is Meillassoux’s primary instance of this failing (Meillassoux 2008, 4, among others).What Kant
calls transcendental knowledge, that is, knowledge of the conditions of genuine empirical knowl-
edge, is itself a priori. Hence, for Kant there can be knowledge on the part of thinking or reason of
itself, apart from knowledge of what is. This misprision of Kant, it should be noted, is in line with
Meillassoux’s understanding of Kant’s categories as factical, here later discussed, and his assignment
to Kant of what he calls Hume’s problem. Kant’s categories, though indeed otherwise unexplained,
for this same reason cannot be “factical,” being a priori.
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its presentation in Aristotle’s logic. For Frege, one can say, “heat is found in bodies,”
without really knowing what heat is or what a body is, how the two interact, or the
precise notions these words purport to express. This fact, as well as the concepts’ in-
ability to be directly named, are two ways in which concepts prove to be silent in
Frege’s treatment. Others will emerge, albeit not always in a manner Frege himself
would have expected.
Hence, when approached from a Fregean perspective, rather than Meillassoux’s
definition of correlationism being decisive, what Meillassoux does with this term in
other sentences and parts of his discourse is of primary importance. Moreover, this
is fortunate, since Meillassoux’s exposition, as already remarked, rings a rather diz-
zying set of changes on his leading notion. Meillassoux initially highlights correla-
tionism’s abandonment of realism, of the ability to grasp things, indeed nature, in
itself, without filters of any sort ‒ in the wild, so to speak. To be against correlation-
ism, consequently, is to insist that knowledge grasps nature raw, if not necessarily
red in tooth and claw.⁵ Through a series of steps, Meillassoux’s program, however,
morphs quite considerably. It turns into the project that his text’s subtitle presents:
the affirmation or establishment of “the necessity of contingency.” Meillassoux’s cru-
sade against correlationism culminates in the imputation to nature of a radical and
unprecedented style of contingency or chance (yet one somehow still necessary) that
Meillassoux in part employs set theory to sketch, here being inspired by Alain Bad-
iou.
Neither such contingency nor its necessity, of course, on their face immediately
answer to what correlationism as first defined aims at: a radical realism, or nature in
the wild, which Meillassoux exemplifies by what he ironically refers to as the “arche-
fossil” (Meillassoux 2008, 10).⁶ The problem, however, of which Meillassoux himself
is aware, is that, as so conceived, his embrace of nature as non-correlated, as in the
wild, yet as still known, runs the risk of returning us to that natural light or sovereign
reason said to hold sway in the early moderns, such as Descartes, as well as their
predecessors.⁷ With nature in the wild, being itself absolute, as Meillassoux has it,
 Meillassoux speaks of “a great outdoors” that he fears contemporary philosophy has lost in respect
to nature (Meillassoux 2008, 17). Christian Thorne also cites this remark in his “Outward Bound: On
Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude” (Thorne 2012, 274). Thorne’s concerns and mine at times over-
lap, though, of course, he makes no reference to Frege nor does he move toward that middle ground
ultimately here set forth.
 The existence of the fossil, according to Meillassoux, embodies a time before human being and
before thought (Meillassoux 2008, 14); thereby, the fossil, by his lights, directly refutes the correla-
tionist affirmation of thinking and being’s mutual dependence, although neither Kant, who gave
an early account of planetary genesis, nor any other philosopher Meillassoux cites, actually doubts
the existence of a pre-human past.
 In fact, Meillassoux initially illustrates the difference between the correlationist and non-correla-
tionist standpoints in terms of Descartes’ separation of so-called secondary from primary qualities.
The difference between secondary qualities, like taste and color, and primary ones, like extension
and shape ‒ the latter being mathematizable, the former not ‒ for Meillassoux exhibits the difference
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yet also an object of knowledge, the knower and her knowledge themselves must
possess a similarly absolute status. (This problem, by the way, seems to me to affect
almost all of the new materialisms insofar as they appeal to metaphysics.) Hence, in
Meillassoux’s case, the terms on which he initially set forth his project will change;
in the place of that initial and ultimately “naïve realism” in respect to nature that he
first depicts, Meillassoux, correspondingly, next affirms a contingency that invests
nature as an object of scientific knowledge (Meillassoux 2008, 27).
As suggested above, a fundamental anxiety about science and its achievements
may, then, subtend Meillassoux’s program in After Finitude, though this worry takes
the form of restoring science’s absolute authority at almost any cost. Indeed, the high
price Meillassoux’s endeavor pays may already be plain, since the conundrum he
faces initially appears insoluble on the terms that he takes up. Meillassoux, to be
clear, will try to reason his way out of this impasse, to find in argument, and thus
in reason itself, a flight from reason’s hegemony. Only in this manner can he hope
to maintain some approximation of realism alongside knowledge in the modern sci-
entific style of laws expressed in mathematical formalisms, without making the ca-
pacity for knowing itself absolute.
To balance what would otherwise mark a return to reason’s traditional sover-
eignty and presumption to know the in-itself, Meillassoux, accordingly, asserts a dif-
ferent absolute on the side of the object: a supposed absolute randomness, a radical
chance or contingency, somehow also still necessary, and also still purportedly com-
patible with modern scientific knowing.⁸ At this moment, moreover, in the service of
this first detour or transformation of his project, Meillassoux’s Aristotelianism re-
turns full throttle, bringing a number of fairly obvious fallacies in its wake, some
of which would be recognized in Aristotle’s idiom, though they are much clearer
in Frege’s. Indeed, to square this circle, to accomplish his embrace of an absolute,
wild, object that nevertheless does not reinstate a sovereign reason, Meillassoux
turns again to Kant, formerly the poster child for correlationism, now in a positive
vein. Meillassoux himself avows a version of Kant’s transcendental turn, launched
against the early modern vantage point, despite its correlationist tendencies. Specif-
ically, Meillassoux embraces what he calls, anachronistically, and arguably wrongly,
a “facticity” that Kant’s twelve categories in the first Critique purportedly exemplify
(Meillassoux 2008, 53‒54).
Meillassoux thus returns to Kant, but also to Kant’s successors, to mount his ar-
gument for radical contingency. Meillassoux would follow both Kant and those ab-
between an anthropomorphized and correlationist access to nature, and that tapping into wild na-
ture, nature in itself, that he wants to defend (Meillassoux 2008, 3).
 It should be noted that Meillassoux himself by his lights never fully accomplishes this task; he
never explains how the mathematization of nature and his new contingency are related, why knowl-
edge of such a radically contingent nature should take the form of mathematically expressed laws.
After posing this problem at the end of his penultimate chapter (Meillassoux 2008, 111), he recurs
to it again on the last page of his work, asserting that it is an issue yet to be resolved (124).
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solutists who followed after Kant, the idealists. Like them, Meillassoux will raise an
aspect of Kant’s thinking to the absolute; Meillassoux’s own absolute, however,
bears on the object, not the subject. Meillassoux chooses to absolutize the so-called
“facticity” of Kant’s categories, a facticity which he claims withstands the idealist
turn. Facticity, on Meillassoux’s view, harbors an otherness, an absolute “absence
of reason,” one which he assigns, not like Kant, to the understanding, but to its ob-
jects (Meillassoux 2008, 53).⁹ Fixing on the seemingly unmotivated status of Kant’s
categories, to which Hegel and the other idealists of course also attended, Meillas-
soux’s aim at this moment, accordingly, becomes to “convert facticity into the real
property whereby everything and every world is without reason, and is thereby ca-
pable of actually becoming otherwise without reason” (53). In this way, Meillassoux
would substitute for the realism earlier sought, now lost sight of in all but name, a
novel and entirely speculative, yet somehow still necessary, contingency.
Whatever else may be said about this new aim, where Meillassoux’s own dis-
course only momentarily rests, reason by itself clearly is presented as accessing
such a radically contingent nature ultimately devoid of reason; a world so determined
can appear in no actual science, nor even, as we shall soon see, in any actual object.
Meillassoux’s stance at this moment is in fact still more contorted than it may seem,
in that what results from this imputation to nature of a version of a radical facticity,
yielding what he himself at one point labels “chaos,” even in this form must remain
consistent with modern science and its findings (Meillassoux 2008, 63). Accordingly,
Meillassoux conjures not only a non-correlationist real, now such solely insofar as it
is absolutely contingent; moreover, this absolutely contingent real, this chaos is also
non-contradictory, and thus still knowable by modern knowledge.
To square this seeming circle, then, Meillassoux argues both syllogistically and
counterfactually, thereby allowing for the fate of concepts, terms, and words in his
own exposition to be grasped, and, with that, the sketch of this middle ground’s
lower bounds to be completed. In particular, Meillassoux claims that were a being
inconsistent in itself, a contradictory nature, to exist, such a being would be incapa-
ble of change, and, since unchangeable, it would not be contingent or random.
Hence, his chaos, his purportedly wild nature, since it must be alterable, subject
to change, must also be consistent, non-contradictory. Accordingly, nature can, in-
deed must both be a chaos and consistent, thereby remaining available to scientific
inquiry.
The sophistry of this argument, which Meillassoux himself seems to acknowl-
edge at one moment, is perhaps not blindingly self-evident, only owing to its syllo-
gistic form; this form and its implications, in any case, are here finally more of inter-
 “Thought, far from experiencing its intrinsic limits through facticity, experiences rather its knowl-
edge of the absolute through facticity,” he writes (Meillassoux 2008, 52).
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est than the sophistry as such.¹⁰ As regards the latter, however, it may be quickly
noted that it is axiomatic in both Aristotle’s and Frege’s logic that any and every con-
sequence follows from a contradictory premise (or condition); all outcomes are pos-
sible, none prohibited. Thus were nature in contradiction with itself, as Meillassoux
posits, it follows that nature so determined could as well not change as that it could.
Both consequences are similarly and equally entailed; Meillassoux’s argumentation,
accordingly, by no means establishes his chaos’ necessary consistency.¹¹
More importantly, however, is why the type of logic Meillassoux employs may
somewhat mask this fallacy. For Frege, rather than being a predicate or a property
of some being, existence is always a second-order concept or function. To say some-
thing exists is to affirm that some first-order concept possesses at least one object
that a given concept ranges over ‒ that the lower order concept in question yields
the value true in at least one statement in which it is used. For example, to say a
horse exists, for Frege, is to claim that there is at least one true judgement that some-
thing, Secretariat or Bucephalus, is a horse. If this is so, that a horse exists is true. On
Frege’s template, then, before reasoning can occur about what follows from a contra-
dictory nature, it would have to be determined whether in the first place there is such
a nature, or indeed any contradictory objects, anything answering to “x is a contra-
dictory being.”
Not so proceeding, Meillassoux instead argues in a manner that effectively ren-
ders him the St. Anselm of contemporary philosophy. In both Anselm and Meillas-
soux, argument proceeds from definitions, and existence is taken as but one possible
predicate among others. For Anselm, God by definition exists, since, owing to God’s
definition as the most perfect being, the predicate existence cannot be denied to him,
existing, after all, being more perfect than non-existing.¹² For Meillassoux, similarly,
an object the existence of which is assumed to be possible, thanks to its possessing
the predicate “contradictory” could not be changeable, and thus must be consistent
with scientific knowledge, its actual existence apparently being simply another pred-
icate it may happen to bear or not. The definition alone in both instances yields con-
clusions about what must be the case, any acquaintance with such entities and their
genuine being rendered beside the point.
The lower reaches of the middle ground here in question, then, are reached with
this brief survey of the logic of subject, predicate, and existence, in Aristotelian log-
 “Philosophy is the invention of strange forms of argumentation, necessarily bordering on soph-
istry,” Meillassoux at one point states, presumably commenting on his own practice (Meillassoux
2008, 76).
 In syllogistic logic this can be shown through the disjunctive syllogism; in Frege’s, through the
conditional, where, if the premise is false, the consequent is always true. In the former, if I say
“whales are either mammals or fish,” and “if they are fish I will eat them,” if the premise embodies
a contradiction (whales are fish and whales are mammals), then both my eating them and not eating
them follows.
 For a very different view of Anselm, see Levene 2017, especially chapter five.
The Silence of the Concepts (in Meillassoux’s After Finitude and Gottlob Frege) 113
ical garb, though their instability in Frege himself has yet to be addressed.¹³ Never-
theless, in contrast to Anselm’s and Meillassoux’s reasoning that begins from terms
or names and their meanings, it can now be seen why it matters that Frege ap-
proaches concepts through their appearance in entire statements, ultimately giving
pride of place to reference or significance (Bedeutung), not sense or meaning
(Sinn) ‒ albeit as becomes clearer below, Frege also, of course, has a doctrine
about the latter. Correspondingly, what is, and even what can be said, finally derives
from apprehensions of the world ‒ Secretariat is a horse ‒ rather than what is true
about the world and our knowledge of such truths deriving from our ideas and no-
tions, as in Meillassoux’s treatment of nature or Anselm’s speculations on the idea of
God. At the lowest level of this middle ground thus stand statements, sentences and
the references that in part make up their understanding.
2 The Middle Ground’s Upper Bound
Frege’s logic thus represents an advance on the Aristotelian one, at least as the latter
is employed by Meillassoux; in a Fregean context, the argument Meillassoux makes
for the consistency of a radically contingent nature could not be countenanced. Frege
himself, however, in his own fashion, attempted to stabilize his logic’s lower bound,
to fix such references and thus his concepts’ identities, through a higher order regi-
mentation of these concepts’ objects.¹⁴ By attending to this facet of his project, the
limits of the upper reach of this middle ground emerge, and, with them, ultimately
the instability of both bounds. Frege’s attempt indeed fails; in its wake, it leaves mul-
tiple conceptualizations and a promiscuity of references that neither can be fixed
once and for all, nor have need of being such in order to operate. Instead, what is
being said (“is a horse”) ultimately can only be grasped in relation to what is
being talked about ‒ Secretariat, this part of a carousel, Mr. Ed ‒ by way of implicit
prior histories of talk! and of commerce with things, permitting them, talk! and
things, to emerge. Things, talk!, and their history, functioning together, allow all dis-
course, all talk!, ultimately from poetry to physics, to refer and to mean, with no sin-
gle aspect ever being stabilized or fixed on its own distinct terms.
 In Aristotle’s own thinking, it should be noted, these issues are more complicated, in part owing
to his categories, which have a different function than Kant’s, and his treatment there and elsewhere
of the upokeimenon (subject) and the todi ti (sometimes translated as the individual), as well as ul-
timately his handling of the notion of ousia (beingness or essence). For the former two, see Aristotle
1962, 15‒31.
 As discussed below, Frege also thought that the senses of sentences or propositions had their in-
herent stability as senses, or thoughts, as he came to term it. Nevertheless, his attempt to identify
concepts by way of their extensions proceeds without calling on this register and thus can be fol-
lowed out in its own right.
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A more profound, because more modern correlationism, it should be noted, un-
derpins Meillassoux’s stance in After Finitude, in effect identical with that he criti-
cized above, in addition to the more classical correlationism Meillassoux evinces
when he reasons his way to his chaotic nature’s consistency as just sketched. This
second instance of correlationism is critical, since the limits of Frege’s thinking ap-
pear in it, as well as those of Meillassoux’s own. Meillassoux’s version of a more
modern correlationism ultimately exhibits why no upper bound to discourse or
talk! can be maintained, no decisive regimentation of talk! and its subject matters
promulgated, now that the fate of the lower, the word or the concept, has begun
to appear. Accordingly, its treatment completes the presentation of the middle
ground here in question by further depicting the concept’s silence.
In the wake of the foregoing, Meillassoux’s discussion of nature takes a still
more unexpected turn. Not only must that absolute chaos, radically contingent na-
ture, be consistent ‒ non-contradictory enough to be known. Nature must also not
appear to be actually changing, since genuine change would not just damage, but en-
tirely undermine, science’s claim to knowledge. Were nature actually to be evident
“becoming otherwise without reason,” to use Meillassoux’s words, obviously no
knowledge of nature in itself would be possible, assuming such a turn of events is
even conceivable (Meillassoux 2008, 53). Accordingly, to resolve this tension, after
arguing for radical chaos’s self-consistency, Meillassoux takes another step along
his presentation’s careening axis; this twist involves fending off what Meillassoux
calls Hume’s problem, albeit Hume does not make use of this consideration in the
manner Meillassoux indicates, and it has nothing to do with Kant, to whom Meillas-
soux also imputes it.
What Meillassoux dubs “Hume’s problem” asserts that were nature contingent
this fact must necessarily have revealed itself within a finite time (Meillassoux
2008, 85). Non-lawfulness would have had to become evident in the course of the
nearly innumerable experiences of nature had by human beings, based on a proba-
bilistic calculation. Hence, the argument as stated affirms nature’s conformity to law.
The supposition that nature’s inconsistency, did it exist, would stand forth, is
turned round by Meillassoux, then, to accomplish two goals. First, he uses it to ex-
hibit the character of his own notion of contingency, which will be more radical than
any randomness probability can calculate. Secondly, Meillassoux turns to Hume’s
framework to defuse the worry that nature might actually be encountered as varying
and thereby elude knowledge. Meillassoux, in engaging with Hume’s hypothesis,
thus will coin a contingency supposedly so radical that, when assigned to nature,
the latter has no need, nor even chance, of appearing as contingent at all.
To capture both characteristics of his absolute, which in every other context
would seemingly be in tension, Meillassoux turns to Cantor and set theory. Probabil-
ity, as Meillassoux points out, insofar as it is quantified, clearly makes reference to a
totality of possible instances: one out of a hundred, two out of ten thousand and so
on ‒ including in the thought experiment upon which Hume and Kant purportedly
rely. Accordingly, Meillassoux appeals to Cantor’s theorem, specifically as it yields
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a transfinite number as the power set ‒ or number of subsets ‒ of the first order in-
finity of the rationals. Cantor famously showed that the set of the reals so derived
(including numbers such as pi, the decimals of which expand without repeating)
consists in a higher-order infinity than the infinity of the integers, one that he
deemed “transfinite.” Meillassoux suggests that the randomness of nature would
be of this second, uncountable, non-totalizable order.¹⁵ Nature’s contingency thus
corresponds not to any possible count, not even the first order infinite of the integers,
but to the next infinity up, a transfinite infinity, on the order of the real numbers,
themselves intrinsically uncountable.
With contingency conceived in this fashion, as answering to the transfinite, it
then becomes thoroughly possible, in effect necessary, that the randomness applica-
ble to nature would never appear. Numerous, paradoxical results, after all, can be
derived from the transfinite, such as the ability to construct from a single sphere
two spheres of the exact same size with nothing missing from either.¹⁶ Natural events
for Meillassoux would be similarly transfinitely random, and thus would have noth-
ing missing from their consistent appearances. Their randomness, conceived in terms
of the transfinite, would not appear even within the sum of things and events belong-
ing to the knowable spatio-temporal known universe, since the latter is at most
countably infinite like the rationals.
Now the most important feature of Meillassoux’s argument, in the present con-
text, is that his entire construction hinges on an historical divergence between set
theory and Frege’s project, in which the limits of Frege’s project, as well as set theo-
ry’s, make themselves felt. That difference also lets Meillassoux’s own correlation-
ism, identical to that he otherwise denounces, be grasped.
The ability of set theory, of mathematical logic to build on itself, to spawn these
infinities upon infinities of different orders, in the manner Meillassoux exploits, in-
deed stands in contrast to the fate of Frege’s logic and his nascent philosophy of lan-
guage. As is well-known, Frege’s program, his attempt to forge a logical formalism
able to generate the totality of modern mathematics with the exception of geometry,
ran into what become known as Russell’s paradox. In the face of Frege’s regimenta-
tion of functions, his attempt to move from first to second-order functions and their
corresponding extensions, and consistently on up, Russell invented a novel higher-
order function, or concept, ranging over lower-order extensions: that of extensions
that do not include themselves as members. The extension of this same function
would fall under this concept, then, only if it did not fall under it, and vice versa ‒
an outcome obviously not sustainable within a logical deductive system. Though
seemingly technical and even contrived, Russell’s paradox showed that extensions
 “We will retain the following translation of Cantor’s transfinite: the (quantifiable) totality of the
thinkable is unthinkable. Accordingly, the strategy for resolving Hume’s problem can now be stated”
(Meillassoux 2008, 104).
 For a relatively deep, yet accessible “dive” on this possibility known as the Banach-Tarski para-
dox, see Kaseorg 2007.
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could not always be made into objects, into arguments of other functions, as Frege
had supposed, nor could one, then, freely generate new higher-level functions and
“move up the ladder,” in the way Frege envisioned to lay the basis for his definition
of the numbers.¹⁷
Now what tends not to be recognized in contemporary philosophical appropria-
tions of set theory, in particular Meillassoux’s, is that the very same paradox that
Frege confronted and failed to resolve, as well as some others, also affected the
first versions of set theory that Cantor framed. Russell in fact had studied Cantor’s
work, and initially established his paradox with an eye to his theory. Moreover,
Ernst Zermelo, of Zermelo-Frankel (or ZF, the now standard formalization of set theo-
ry), discovered virtually the same issue as Russell in his own examination of Cantor’s
early writings. Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory, later fine-tuned by Frankel,
was thus designed to avoid precisely the same paradoxes to which Frege’s logicism
fell prey. Though Zermelo’s attempt is widely considered successful, nevertheless, to
achieve his goals, Zermelo had to pay a price. To avoid the issues Frege and Russell
confronted, Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory made it impossible to generate
sets in some situations where that possibility intuitively should be available (for ex-
ample, when all the members in question, originally found in different sets’ subsets,
fall under a single function, thus disallowing sets, such as Russell’s, composed of
sets not members of themselves).¹⁸ Similarly, it is impossible in Zermelo’s theory
to speak of all sets, the set of all sets or the so-called universal set. There is not
one function or concept under which all set theory’s sets fall. Accordingly, the set
as such cannot be defined within set theory itself (which was also true of Russell’s
formalism in his Principia, as Gödel noted). Axiomatized set theory indeed by design
cannot provide a univocal notion of a set. Instead, its axioms define what counts as a
set and what does not by way of the operations that can be performed upon it, re-
maining silent about what this notion everywhere designates, as well as the original
collections, afforded by broader domains of discourse, from which sets are first gen-
erated.
With an eye to these stipulations and restrictions, Meillassoux’s way of proceed-
ing at the moment he turns to Cantor and set theory is, then, correlationist in his own
original sense. In the formalism on which Meillassoux depends, “set” itself has no
 Russell’s own revision of Frege’s project, in his Principia Mathematica, written with Whitehead,
used what was called the theory of types to avoid these difficulties ‒ types being assigned to concepts
and to value-ranges to restrict them to their own levels. This strategy, in turn, encountered Gödel’s
proof, based on the Principia’s formalism, that both consistency and completeness were never attain-
able in complexly ordered logical systems, thereby bringing the logicist program in mathematics to its
end. Chapter seven of Joan Weiner’s Frege Explained gives a strong and accessible account of the
problems Frege’s philosophy of arithmetic encountered (Weiner 2004, 115‒126). See also chapters
five and six of Hans Sluga’s Frege: The Arguments of the Philosophers (Sluga 1999, 102‒148).
 This feature follows from Zermelo’s Axiom of Separation; for a discussion of it and the following
claim, the paradoxes attendant upon the positing of a “universal set,” see Hallett 2013.
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isolatable semantic value, no single meaning, concept, or function belonging to it. At
the same time, nature in itself as purportedly transfinitely contingent can only be
spoken about at all thanks to this otherwise empty scheme. The nature Meillassoux
has in mind cannot be designated as such apart from this formalization. Accordingly,
neither nature (being) nor thought (the set) at this moment have any standing apart
from one another. Neither access to radically contingent nature in itself nor to the set
as such is available in Meillassoux’s account, only to their correlation ‒ in conform-
ity with the definition of correlationism Meillassoux himself initially gives.
Meillassoux at this moment in After Finitude, then, practices correlationism ex-
actly as he defines it, something which I would argue is also true of Alain Badiou’s
work.¹⁹ Accordingly, the question posed of whether correlationism can be imputed to
the present paper’s stance returns. If Meillassoux cannot avoid correlationism, both
of a pre-Kantian variety (as in the first, syllogistic, instance) and a post-Kantian one
(as just reviewed), no alternative to some version of this position may exist. At the
same time, a different arrangement may perhaps better retain Meillassoux’s original
commitment to realism than Meillassoux’s own thinking, and to this extent no longer
deserve the correlationist label.
To sketch this alternative possibility, the limits of Frege’s project that have begun
to be glimpsed must be further set forth and this middle ground more fully laid bare.
The paradox that Frege stumbled over, and that set theory subsequently found ingen-
ious ways to circumvent, shows how this middle region is open-ended on its upper,
as well as its lower bound. In fact, neither extreme being possessed of stable, defin-
able elements, the two openings ultimately are one.
Concepts or functions, inherently incomplete and unsaturated, are to be identi-
fied for Frege, as has been noted, by their extensions, through all those instances
that fall under them, all the arguments that make them true. This confidence,
which implies a vertical construction of higher-order functions and value-ranges,
cannot be wholly sustained, as has just been witnessed. The inherent instability of
functions and concepts, in turn, ripples back on to the statements wherein they op-
erate, ultimately leading to the demand that something other than expression, some
thing or worlded subject matter, buttress each sentence’s operation.
Statements are all the more unstable, and some sort of worldly factor are thus
required to support them, moreover, since statements encounter problems of their
own with maintaining their identity as construed by Frege. Frege deems statements
closed, complete, and autonomous, as he also does the names found in them. For
 Badiou’s Being and Event, of course, rests on a sustained appropriation of set theory. That work
never appears to me to aim at genuinely mathematical, set-theoretical rigor, but to use set-theory in-
stead as a kind of philosophical allegory, as attested by Badiou’s unorthodox treatment of the null
set, and it is thus correlationist from the ground up. (On the null set, see Badiou 2005, 68 and
90). Ricardo L. Nirenberg and David Nirenberg have, in any case, contested Being and Event’s claims
to rigor, were it to make them, in their “Badiou’s Number: A Critique of Mathematics as Ontology”
(Nirenberg and Nirenberg 2011).
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Frege, both the statement and the name possess reference (what would make the
statement true, and in the case of the name, the object named) and a sense
(which Frege later called the “thought”). Frege could treat concepts as he did in
part because the statements in which they function are understood in terms of
these supposedly autonomous meanings and senses, and thereby viewed, to this ex-
tent, as independent.²⁰
Statements and names possess self-subsistent ideal senses for Frege, a notion
Meillassoux surprisingly at one moment himself credits.²¹ This construal, which
later is overtaken in analytic philosophy by the attempt simply to formalize the se-
mantics of statements, in both versions ultimately proves unsuccessful, however.
For one thing, indexicals, such as “I” or “here” or “now,” with their inherent seman-
tic incompleteness, their lack of stable meaning in respect to what they designate,
are never able to be entirely subtracted from the equation; no construal of the state-
ment can wholly factor out their operation, especially when it comes to naming and
names.²² “I” or “this” always involves an expression’s context and thus provides no
meanings that can simply be lifted out of it and stand alone, even if there may be
rules for generating other sorts of significations (turning “I” into “Josh,” for exam-
ple). In addition, statements may appear in what are called indirect contexts, within
reports about a speaker’s beliefs or other attitudes. The truth of the latter, however,
vary from the truth or falsity of the statement when it stands alone, thus raising the
question of how their own semantics are to be understood.
“Johnny believes Flipper is a fish,” to take an example, obviously may be true
even when “Flipper is a fish” is false. Frege, accordingly, attempts to distinguish ref-
erences and senses in the two cases. Specifically, he claims that the embedded state-
ment (“Flipper is a fish” appearing in “Johnny believes that Flipper is a fish”) has for
its reference the meaning of this same statement when it stands alone. In this case,
when embedded, the reference of “Flipper is a fish” is not Flipper and his possible
fishiness, but the meaning of the statement that speaks of such. But if this is so, what
this statement’s own new meaning is in this context (what “Flipper is a fish” means
when it appears in “Johnny believes that Flipper is a fish”) seems inexplicable. If its
old meaning becomes its new reference, what meaning can this expression now em-
bedded in the new statement have? Alternatively, if it has no meaning, as some com-
mentators suggest that Frege came to believe, how can a statement contain referen-
ces without meaning, yet still be capable of independently being adjudicated true or
false?²³
 For the relationship between sense, reference, and “thought,” see, respectively, Frege 1997a and
Frege 1997b.
 Meillassoux affirms that “generally speaking, statements are ideal insofar as their reality is one of
signification” (Meillassoux 2008, 12).
 On indexicals and these issues more broadly, see Kates 2015.
 Sluga somewhere suggests that Frege eventually came to believe that they lacked all meaning ‒
how that suggestion would work, however, clearly presents a conundrum (Sluga 1999).
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In Frege’s account, then, the instability of concepts ultimately combines with the
instability of statements, the latter being the contexts in which concepts themselves
are found. As a result, statements do not close on themselves, nor can names be as-
signed fixed senses and references. No regimentation can organize once and for all
concepts, extensions, and their various levels. Accordingly, the project of treating
what is said, discourse, in separation from its background, from the actual contexts
it operates in, including those things and subject matters talked about, cannot itself
be maintained. Frege’s model at both its upper and its lower reaches frays, yielding a
continuum of understanding and insight, wherein not just concepts, but sentences
and names must recur to other instances of their use to articulate what they say
and mean, in a fashion that also requires attention to the referents in question, to
these expressions’ subject matters.
Indeed, it follows from Frege’s failure that ultimately neither what a statement
says nor whether it may be true can be known without acquaintance with other in-
stances of talk!, as well as with what is being talked about, instances which neces-
sarily in part recur to the speaker’s and the hearer’s history. Once Frege’s stipulations
cease to hold sway, to understand both what “Flipper is a fish” expresses, as well as
whether it is true or false, attention must be paid at once to the fact that it is little
Johnny who says it, and to the matter being talked about (“Flipper” in context
could be the name of his dog who has just jumped in a fountain), as well as other
related expressions (“sushi is fish”) and topics (whales, porpoises, tuna, their habits
and habitats), yielding not an intentionalism, but a triangulation across differing di-
mensions, all of which are in motion. In a similar vein, at the present juncture, phys-
icists can identify and generate new subatomic particles on the basis of particle
physics’ current theorizations, though these theories include problems, the resolu-
tion of which may change the contents and character of these observations them-
selves. Both aspects, what is observed and what is theorized, are correlated with con-
texts, and hence also with where researchers stand within this discursive middle
ground. What Frege would call the concept and the world are both in play, and
with them come what is said and what is being talked about and their history.
Leeway, to be clear, remains for truth, ultimately construed as an irruption from
elsewhere, since these statements’ very articulations, their ability to express any-
thing at all, are deemed impossible in isolation from referents and the world.
Hence, no construction of what exists by thought or speech is here in question. As
a result, the present conception, unlike his own, avoids what Meillassoux calls cor-
relationism, at least to this extent. While no “view from nowhere” here takes hold ‒
that pre-Kantian correlationism toward which Meillassoux at times backslides being
rejected, indeed owing to understanding’s finitude ‒ on the present account things
and their determinations can and do meet us from unexpected directions of their
own devising. Thinking and being follow different careers, even as they also inter-
sect.
Having arrived at this middle ground, some of its implications for literary stud-
ies, finally, may be briefly unfolded. This ground and its corresponding hermeneutic
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view of truth (hermeneutic solely in that things’ unfoldings and their understanding
and expression are always preceded by prior episodes of each), both imply facticity,
not in some perhaps fanciful Kantian sense, but in Heidegger’s. Facticity indicates
that world ‒ understood as a pre-existing nexus of things and understanding ‒ pre-
cedes each individual instance of expression and any encounter with specific exis-
tents. On existence and existents holistically conceived, a genuinely wild, because
never fully apparent, real, in turn, will have already left its mark. Owing to facticity,
persons have always already been handed over to a world already there in a way that
entails that the finitude of understanding has a supra-finite, or indeed in a different
sense than Cantor’s, transfinite real as its correlate. While thought has always been
tethered to a world in Heidegger’s holistic and practical sense, a transfinite real ‒ the
ultimate reference of what Frege called the true ‒ has also previously left its mark on
this arrangement. Facticity thus pertains not just to the individual persons who come
upon the scene, but to this entire matrix. The backgrounding thereby afforded, in
which the real has always already been taken up, in turn, lets the difference between
what is and what is said be maintained, while honoring their mutual yet differing
intelligibility, yielding at once a confluence and divergence of thought and things.
Facticity, in short, on the present account, enables a (non-naïve) realism.²⁴ In
turn, as so conceived, reality and the real prove capacious enough for literature, lit-
erary criticism, the arts, and the humanities to field insights and truths on their own
terms. Any final, stable one-to-one correspondence between statements and their
subject matters having ceased to be in question, while the statement as such is no
longer privileged, multiple modes of expression and their corresponding insights
can now be seen to operate. In these instances, too, the real precedes any given ar-
ticulation, it overflows every context, while also giving itself in them. Accordingly,
literature and criticism, as well as the arts and humanistic disciplines can have an
eye to their subject matters and pursue their concerns with an aim at some sort of
truth, while drawing on their own various traditionalities or historicities, articulating
understandings in their specific fashions, albeit these are never determinative in ad-
vance of what transpires in any given instance.
Indeed, statements, descriptions, and reports never speak apart from their im-
mersion in larger contexts of utterance and understanding, owing to their appurte-
nance to the middle ground here in question. Literature, criticism, and the human-
ities, however, regularly bring just such larger contexts forward and explicitly make
them parts of their own talk! The complex dimensionality inherent in this middle
ground, which allows for, rather than checking, insight (without feigning to escape
its own temporally conditioned existence) in our disciplines explicitly enters into un-
derstanding texts, posing problems, disclosing truths, and/or generating new feel-
 Hence on the present view, fossils, to take Meillassoux’s example, can be, and also can be fossils.
That fossils would have existed had human beings not sprung up hundreds of millions of years or
even billions of years after their formation, no one actually doubts. The understanding that fossils
exist, however, would not, of course, itself exist under these same circumstances.
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ings and sensibilities. Humanistic instances and their understanding uniquely fore-
ground their own embeddedness and implicit traditionality, though the possibility
for this sort of scrutiny inheres in all discourse or talk!
On the present account, inquiry and truth, are not only broadened, then, extend-
ed to the arts and humanities, but turn out to be filiated, funiculated, organized in
strings, temporal and historical. This middle ground’s lack of closure entails that
every insight or problem or achievement emerges in a discourse already begun, mak-
ing possible going back over its articulations, in respect to its subject matters and its
expressions.
Accordingly, in question can never be “science,” or “nature,” but some develop-
ment (information theory, gene splicing) broached from out of an ultimately tempo-
ral aggregate of sayings, texts, and subject matters that can be gone over with an eye
to a question and a future understanding. Similarly, what is necessary for the sorts of
truths the humanities and literary criticism usually convey are not considerations
pertaining to structures and forms (as surface reading and other contemporary crit-
ical moments also suggest), nor even networks or zones of interpenetration and in-
determinacy.²⁵ Instead, attention must be paid to the relevant historicities, by way of
discursive threads themselves convened on occasion and oriented by situated prob-
lems, questions, affects, and other styles of understanding. Literature and criticism
and other humanistic disciplines must pursue questions and discoveries (as here
concerning the relation of set theory to semantics, or in other instances, evolving
types of narration or the formation and understanding of race or gender) by giving
due weight to the different traditions of understanding at play in such talk! In
these contexts, themselves reconvened with reference to the questions at issue,
and thus in their own fashion in part always novel and unprecedented, such prob-
lems and subject matters, as well as others, can be explored; only there and then
can insights about our situation, and perhaps also at times remedies for it, be dis-
cerned.
Inquiry and insight always occur at concrete crossroads, at once both not, and
of, the critic’s own making. Discovery/invention of this type, moreover, operates
alike in poetry and science, philosophy and literary criticism, mathematics and
legal scholarship, where researchers at once understand and innovate from within
a situation both intellectual and worldly that they must also in part project, owing
to their work’s ultimately futural orientation. Of course, the view here on offer of
such achievements is not necessarily the one found in such sayings themselves:
poems, theories, theorems, literary criticism and so on. This middle ground, entailing
the historicity of all understanding, nevertheless can be traced at work in all of these
and other discursive achievements, and thus the silence of their concepts.
 On surface reading, see Best and Marcus 2009; Latour, of course, is the prime progenitor of actor-
network theory, or ANT. For an interrogation of his program, see Kates 2017.
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What does all this concretely imply for literature and literary studies, then? Nei-
ther the upper nor the lower bound holding, the middle ground here sketched being
all there is, in the end, it is fair to say that all speech effectively is literary speech: all
talk! involves a new sighting, an attention to some, as in part still undetermined,
subject matter, along with inviting, if not always necessitating, an eye to the
means and medium of that subject matter’s articulation on a given occasion. Other-
wise stated, judgement, critique, is poetic; it inevitably involves poeisis, a kind of
making, not of its subjects, but their understanding. The reverse, however, also is
the case. To affirm that all speech is literary, after all, equally implies that none is,
that neither literature nor literary criticism ultimately stand apart from any other
sort of talk!
Schlegel himself perhaps had in mind a similar collapse of these distinctions
when he spoke of poetic critique. At the very least, Schlegel indicates that literary
speech may comment on other speech. The context of his remark concerns the ca-
pacity of one work (in this case Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister) to speak about another ‒
here Shakespeare’s Hamlet (a discussion and then production of which is presented
in Books III and V respectively of Goethe’s novel). For Schlegel, however, unlike in
the present instance, such retroactive potentiating of one work by another, ultimately
gives access to the aesthetic in its specificity, in its purported difference from the re-
mainder of understanding. It makes available a so-called literary absolute descended
from, but not identical to Kant’s setting out of the free play of our faculties in his Cri-
tique of Judgement.
In the present instance, however, aesthetic experience is no more subjective or
objective than any other; correspondingly, the distinction between that experience
and other sorts, and thus between literature and other discourses is not structural
or fundamental in Schlegel’s sense nor an alternative one. The difference between
literary talk! and other sorts is instead a matter of quantity, pertaining to the degree,
not to the kind, of attention paid to how what is said is said and to who is speaking,
alongside what is being talked about and the insertion of all three into an ongoing
sequence or tradition or historicity.
Accordingly, for the present approach, innovations in media (in lyric poetry,
drama, or the novel), which Kant took to be the work of genius, can never be sepa-
rated from their subject matters. As is readily evident in Thomas Pynchon’s early
works or in some of Gerhard Richter’s paintings, new views of a subject and new
means of presenting it mutually enable one another. The medium draws attention
to some phase of existence and presents it anew, in Pynchon’s and Richter’s case
this aspect often being an historical occurrence (in fact sometimes the same one,
the second world war). In turn, concern with grasping that occurrence or some
other subject matter permits innovations to be forged within their respective artistic
traditions ‒ as in Richter’s blurred paint, or Pynchon’s discovering in the molecule
responsible for a banana’s aroma a new model for his prose.
Poets, literature, the literary and the aesthetic are thus neither the antennae of
the race, nor a transcendental clue to human existence and its self-understanding.
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They do not accede to a realm apart, whether painted paradise or hell. These dis-
courses and endeavors instead work with the same tools of which the rest of us dis-
pose. This fact has never, nor does now, however, prevent literature and the other
arts from unearthing valuable nuggets, providing flashes of illumination at once
on what is and how we understand it ‒ insights that critics, thinkers, readers, and
society must both potentiate and heed.
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Bettine Menke
Theater as Critical Praxis: Interruption and
Citability
In this article, I will reflect on a question that was posed in the announcement of the
conference, on which this volume is based (“Poetic critique – is that not an oxymor-
on?”) by shifting (it) to the field of theater, where the intersection between the “po-
etic” and “critique” takes place in a specific way, and in each of the ‘elements’ of the
question, the poetic and critique. In what follows, I will consider theatrical practice
that takes a distance from itself, is divided in itself, and thereby, as the critical reflec-
tion on theatrical (re)presentation, interrupts it and allows for “critical stances” (kri-
tische Stellungnahme[n]) (Benjamin 1939, 538).¹ I will make use of concepts from Wal-
ter Benjamin, referring to notions from his essays on Brecht’s theater (Benjamin
1931b and 1939), and, where it seems apt or necessary, I will also address Friedrich
Schlegel (as well as Benjamin’s readings of Schlegel). In reading Benjamin’s essay(s)
“Was ist das epische Theater?” (“What is Epic Theater?”) – one version of which was
stopped in print in 1931 and the second of which was published anonymously in
1939² – I will focus in particular on the notions of ‘gesture,’ ‘interruption,’ and ‘cit-
ability.’³ These terms mark central tenets of Benjamin’s philosophy, that is to say of
his readings, and they have a particular relevance for theater (and not only that of
Brecht).
Benjamin explicitly relates what he sees Brecht’s theater to achieve to the con-
cept of romantic-ironic self-distancing (of form) and thereby to critique as the
(self‐)reflection of form in/on itself. Benjamin does this, on the one hand, when he
accounts for epic theater’s “awareness of being theater” in interrupting its (re)pre-
sention with the old phrase: “an actor should reserve for himself the possibility of
falling out of character artistically” (Benjamin 1939, 538).⁴ Thus, Benjamin brings
Note: Translation by Jason Kavett
 All translations of Benjamin’s and of other texts are modified where necessary. Throughout the ar-
ticle, the references usually list the page numbers for both the original edition and for the translation.
The first page number refers to the original.
 In 1931, Walter Benjamin wrote “Was ist das epische Theater? Eine Studie zu Brecht,” invited by
Siegfried Kracauer to be published in the journal Frankfurter Zeitung. It was stopped while being
printed by the editor Bernhard Diepold (cf. Benjamin GS II, 1374, 1379–1381; printing proof and docu-
ment in Wizisla 2017, 71–80). Benjamin wrote a second version, “Was ist das epische Theater?,” to be
published anonymously in the bimonthly magazine Maß und Wert 2/6 (1939).
 There is some overlap here in wording and ideas with my article “Gesture and Citability: Theater as
Critical Praxis” (Critique: The Stakes of Form. Eds. Sami Khatib, Holger Kuhn, Oona Lochner, Isabel
Mehl, and Beate Söntgen. Berlin: diaphanes, 261–296).
 “Der Schauspieler soll sich die Möglichkeit vorbehalten, mit Kunst aus der Rolle zu fallen.” (Ben-
jamin 1939, 306–307)
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the concept of parekbasis and thereby the paradigmatic figure of ‘romantic irony’
into play, which he, on the other hand, immediately rejects as a flawed analogy
for the epic/gestural theater.
According to Benjamin’s doctoral dissertation, Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der
deutschen Romantik, the “critique of a work [die Kritik des Werkes] is […] its reflec-
tion” (Benjamin 1920, 78/159), which “drives [its form] out of itself” (73/156).⁵ This
is the case, because the form of the work ‘is’ self-limitation, and therefore ‘is’ not,
but rather remains bound to what is excluded, what is external to it (Benjamin
speaks of the ‘contingency’ [Zufälligkeit] to be excluded). Therefore, in order not to
remain ‘limited,’ it must relate itself to its own constitution and refer to the formless-
ness from which it has emerged, which it excludes while delimiting itself. Thus, the
“criterion” (Maßstab) of “immanent critique/criticism” is the “immanent tendency of
the work,” the reflection of its form on its form(giving) (77/159). “Critique fulfills its
task by” “resolving […] the original reflection” of its form (form as “the work’s own
reflection”) “into a higher one and continuing it in this way,” since this deferral out
of itself always attains form again (73/156).⁶ Tieck’s comedies are well known as ex-
amples of the romantic irony of form.⁷ His Puss in Boots, to which Benjamin explicitly
refers in the second text from 1939, is a case of reflection of the play in/on itself. The
play performs what Benjamin refers to as the most ‘evident’ “technique” of a “play
within the play” in The Origin of the German Trauerspiel: “the stage itself” “is set up
on the stage, or the spectators’ space is incorporated within the space of the stage,”
which mirrors or folds the play and its framework into the occurrences on stage (Ben-
jamin 1928a, 261/69). In this play, the actors, in ‘falling out’ of character, assert them-
selves ‘beside’ the dramatic figures, thereby establishing a duality between actors
and dramatic figures.
Parekbasis as gesture, with which a figure on the stage turns away from the dra-
matic scene, had traditionally been chalked up as a failure of ancient comedy, be-
cause it interrupts the dramatic illusion of what is taking place on the stage⁸ in ad-
dressing the audience. Friedrich Schlegel not only re-evaluated this gesture of
speech⁹ but also defined romantic irony tout court as “a permanent parekbasis.”¹⁰
The reflection of the play – this is what makes it paradoxical – performs the consti-
tution of what may become presented by means of its delimiting (folded into the play
 “[T]he unity of the single work” is “continually being displaced [from itself] into irony and criti-
cism.” (Benjamin 1920, 86/164)
 “Formal irony […] presents a paradoxical venture: to build on the formation even through demo-
lition [am Gebilde noch durch Abbruch zu bauen]” (Benjamin 1920, 87/165).
 See Benjamin 1920, 84/163; also Benjamin 1939, 538/307; cf. de Man 1996, 178.
 See de Man 1996, 178, 177– 180.
 See Schlegel 1794 [1979], esp. 30.
 “Die Ironie ist eine permanente Parekbase” (Schlegel 1797 [1963]: KFSA, XVIII, 85 [Fr. 668]). De
Man reformulates this ‘permanence’ of the parekbasis of romantic irony as a self-disruptive turn-
ing-away, which can occur or may have occurred anytime, everywhere, and at every moment (de
Man 1996, 178–179).
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and its framework)¹¹ in that it presents the processes of constitution,which must con-
tinually be carried out as figural separations between that which belongs, between
form, between what is ‘actually presented,’ and the digressions, additions, or mar-
ginal occurences, what is merely contingent or not meaningful: without reaching a
conclusion and thereby a ground or a separation of form or figure from the formless
or (the figure’s) ground. In the potentiated (potenziert, a concept from early German
Romanticism)¹² displacement or transgression of delimited form and its framework
in/to play, the limit/border that decides about form becomes always again and
still uncertain,¹³ becomes always again and still unrecognizable, its contours diffuse
in an undecidable manner.
But Benjamin states with unusual clarity that it would be “erroneous” (irrig) to
recognize the “old Tieckian dramaturgy of reflection” within the Brechtian praxis of
theater (Benjamin 1931b, 529/11, cf. 522/4; 1939, 538–539/307). The latter performs the
theatrical presentation’s taking a distance (from/to itself) in a different way, as its
interruption taking place in presentation: as “gestural theatre” (Benjamin 1931b,
521/3).¹⁴ The theatrical presentation’s “awareness of being theater” is indeed a theat-
rical one: manifesting in gestures, its citability, and the interruptions they open up.
According to Benjamin, epic theater thereby withdraws itself from ‘professional’ criti-
cism and contests it and its failed standards.¹⁵ It does so with the distance the play
takes from itself, by letting “intervals” into itself, which are to incite the audience to
take a “critical stance” (kritische Stellungnahme):
Thus, intervals emerge which rather undermine the illusion of the audience and paralyze its
readiness for empathy. These intervals are reserved for the audience’s critical stance toward
the behavior of the persons and the way they are presented. (Benjamin 1939 [trans. 2006], 306)
So entstehen Intervalle, die die Illusion des Publikums eher beeinträchtigen. Sie lähmen seine
Bereitschaft zur Einfühlung. Diese Intervalle sind seiner kritischen Stellungnahme (zum darge-
 When (limited) form interrupts itself ironically and reflects itself, it still does not escape what is
limited, the conditionality of theater, in the “paradoxical reflection of play and illusiveness” (para-
doxen Reflexion von Spiel und Schein) (Benjamin 1928a, 261/69).
 What this potentiation refers to here is an ‘irony of irony’: the ironizing turning (away) of the rep-
resentation from and out of itself does not allow something else to be understood as what is (really)
meant but rather suspends the decision about the position of speech, its object, and its addressee, in
favor of its potential deferrals (cf. Schlegel 1800, KFSA II, 368).
 In the potentialization of the folding of what presents into what is represented, it is uncertain
where the contour between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ is: does the puss in boots fall out of his
role when he climbs up a tree in fear? Or does the actor fall out of his role into the role of the
puss in boots? Or something else? In this falling out of the role, what is shown in Tieck’s comedies,
according to Szondi, is not the actors but rather the “role,” which takes distance from their “dramatic
existence” (Szondi 1978, 28–31/68–75).
 See also Benjamin 1939, 536/305; cf. his drafts “Studien zur Theorie des epischen Theaters” (Ben-
jamin GS II, 1380– 1382).
 The critics have to become aware: “ihren Agentencharakter aufgedeckt und zugleich außer Kurs
geraten” (Benjamin 1931b, 527–528/9– 10).
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stellten Verhalten der Personen und zu der Art, in der es dargestellt wird) vorbehalten. (Benja-
min 1939, 538)
Through his acting/playing, the actor has to demonstrate (in seinem Spiel auszuweis-
en [538]) the “intervals” as interruptions let into the theatrical presentation, in the
action on the stage, opened up to give the audience space for their “critical stance”:
in the self-distancing of acting from what is represented and from its own presenting.
There is no place for a position of authority, no certain ground for critique (or criti-
cism).¹⁶
Epic theater, as gestural (gestisches) theater is constituted, as Benjamin puts it,
by the “Vorstellung des ‘Theaterspielens’” (Benjamin 1939, 538/306).What this refers
to is not the idea of theater-playing but, roughly, the presentation, or the ‘putting on
a show’ of “‘theater-playing’” itself, taking place in the praxis of acting/playing
(schauspielen). Benjamin accounts for this explicitly with the old phrase for parekba-
sis: “falling out of character artistically/artfully” (538/306–307). As a gesture of
speech, parekbasis is an act: a turning away, an interruption and a suspension.
But in Tieck’s Puss in Boots, this act of turning, interrupting, and addressing the
spectators in the theater is contained in a new frame, the play in the theatrical
play. Thus, parekbasis and the reflection of the theatrical play inside the play become
dramatic action (again). The interrupting turning away,which drives the form beyond
itself, thus is included in “Tieck’s old dramaturgy of reflection,” which would pro-
duce a rather dull satire of the philistines in the theater. But, even in this case,
the presentation is not homogeneous and is always only provisional,¹⁷ because it
is always again undecidable what and where its frame actually is; the distinction be-
tween form and its being shifted from/out of itself is, in this manner, always unde-
cidable. In parekbasis, in the speakers’ turning away from the represented action, out
of the contours of the dramatic person and out of the scene of dramatic speech, the
speakers address those others who do not belong to the represented action and who,
according to Diderot, should be made forgotten by what is represented and by the
actors who represent – for the sake of illusion and empathy. Diderot’s fictive fourth
wall represented the closure or containment of the play in itself. Benjamin refers to
this self-containment by speaking of the “pit” (Graben) into which the “abyss” (Ab-
grund), “which separates the actors from the audience as the dead from the living,”
and which “bears the most indelible traces of its sacral origin” (Benjamin 1939, 539/
307), had then been transformed, and which thereby becomes obsolete. It is decisive
that, according to Benjamin, “[t]he aims of theater (today) ([w]orum es heute im The-
 According to Benjamin’s “Memorandum” to Krisis und Kritik (Benjamin 1930, 619), the journal
conceived by Brecht and Benjamin in 1930 and 1931 (with obvious reference to the events of the
times), critique cannot “rely on authorities” ([sich] im Ganzen nicht auf Autoritäten stützen). It is nec-
essary to draw “radical conclusions from the unfoundedness and untenability of authoritiy” (Müller-
Schöll 2002, 310). For more on the journal project, see “Konzeptgespräch” (in Wizisla 2017, 102– 104).
 On provisionality and its incompatibility with drama, see Szondi 1978, 26/1986, 68–69.
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ater geht) can be defined more precisely in terms of the stage than in terms of a new
form of drama” (Benjamin 1931b, 519/1; 1939, 539/307) – thus through its relating oth-
erwise to the stage that has been transformed into a “podium,” whereas the ordinary
old theater business continues to operate an ‘obsolete’ “stage apparatus” (Benjamin
1939, 539/307).¹⁸
Benjamin’s reservation that the gesture, the taking distance of the actors in ges-
tural theater, should not “remind” us of romantic irony (538/307) is not only an ob-
jection against its restrictive performance in terms of Tieck’s “old dramaturgy of
reflection.” In his book on romantic criticism, Benjamin had already pointed out
the insufficiency of the romantic concept of critique. As “medial, continuous trans-
position” of the reflection of form (Benjamin 1920, 70/154), the romantic critique of
art that “drives [form] out of itself” (73/156) should be both: “on the one hand, the
completion, consummation, and systematization of the work and, on the other
hand, its resolution in the absolute” (78/159).¹⁹ If thereby the “unity of the individual
work” shall “continually be displaced in irony and criticism/critique,” then in this
way a continuum of artworks and the “idea” of art is conceived (86/164),²⁰ without
the conflict between the work (of art) and (the idea of) art actually becoming man-
ifest. According to Benjamin – contrary to Friedrich Schlegel – it is not that critique/
criticism should be poetic, but poetic form is (“immanent”) critique/criticism of itself;
critique does not process the “continuity” of the work (of art) and shift in(to) art, but
rather sets a caesura. Benjamin invokes the “caesura,” the “inexpressive” (das Aus-
druckslose) as “critical violence,” which has to impede and shatter the work’s “false
totality.”²¹ And in an explicit revision of the romantic concept of critique/criticism as
reanimation – or to quote again Friedrich Schlegel on the poetic critic, who will “add
to the work” and “rejuvenate” it (ergänzen, verjüngern) (Schlegel 1798, 140/281) –
Benjamin, in The Origin of the German Trauerspiel, defines critique as the “mortifica-
 “Auf diesem Podium gilt es sich einzurichten. Das ist die Lage. Wie aber vielen Zuständen gege-
nüber, so hat sich auch bei diesem der Betrieb ihn zu verdecken vorgesetzt, statt ihm Rechnung zu
tragen” (Benjamin 1931b, 519/1; Benjamin 1939, 539/307). As Benjamin postulates in “Der Autor als
Produzent”: No “apparatus of production” (Produktionsapparat) should be supplied without chang-
ing it or giving it a new function (Benjamin 1934, 691–692/774–775).
 “[E]inerseits Vollendung, Ergänzung, Systematisierung des Werkes, andererseits seine Auflösung
im Absoluten” (Benjamin 1920, 78). “Both of these processes coincide in the end” (Benjamin 1920, 78/
159). “Formal irony […] presents a paradoxical venture: to build on the formation even through dem-
olition, to demonstrate in the work itself its relationship to the idea” (Die formale Ironie […] stellt den
paradoxen Versuch dar, am Gebilde noch durch Abbruch zu bauen: im Werke selbst seine Beziehung auf
die Idee zu demonstrieren) (Benjamin 1920, 87/165).
 See also Benjamin 1920, 87–91/165–167.
 The conclusion of Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik alludes to this with refer-
ence to Goethe (Benjamin 1920, 111– 115). The work, a concept for which Goethe stands, needs, as
Benjamin has it in “Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften,” the caesura as the expressionless (ausdruck-
slose) interruption, the “critical violence” that applies to the mistaken mythical supposition of whole-
ness, that “completes the work, which shatters it into a broken piece [Stückwerk], into a fragment of
the true world” (Benjamin 1924– 1926, 181– 182).
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tion of works,” as which critique takes effect in complicity with the duration in which
the works decay and endure as débris.²²
Benjamin claims that “for all its skills of reflection, the Romantic stage never
succeeded in doing justice to the […] relationship between theory and praxis”
(dem Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis gerecht zu werden) (Benjamin 1931b, 529/
11– 12). Tieck – that is Benjamin’s reservation – merely demonstrates his being “phil-
osophically savvy” (seine philosophische Informiertheit): “the world may ultimately
prove to be a theater” (Benjamin 1939, 538/307).²³ In contrast, gestural theater
copes with the relation between theory and praxis “with the ongoing setting-apart
[Auseinandersetzung] of the action which is shown on the stage [Bühnenvorgang]
and the behavior of showing on the stage [Bühnenverhalten]” (Benjamin 1931b,
529/11). Quoting Brecht, Benjamin characterizes the relatedness and division of
both actions in the play-acting as the actors’ “showing a thing” and “showing them-
selves”:
The actor must show a thing, and he must show himself. He naturally shows the thing by show-
ing himself, and he shows himself by showing the thing. Although these two tasks coincide,
they must not coincide to such a point that the contrast (difference) between them disappears.
(Brecht, cit. in Benjamin 1931b [trans. 1998], 11)
Der Schauspieler muß eine Sache zeigen, und er muß sich zeigen. Er zeigt die Sache natürlich,
indem er sich zeigt, und er zeigt sich, indem er die Sache zeigt. Obwohl dies zusammenfällt, darf
es doch nicht so zusammenfallen, daß der Gegensatz (Unterschied) zwischen diesen beiden Auf-
gaben verschwindet. (Cit. in Benjamin 1931b, 529) ²⁴
‘Showing a thing’ would “coincide” with the actors’ ‘showing themselves’ in playing
(as acting) (Vorspielen); thus, precisely, the play is split and doubled in itself (in sich
entzweit): The “ongoing setting-apart of the action which is shown on the stage and
the behavior of showing on the stage” (Benjamin 1931b, 529/11) is what constitutes
gestural theater. This is taking place in theatrical performance, in playing and putting
on an act, in the playing’s/acting’s practice, turning it to – im-plicating – theory. The
text from 1939 continues: “The extent to which artistic and political interests coincide
in the epic theater can be easily seen in its mode of playing” (die Art des Spiels) (Ben-
jamin 1939, 538/307). This is not (so much) because of its political content, but rather
due to precisely the ongoing process of setting-apart: the Auseinandersetzung in act-
 See Benjamin 1928a, 357/193. Critique/criticism is a mode of the “living-on of works,” where these
no longer belong to art, which is “merely a transitional stage of great works.” This is analogous to the
status of translation in Benjamin’s notes on critique/criticism in the context of Krisis und Kritik in 1931
(Benjamin GS VI, 174, 170– 172). The scope of Benjamin’s concept of critique/criticism is thus indicat-
ed (see Steiner 2000).
 See also Benjamin 1931b, 529/11– 12. With this, the presupposed givenness of both “world” and
“theater” would merely be confirmed. And the counterpart to this (which is merely inverted) is the
stage as “‘the planks, which mean the world’” (520/2).
 In the text’s second version, see Benjamin 1939, 538/306.
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ing/playing (Vorspielen), which allows “the one showing – the actor as such – [to be]
shown” (Benjamin 1931b, 529/11). Thereby, in epic theater, “the awareness that it is
theater” “is incessantly asserted,” something which the naturalistic theater must re-
press in order to “devote itself,” without being “distracted,” to the supposed repre-
sentation of the supposed real (522/4). And this “awareness” is politically relevant.
This can be argued by referring to Benjamin’s essay on “historical drama,” writ-
ten close in time to (and in thematic proximity with) The Origin of the German Trauer-
spiel.²⁵ Here, Benjamin presents the “historical drama” as a “problem,” since it as-
sumes a “meaning of the determinateness” (Sinn der Determiniertheit) of the
dramatic action, for which the recourse to causality would be insufficient: history
can “only” “claim dramatic truth” as “fate”; it must present “history as fate” (Benja-
min 1923, 276, 250).²⁶ But it can only do that as the “play” that drama is. “When the
drama of play [Dramatik des Spiels] is confronted with historical subject matters, it
finds itself compelled to unfold fate as play. It is precisely this cleavage [Zwiespalt]
that constitutes the ‘romantic tragedy’” (260). The play-character, which the “fate”
of the “drama of fate” inevitably has (and exhibits), requires the “romantic,” that
is, “paradoxical reflection of play and semblance [Spiel und Schein]” (Benjamin
1928a, 261–262/69). If the “world of fate,” or rather, of the “dramas of fate” is “closed
in itself” (in sich geschlossen) (Benjamin 1923, 267; 1928a, 262/71), this world is none
other than the stage, the “strictly delimited space” of the theater-play (Benjamin
1923, 272): Fate is presented “as play,” as the play (Schauspiel) and its framings
are ‘playfully’ reflected as a play, mirrored inside of its constitutive delimitations,
“minimizing” (verkleinernd) and “framing” it (umrahmend) (Benjamin 1923, 268–
269; 1928a, 262/70).²⁷ In contrast, when taken seriously, when “fate is postulated as
real” (das Schicksal schlechthin real […] gesetzt [werde]), that is, “only in the bad, un-
romantic tragedies of fate” (Benjamin 1923, 272), such “historical dramas” that pre-
sent history “as fate”must fail.Without the exposition of the play that it is – that is to
say, without the disruptive entry of theater into what is represented – the play of fate
(which cannot be other than a deliberate assemblage) will be forgotten or repressed.
Thus, “unromantic historical dramas” fall prey to a “realistic” misunderstanding of
“fate” or of the necessity of reality (or history).
 In making this reference to Benjamin’s The Origin of the German Trauerspiel and its contexts, we
also recall that, on the one hand, the awkward German baroque Trauerspiel (not closed in itself) re-
fers to the coming “most recent experiments in drama” (neuesten Versuchen) (Benjamin 1928a, 390/
235). And, on the other hand, according to the text’s inquiry into the Brechtian theater, this theater
emerges from a non-linear tradition, travelling on smuggler’s paths and mule’s tracks, of a whole dis-
orderly clan (Sippe) of anti-dramatic theater forms, to which the baroque Trauerspiel belonged (Ben-
jamin 1931b, 523/5). On the relations between Benjamin’s texts on epic theater and the Trauerspiel
(book), see Müller-Schöll 2002, 50–52, 110– 112, 139.
 Here and in what follows, see also B. Menke 2005.
 It is the “Verkleinerung des Reflektierten” in the play (im Spiel) (Benjamin 1928a, 306, 260–262/
126, 68–71.
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Against the “naturalistic” confusion of the events on the stage with the extra-
theatrical world,²⁸ ‘epic theater’ precisely does not perform without being distracted,
but rather, has a “productive awareness” “incessantly” that “it is theater” (Benjamin
1931b, 522/4). In Brecht’s theater, “historical incidents” (Vorgänge), according to Ben-
jamin citing Brecht (Benjamin 1931b, 525; 1939, 533/303), resist, precisely, the Dra-
matik des Spiels (Benjamin 1923, 260), the dramatic conception of the theatrical
play. Since the course they follow is known, they do not preoccupy spectators
with comprehendingly following (Nachvollzug) the course of action. Therefore, ac-
cording to Benjamin (but not Brecht), they allow theater “to loosen the […] joints
of the plot [Fabel] to the limits of the possible” (bis an die Grenze des Möglichen)
(Benjamin 1931b, 525/8; 1939, 533/303).²⁹ Hence, what is “incommensurable” to the
plot, what is not along the “lines of expectation” (Fluchtlinien der Erwartung) (Ben-
jamin 1931b, 525), is allowed to come to the fore, with its known and presupposed
connections being “loosened.”³⁰ Instead of presupposing the given “state (of things)”
(Zustände) as to be imitated, theater as theater is handled as a Versuchsanordnung,
that is, as an “experimental disposition” (522/4) which always also refers to its re-
spective framing – where the Zustände that may stand “at the end” of the experiment
are possible (522/4) – and thereby refers beyond the particular frame and the
Zustände it reveals too. This kind of theater-playing, then, makes the contingency
of theater “productive” – in taking this basic attitude (Grundhaltung): “‘It can happen
in this way or in a completely different way’” (“Es kann so kommen, aber es kann auch
ganz anders kommen”; quotation marks are Benjamin’s) (525/8).³¹ “Where someone
experiments, there reigns no necessity; rather, possibilities are obtained,” states
Christoph Menke (2005, 145/117). “At the end,” that is, retroactively, or belatedly,
what is shown in “the experimental disposition” (Versuchsanordnung) may be (re)
cognized as the “real state of things” (die wirklichen Zustände) (Benjamin 1931b,
522/4). Then not only the events on the stage, but also die wirklichen Zustände are
cognizable as not necessary, that is, as possible otherwise: They could not be, or
be different, and are always accompanied by the shadows of other possibilities.³²
 See Benjamin 1939, 539/307. Benjamin’s text from 1931 finds the traces of the interrelation between
irony and criticism in Strindberg’s histories, which have “paved the way for the gestural theater”
(Benjamin 1931b, 526/8).
 Benjamin’s metaphor “wie ein Ballettmeister der Elevin” (Benjamin 1931b, 525; 1939, 533/303)
would have to be read as very specifically gendered. The Brechtian theory of theater is bound to
plot or Fabel (cf. Lehmann 2002, 219–237; see also Lehmann 2016, 147– 164, esp. 157–159).
 On the “epic extension” (Streckung) of “historical incidents” (geschichtliche Vorgänge) “by a par-
ticular mode of acting, by placards, and by onstage captions,” see Benjamin 1939, 533/303; 1931b,
524–526).
 See Lehmann 2002, 368.
 The abandonment of the illusion of the reality of ‘how it really was’ is decisive for Benjamin’s
concept of historiography and its relation to its ‘subject matters,’ which are not to be conceived as
pregiven (cf. especially Über den Begriff der Geschichte, 1935– 1940).
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While what constitutes gestural theater is the “presentation of play-acting [Vor-
stellung des Theaterspielens]” (Benjamin 1939, 538/306), this is not to be read as a ref-
erence to a (Brechtian) theoretical concept (Vorstellung) but rather with respect to the
“presentation of playing” in acting.What is emphasized is the practice of play-act-
ing,³³ the playing itself – which is doubled and divided in itself and thereby is de-
pendent on and engenders insight. Playing (in) theater (Vorspielen) brings “the rela-
tion of the performed action to that, which is given as such in the performance,” “to
expression” (Benjamin 1931b, 529/11),³⁴ since it unfolds the relation of both as divi-
sion of both, and at the same time exposes, in both “actions,” their non-identity,
their difference from themselves. Thus, theater-practice is divided in and from itself:
it is never one, never identical with itself: it is foreign to itself. Brecht’s theater, ac-
cording to Hans-Thies Lehmann (2002, 231), referred “to a radicalized self-foreign-
ness, or an internal otherness, alterity […] from which Brecht – in theory – always
shrinks away in fear.”
“[T]he relation of the performed action to the action given in the performance as
such” is brought “to expression” (Benjamin 1931b, 529/11) insofar as the relationship
between the two is blocked in the gesture; thus, they do not collapse into one anoth-
er. The gesture is not the expression of something that supposedly preceded it;³⁵ it is
not a form of expression, whether involuntarily or historically conventionalized; it
contradicts the representational model and asserts itself as an act in its dynamis in-
transitively against anything that it would ‘carry.’³⁶ It is an “element” of a stance
(Haltung) as a halt, an interruption of the courses of events that “retards” them,³⁷
and sets itself apart, incompatible with any interest in the coherence of action.³⁸
In a gesture of casualness, Benjamin highlights the “interruption [as] one of the
fundamental procedures of all form-giving,” bringing in citation: “To cite a text also
 Thereby ‘practice’ does not apply to the ‘real’ reality outside of theater as opposed to the illusion-
ary theatrical play. The relation between play and world is put differently by Christoph Menke, who
distinguishes the action of playing something to someone [Handlung des Vorspielens] from the (con-
cept of) praxis (derived from prattein), which is aim-oriented and completes itself in the achievement
of the aim (C. Menke 2018, 45; 2005, 123–125, 128– 129/98– 100, 103– 104).
 “[D]as Verhältnis der aufgeführten Handlung zu derjenigen, die im Aufführen überhaupt gegeben
ist, zum Ausdruck zu bringen” (Benjamin 1931b, 529). See Benjamin 1939, 538–539/306–307.
 Regarding the common understandings of gesture as a sign bound to semantics, see Meyer 2004,
61.
 See also, very close to Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben, “Notes on Gesture” (Agamben 1993, 133– 140/
49–54); on gestures becoming intransitive (with reference to Bergson and Barthes), see Meyer 2004,
56–57.
 See Benjamin 1931b, 521–523/3–5. In the second text: “‘one waited until the crowd had laid the
sentences on the scale.’ In short the play was interrupted.” (“‘abgewartet wurde, bis die Menge die
Sätze auf die Waagschale gelegt hatte.’ Kurz das Spiel wurde unterbrochen.”) (Benjamin 1939, 535–
536/305)
 “Until now it was missed” that “there might be an even unbridgeable discrepancy between what
Brecht‘s idea of gesture is aiming at and his concept of the plot [Fabel]” (Lehmann 2002, 231, also
214–216; Lehmann 2016, 159).
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means: to interrupt its context” (Benjamin 1939, 535–536/305).³⁹ The epic theater,
“which is organized by interruption, [is therefore] a citable [theater] in a specific
sense” (das epische Theater, das auf die Unterbrechung gestellt ist, [ist] ein in spezifi-
schem Sinne zitierbares); not only in the sense of the “citability of its texts,” but
rather with respect to the “gestures that have their place in the course of the play”
(536/305).⁴⁰ With gesture, there is no form specified that critique could assume;
rather, it is an ‘entry of form’ and as entry it is disruptive, form-giving, but not an es-
tablished form. It is an act of giving that is suspended before its becoming present (as
something),⁴¹ not something that could be stated, but in the very process held out
before this. This must also be opposed to concepts of theory as a ‘content’ to be
learned or taught.⁴² Thereby the ‘position’ of theory as such is affected.
Benjamin conceptualizes “the actor’s most important accomplishment” to
“‘make gestures citable’” [“‘Gesten zitierbar zu machen’”] by making a stunning com-
parison: “he must be able to space out his gestures as the typesetter spaces out
words [seine Gebärden muß er sperren können, wie ein Setzer die Worte]” (Benjamin
1931b, 529/11). Theater is thereby thought of according to the spatial arrangement of
letters and the typeface of books.⁴³ Gestures are not only produced by means of the
interruption of an action; rather, they interrupt the course, setting themselves off as
an extended – retarding – interruption, like the typesetter, who spaces out words by
expanding the spaces between letters into interstices, which in turn separate the let-
ters (from each other) in such a way that the words space out (sperren) or block the
course of the sentence by inserting intervals in themselves, and setting themselves
 In “Karl Kraus,” Benjamin sets the task of “unbinding” the “force” (Kraft) in citation: “to expur-
gate, to destruct, the only [force] that gives hope [zu reinigen, zu zerstören; die einzige [Kraft], in der
noch Hoffnung liegt]” (Benjamin 1931a, 365); this relates to the status of citation in Benjamin’s concept
of historiography as expounded in his Passagenwerk (Benjamin 1934– 1940, 595 [N 113]).
 At around 1931, Benjamin defined criticism/critique as a mode of citation (cf. Benjamin’s nota-
tions [Fragmente zur Literaturkritik], GS VI, 169– 171 [Fr. 135 and 136], 161–162, [Fr. 32]).
 This is how Jacques Derrida conceives of the gift. See Derrida 1992, 12–15, 23–27, 38–42, 100–
102, 111– 112; see also (referring to Nancy) Lehmann 2002, 367–368.
 The “relation between theory and practice” refers to the “dialectic that reigns between teaching
and learning comportment” (Benjamin 1931b, 529/11– 12). “What the Lehrstück promises to teach con-
sists not in the transmission of content, but rather in an attitude of experimental action and interpre-
tation [einer Haltung des versuchenden Selbermachens und -deutens]” (C. Menke 2005, 145/117).
Lehrstücke, “Dichtung für Übungszwecke” (Brecht, cited in Müller-Schöll 2002, 325), instead of
using the production of gestures merely as a means to an end, make them “one” of their “most im-
mediate ends” (Benjamin 1939, 536/305).
 Benjamin characterizes the baroque mourning plays (Trauerspiele) in a similar way: “daß die
Situationen nicht allzu oft, dann aber blitzartig wechselten wie der Aspekt des Satzspiegels, wenn
man umblättert” (Benjamin 1928a, 361/198). The ‘literalization’ of theater connects there: “‘Auch in
die Dramatik ist die Fußnote und das vergleichende Blättern einzuführen’” (Brecht, quoted by Ben-
jamin 1931b, 525/7). Instead of “scenery sets” (Dekorationen zu Szenen), surfaces of presentations are
assembled: “inscriptions” (Beschriftungen), “placards” (Plakate), relating to the several “numbers”
(Nummern) of the program (Benjamin 1931b, 524–525/6–7; 1939, 533/303).
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off from it, dissociating it in itself.⁴⁴ Gestures are made “citable” insofar as they are
spaced out or barred, as a damming-up of the course of action, exposing the “rela-
tion” of the “action given in performing” to “the performed action” (Benjamin 1931b,
529/11; 1939, 538–539/306–307). Gesperrt and sperrend: spaced out, barred, and
blocking, they set themselves off as “citable.”⁴⁵ Conversely they are as such given
only through their repetition or citation, and that means precisely where and insofar
as they are not themselves.⁴⁶ As Benjamin emphasizes with regard to Brecht’s Mann
ist Mann: “One and the same gesture summons Galy Gay, first to change his clothes,
and then to be shot, against the wall” (Benjamin 1931b, 530/12). Set off in the repe-
tition as gesture, that is, as citable, precisely there, where it (always already) will not
have been able to be ‘one and the same thing,’ it interrupts, by referring back and
potentially ahead to what is to come (a repetition elsewhere, sometime); it is citable
as other (to itself). In Brecht’s Die Maßnahme, one of his Lehrstücke, gestures are
cited in a very specific kind of “play within a play,”⁴⁷ that is, according to Benjamin,
“not only the report from the communists, but through their acting [Spiel] also a se-
ries of gestures of their comrade whom they acted against [des Genossen, gegen den
sie vorgingen] are brought before the party tribunal” (Benjamin 1939, 536/305). In the
acting/playing of what has happened before the tribunal and before the spectators,
one of those who have returned at each time acts/plays (spielt vor) the absent one,
whom they killed, and for whose effacing they seek a judgement.⁴⁸ In this (doubled)
Vorspielen of Vorspielen (playing/acting of playing/acting) – ex-citing, as it were, the
dead, the absent one⁴⁹ – the actors (as those who returned acting the absent dead,
whose ‘part’ they play) cite his gestures: citing them and making them citable, per-
forming them as citable by showing them as gestures. ‘Making gestures citable’ is
here the “action performed” itself. The entry to the stage, which in drama must be
integrated as a transition into the performed dramatic person, (here) is hindered
as a problematic – provisional – passage into the performance: in these cited ges-
 Benjamin cites Karl Kraus who spaces out in his citation: “die dort im G r ana t baum saß” (Ben-
jamin 1931a, 363); thereby the citation that calls out of the context is both destroying (the context)
and saving (the cited).
 See also Meyer 2004, 60–61.
 On the foreignness of the gesture to itself, insofar as it is repeated or lends itself to imitation, see
also Henri Bergson: “We […] become imitable only when we cease to be ourselves. […] To imitate any
one is to bring out the element of automatism he has allowed to creep into his person” (Bergson 1911,
33). The imitative process is cleaved in itself from the beginning (Müller-Schöll 2002, 156).
 See C. Menke 2005, 146/118.
 See Lehmann 2002, 256–257, also 264–266; in addition, see Lehmann, “Die Rücknahme der
Maßgabe” (Lehmann 2016, 165–180).
 This is to recall the (rhetorical) figure of the excitation of the absent, of the dead, of the faceless,
that is, prosopopeia. The “separation of actors and spectators as the dead from the living” (der Spieler
vom Publikum wie die Toten von den Lebendigen), which has become inoperable (Benjamin 1931b, 519/
1; 1939, 539/307), is indeed to be held by the threshold that Die Maßnahme folds onto the stage in its
playing.
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ture-citations – in spacing out these gestures – otherness, absence, defacement, pre-
vails.
Here we might recall the (word) episodion in its significance for ancient theater. It
speaks of the entrance (Zutritt) of the protagonists as a stepping-into-the-way, open-
ing up another time-space of the protagonists’ speech, disruptively opening the epi-
sodion of each entry between the choruses’ songs and dances. Every stage entry has
the character of an interrupting intrusion by a stranger. Benjamin cites this access,
which as an interruption gives and sets off episodes,⁵⁰ with the entrance of the
stranger, who in interrupting a ‘situation’ brings it to a standstill (stillstellen) and
in setting it off produces it.
The epic theater that is interested in Zustände (“the state of things”) instead of
the development of actions (Handlungen) is gestural, because these Zustände are not
available objects which would only have to be represented or imitated; rather, they
first had to be “discovered” by being “distanced from the spectator” (Benjamin
1931b, 521–522/4–5; 1939, 533/303). This discovery, in the sense of an alienation of
situations, is performed as the “courses” are interrupted and brought to a halt.⁵¹
The sudden appearance of a stranger is the gesture which interrupts the course of
things, which inserts the distance of another regard and, in effecting a standstill,
brings forth “a state” (einen Zustand) one runs into:
The most primitive example: a family scene. Suddenly a stranger enters. The wife had just been
about to clench a pillow, in order to throw it to the daughter; the father had just been about to
open the window, to call a policeman. In this moment the stranger appears in the door. A ‘ta-
bleau’ – as one called it around 1900. That means: the stranger now runs into a situation: rum-
pled bedding, open window, ravaged furnishings. But there is a gaze before which even the fa-
miliar scenes of bourgeois life do not look much different. (Benjamin 1931b [trans. 1998], 5)
Das primitivste Beispiel: eine Familienszene. Plötzlich tritt da ein Fremder ein. Die Frau war ger-
ade im Begriff, ein Kopfkissen zu ballen, um es nach der Tochter zu schleudern; der Vater im
Begriff, das Fenster zu öffnen, um einen Schupo zu holen. In diesem Augenblick erscheint in
der Tür der Fremde. ‘Tableau’ – wie man um 1900 zu sagen pflegte. Das heißt: der Fremde
stößt jetzt auf einen Zustand: zerknülltes Bettzeug, offenes Fenster, verwüstetes Mobiliar. Es
gibt aber einen Blick, vor dem auch die gewohnteren Szenen des bürgerlichen Lebens sich
nicht viel anders ausnehmen. (Benjamin 1931b, 522) ⁵²
Thus, a Zustand in the moment (Augenblick) of the interruption by the sudden entry
of a ‘spectator’ (of sorts) is brought forth to a pause (Inne-halten) and thereby ex-
 This is referred to by the “episodic character” of gestural theater, organized and presented by
“frameworks” as a disruptive-retarding setting-off of its parts (Benjamin 1931b, 521–523/4–6; 1939,
533–535/303–305).
 In the original, it says: “Diese Entdeckung (Verfremdung) von Zuständen vollzieht sich mittels der
Unterbrechung von Abläufen” (Benjamin 1939, 535/304).
 In the second text, it says: “verstörte Mienen, offenes Fenster” (Benjamin 1939, 535/305).
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posed.⁵³ Such Zustände – in this way ‘dicovered’ through interruption – may be “cog-
nized” (erkannt) by the spectator “as the real state of things (die wirklichen Zus-
tände), not [merely recognizing], as in the theater of naturalism, with a smirk, but
with amazement” (nicht, wie auf dem Theater des Naturalismus, mit Süffisance son-
dern mit Staunen) (Benjamin 1931b, 522/4).⁵⁴ For the wirklichen Zustände are cogniz-
able where, and insofar as, they are precisely not available as something to be rep-
resented and cannot be imitated (nachgeahmt), but insofar as, to use a phrase from
Lehmann (Lehmann 2002, 366), they must be pre-mitated (vor-geahmt): “at the end,
not at the beginning of this experiment” (Versuch) (Benjamin 1931b, 522/4), which is
carried out tentatively (probeweise).⁵⁵
This, on the one hand, makes for the “episodic character” of gestural theater, or-
ganized and presented by its framing, a disruptive-retarding setting-off of its parts,
exposed as such,⁵⁶ that lets us perceive the theatrical presentation – quite contrary
to the alleged dramatic coherence of action – as a disjunctive assemblage⁵⁷ of disso-
ciated parts or separated “panels.”⁵⁸ On the other hand, the Zustände that might be-
come cognizable “at the end of this experiment” (Versuch) as which, according to
Benjamin, the theatrical presentation takes place – on trial and revisable (Benjamin
1931b, 522/4)⁵⁹ – refer to the otherwise possible: that which is not realized. “Amaze-
ment” (Staunen), as Benjamin’s text from 1931 quotes in an extraordinarily long pas-
sage of Brecht, is the effect of the theatrical observance: that “man [der Mensch] is
not to be recognized completely [ganz] or definitely [endgültig] but rather is not so
easily exhausted, holding and hiding within him many possibilities” [viele Möglich-
keiten in sich Bergendes und Verbergendes] “is a delighting insight” (lustvolle Erkennt-
nis) (531/13). It is made possible by theater, which deals with “the elements of the real
in the sense of an experimental disposition” (im Sinne einer Versuchsanordnung)
 It is the gaze of the spectator which brings those entering the stage fleeing to a standstill: “Der
Augenblick, da sie Zuschauern sichtbar werden, lässt sie einhalten.” (cf. Benjamin 1928b, 72)
 See also Benjamin 1931b, 531/13; 1939, 535/304).
 See also Benjamin 1939, 535/305.
 Regarding the “episodic character of framing [Umrahmung]” (Benjamin 1931b, 521–523/4–6; 1939,
5/303–305), compare the baroque choruses or interludes as “bracketings of the action” that is there-
by presented as “part of a mere show” (Bestandstücke einer bloßen Schaustellung) (Benjamin 1928a,
300–301, 367–369/119, 205–207). This corresponds to the observation that the “episodic theater,”
“comparable to the images of the film strip,” “advances in jolts” (den Bildern des Filmstreifens ver-
gleichbar, in Stößen vorrückt); similarly, in the allegorical mourning play, action advanced into the
allegorical framing, always altered “in jolts” – through “the intermittent rhythm of continual arrest
[Einhaltens], sudden reversal [stoßweisen Umschlagens], and new freezing [neuen Erstarrens]” (373/
213).
 This is characteristic for all the forms of that ‘kin’ of theater, that counters drama, whose “mule
track” (Pasch- und Schleichpfad) “today – however unkempt and wild” (wie struppig und verwildert
auch immer) – emerges in the Brechtian theater (Benjamin 1931b, 523/5).
 According to Brecht, theater is “a series of panels” (eine Folge von Tafeln) (cited in Müller-Scholl
2002, 165).
 See Benjamin 1939, 535/305. The Lehrstück is revisable (see 537/306).
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(522/4), whose “stance” or tenor is that all that is represented, and all those who are
presenting, are possible otherwise or possibly are not (525/7), which is practiced in
theater-playing, in an ‘acting on trial’ or ‘in rehearsal.’ In this way, theater refers
“productively” to itself as a space of the possible⁶⁰ in which what is presented and
the presenters are not given as identical with themselves and are not self-contained
– where every tentative or experimental arrangement in which the wirkliche Zustände
may be (re)cognized retrospectively⁶¹ implies (and this applies both to the events on
stage and to reality) an uncountable multitude of other “possibilities” (that have not
become real) held and hidden in themselves.
Therefore: “Der Zustand, den das epische Theater aufdeckt, ist die Dialektik im
Stillstand” (“The state that epic theater uncovers is the dialectic at a standstill”), as
Benjamin puts it here for the first time, coining a phrase for theater’s interrupting
Stillstellung, its putting-to-a-halt (Benjamin 1931b, 530/12– 13),⁶² which he will further
develop in his later notations on history and historiography.⁶³ The “amazement”
(Staunen) notably emerges from the play of the signifiers between Staunen and
Stauen (“damming-up”), characterized as the “backwards tide” of a “swell in the
real flow of life” (Stauung im realen Lebensfluß), in the “instant that its flow
comes to a standstill” (im Augenblick, da sein Ablauf zum Stehen kommt) (531/13),⁶⁴
there, where at the same time – in the katachrestic breaking of the metaphors –
“the flow of things breaks itself” on the “cliff of amazement” (Fels des Staunens), al-
lowing “Being” (Dasein) to “spray up high out of the bed of time and, irridescent, in
an instant [Nu] to stand in emptiness, in order to bed it anew” (531/13).⁶⁵ The dynamis
 In particular, the Lehrstück discovers the “space of the possible” as a “setting free of potential,
play, fantasy, provisionality, openness” (Lehmann 2002, 368); see also C. Menke 2005, 145/117–118.
 Christoph Menke (following Nietzsche) ties imitation (Nachahmung) to playing as form-giving out
of formlessness, in which the forms, in becoming, again and again dissolve themselves, “meet[ing]
the abyss, the emptiness, and the potential of formlessness”: in the play, form is the imitated
“form of life” (C. Menke 2018, 41) if what is represented finds its form given in reality as that
which can be imitated – “the imitation [Nachahmung] of another, preceding form” (42). This is, how-
ever, just a retroactive effect, as is (according to Benjamin) the cognizability of the “real state of
things” (der wirklichen Zustände).
 See also Müller-Scholl 2002, 160. “Immanent dialectical behavior is what in the ‘state of things’ is
cleared up in a flash” (Immanent dialektisches Verhalten ist es, was im Zustand […] blitzartig klarge-
stellt wird) (Benjamin 1931b, 530/12). Thus, Galy Gay in Mann ist Mann is “nothing other than a stage
of contradictions, which constitute our society” (530/12). Instead of “forcing open our state of things
from the outside” (von außen her unsre Zustände einzurennen), Brecht is said to let them “mediated,
in a “dialectical way” (vermittelt, dialektisch) “criticize one another, play their various elements log-
ically against each other” (526/8).
 See Benjamin’s Über den Begriff der Geschichte, 1935–1940, 104, 102– 105; see also Benjamin’s no-
tations (Benjamin GS I, 1236, 1250); Benjamin 1934–1940, 55, 577–578 (N2a,3; N3,1), 1001.
 “[D]as Staunen ist diese Rückflut. Die Dialektik im Stillstand ist sein eigentlicher Gegenstand”
(Benjamin 1931b, 531).
 “[…] [lässt] das Dasein aus dem Bett der Zeit hoch aufsprühen und schillernd einen Nu im Leeren
stehen, um es neu zu betten.” Here there is “no difference between a human life and a word.” The
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of rupture in the interruption, in the damming-up (Stauen) as a broken movement,
trembles ‘inside’ of the Zustand brought forth by interrupting and in retarding. The
dialectic at a standstill manifests itself “already in gestural elements that underlie
every temporal sequence and that one can only improperly call elements” (530/
12).⁶⁶ Indeed, as they are not indivisible elements but are already split and doubled
in themselves – and thus are citable – they are not themselves and not identical with
themselves.⁶⁷ The force of the form-giving interruption putting to a halt conveys itself
to that which it gives, without this attaining any identical givenness.
If gestural theater is characterized by Benjamin as “a way of acting [spielen] that
directs [the actor] to cognition” (die ihn [den Schauspieler] auf Erkenntnis anweist)
(Benjamin 1931b, 528/11), then the latter, being “produced” in the play-acting or the-
ater-playing, is nothing one would have already known in advance, or which could
simply be stated. But here, cognition is a matter of performing, a matter of opening
gestures and breaches that hold open ruptures in the inside, turns and gaps.⁶⁸ The
actors act “the one thinking (about his part)”⁶⁹ insofar as, with their distance from
both what is represented and “the way in which it is represented,” “in their acting”
(in ihrem Spiel), in its difference from itself, they display the “intervals,” which give
the spectators occasion (Anhalt) to take “critical stances” (kritische Stellungnahmen)
(Benjamin 1939, 538/306). This takes place in theater-playing, which is doubled and
split in itself, and which inserts spectatorship into itself and thereby turns actors into
spectators, to the effect that spectatorship sees itself being inserted into the acting/
broken metaphor continues and transforms the verses cited from Brecht: “Beharre nicht auf der
Welle,/Die sich an deinem Fuß bricht, solange er/Im Wasser steht, werden sich/Neue Wellen an
ihm brechen.” (Benjamin 1931b, 531)
 The “mother” of “the dialectic at a standstill” – which is Benjamin’s rather irritating metaphor –
is “not the course of contradictions” but “gesture itself” (Benjamin 1931b, 530/12).
 Benjamin conceives the “dialectic at a standstill” (Dialektik im Stillstand) in the context of the “di-
alectical image” as the “readable image,” for epistemology or, more precisely, the procedures of his-
toriography (Benjamin 1934– 1940, 570, 576–578, 591–592). These tie “cognizability” as “readability”
to citation,which rips out and makes readable what has been (das Gewesene), in its broken bits, cited
into the text of the present (595 [N11,3]).What has been ‘is’ not what one might be used to conceiving
as facts (see Benjamin’s Über den Begriff der Geschichte; see Hamacher 2005). As in a flash, the “read-
able image,” that is, the “historical object,” appears in the “now of readability” (Jetzt der Lesbarkeit)
(Benjamin 1934–1940, 570 [N1,1], 577–578 [N3,1], 591–592 [N9,7]) that must be grasped as the moment
(Augenblick) of perceptibility of a constellation, that is, in danger of being missed “already in the next
moment” (592 [N9,7]). The so-called “image” ‘is’ the “dialectic at a standstill,” “in its interior,” a “field
of tension” that is polarized into “pre- and post-history by the effects of “actuality” (Aktualität) (594–
596 [N10,3; N10a,2; N10a,3; N11,5], 587–588 [N7a,1; N7,7], 577–578).
 The Lehrstück places more weight on “the reality and the occurrence of the act of representation
itself” than on the completion of representation and content (Lehmann 2002, 368). This, as an act
without completion, contradicts Austin’s concept of performatives (see Hamacher 2018).
 More exactly, Benjamin’s text from 1939 claims that the actors should: “[es sich] nicht nehmen
lassen, den (über seinen Part) Nachdenkenden vorzumachen” (Benjamin 1939, 538/307).
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playing (Schauspielen) – as other.⁷⁰ Distance to oneself (and to one’s own action [Ben-
jamin 1931b, 521/3]) is taken and given – opened – in and as acting (Verhalten) in
play-acting (Schauspielen), which refers ‘critically’ to the “actions on the stage”
that it shows, but also to itself as this showing (Zeigen).
Thus, Theater-playing (Theaterspielen) is a ‘critical practice’ not because of some-
thing that may be said or meant, but due to its giving of a non-identity – interruption
as a gift – through which it becomes theoretical, (potentially) everywhere, by refer-
ring everything that is shown elsewhere to an other which it is not, to the fissure or
gap that makes it possible and that the gesture holds open.⁷¹ It is a matter of theater
as critical praxis, as the setting-apart of acting in itself, as a praxis that splits/dou-
bles itself from and in itself,⁷² that, as the act of performing in/as playing, performs
an action (allegedly identical with itself) on the stage as split/doubled in itself.What
is at stake in theater-playing is not a distinction that ends in judgment (as is the case
for criticism or critique).⁷³ Rather, theater-playing is ‘critical’ as performing or as tak-
ing place, without instituting any authority that may state or judge, consisting (un-
decidably) in the event or in what is coming,⁷⁴ where it does not coincide with itself:
potentially at any moment, in every place, differing from itself, becoming other.
Thus, the behavior or acting in “theater-playing,” the stance (Haltung) toward acting
in playing, conflicts with instituting such an authority. Theater can be called critical
because, according to Christoph Menke, with its non-identity it counters the repres-
sion of the non-identical,⁷⁵ through which alone the supposedly self-contained iden-
 In particular, in the Lehrstück “[t]he act of spectating is brought into the play. The actors [Spieler]
[…] are actors [Akteure] and spectators at once and thus, strictly speaking, are acting spectators and
spectating actors” (Lehmann 2002, 372). Benjamin puts this the other way around: “Every spectator
will be able to become an actor [Mitspieler]” (Benjamin 1939, 536/305).
 This is articulated in the theatrical presentation’s relation to the stage, which allows considering
“what theater is about today” (Benjamin 1931b, 519/1; 1939, 539/307).While gestural theater is the at-
tempt (Versuch) to ‘arrange’ itself on the “podium” (of the stage), this attempt can only ever be exper-
imental, tentative, provisional. The gesture of form-giving remains in reservation before and against
every givenness (even that of reality).
 If praxis is “reflected and thereby transformed in drama,” this opens up “a tension in the inside
of praxis”: between completion and possibility (C. Menke 2018, 45, 41). But Christoph Menke develops
the “paradox” of theater-playing as that of playing (something to someone) (Vorspielen) and imitating
something.
 See also C. Menke 2018, 37–38, 48.
 “‘[E]s gibt’ […] ist im Modus des Entstehens da”; “[es] besteht in einem Ankommen” (Lehmann
2002, 368 [with reference to Nancy], 367).
 “The critique of theater goes against the defense, the immunization of life against the transforma-
tion it experiences in the theater.” “Theater criticizes […] the immunization against paradox, and thus
against theater; for theater is the implementation of paradox” (C. Menke 2018, 45–46). “Theater
brings forth in its bringing-forth of form, and indeed through its paradox, an other play and indeed
another life. This always already happens when there is theater. […] Theater transforms life (or the
world).” (44)
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tity and necessity of the world asserts itself as given.⁷⁶ Moreover, it can be called ‘crit-
ical’ as it (that is to say, the “reflection [Nachdenken] about theater” implied in it)
demonstrates “that one can criticize in the name of paradox, decide in the name
of undecidability” (C. Menke 2018, 48). Its halt is without place, it comes from a
(non)place of difference – which attains no unity. The theatrical distancing of the
presentation and those presenting/acting from themselves contests (pretensions to)
self-identity and self-containment. It refers the represented action on the stage and
the act of performing (suspending it in its becoming) to their margins; refers form
to (excluded) other possibilities (not having become reality), to the shadows of the
otherwise-possible, which is excluded in every instance of form-giving, but which ac-
companies each constituted form. Each ‘form,’ that is, everything presented (accord-
ing to Benjamin citing Brecht), thus birgt – implicates and holds – the otherwise pos-
sible in its interior, being thereby divided and virtualized. The potential being-other
of what is provisionally (probeweise) cited from the space of the possible partakes in
‘what is shown’: as its gaps, ambivalences, and ambiguities,⁷⁷ in “the trembling of
the contours” (Zittern der Umrisse),⁷⁸ in the shadows of the otherwise possible.
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Walter Benn Michaels
Historicism’s Forms: The Aesthetics of
Critique
In 1989, in an essay called “The History of the Anecdote: Fiction and Fiction,” Joel
Fineman undertook an analysis of what he called “The formal operation of the an-
ecdote, understood as a specific literary genre” (Fineman 1989, 50) and thus also
of what he called “the characteristic writing practice of the New Historicism ‒
those essays that begin with an anecdote” (64). Fineman’s interest was in the way
that the foregrounding of the anecdote (his example was Stephen Greenblatt) took
up a problem that had been central to historiography since its beginning, in Thucy-
dides, where the problem of how to locate the anecdote – “the narration of a single
event” that “uniquely refers to the real” (56) ‒ in some “logic of sequential and tran-
sitional necessity” (53) was, he argued, first posed. And the central point of his essay
was to assert the aporetic relation between the anecdote’s claim on the real and the
logic of transition, the way in which the anecdote’s opening to “contingency” is, he
says, closed off by its opposite, the “transitional necessity” that gives it “historical
significance” (53).
Two years later, in the “Theory” chapter of Postmodernism, Fredric Jameson also
undertook an analysis of what he called not the “writing practice” but the “writing
convention” or “aesthetic” (Jameson 1991, 188) of the new historicism and he too fo-
cused on the question of transition while saying nothing, however, about the anec-
dote. For Jameson, the problem in new historicism was not exactly how to get from
the anecdote to the larger historical narrative, it was how to construct a relation be-
tween literary texts and what he called the analyses of “a dazzling heterogeneity of
raw material” (“medicine, gambling, land tenure, masochism, slavery, photography,
contracts” etc.) (193) without producing such a narrative – without a story about how
one thing caused the other or was about the other. And the new historicist aesthetic,
in which “Elegance […] consists in constructing bridge passages between the various
concrete analyses, transitions […] inventive enough to preclude the posing of theoret-
ical or interpretive questions” (188) was its solution to this problem, its way of refus-
ing or avoiding the “theoretical” question of how these analyses were connected.
For the purposes of a volume on poetic critique, my initial interest here is in the
idea ‒ taken usefully for granted in both these texts – that a mode of criticism might
be said to have an aesthetic. So we do not have to worry about making it poetic, it
already (for better or for worse) is. But my more basic interest is in the idea that tran-
sition is the formal problem the new historicism is seen to confront or the solution it
is seen to deploy. And that interest, I should confess, is in part personal – since it
was mainly the question of transitions in my book The Gold Standard and the
Logic of Naturalism that Jameson was interested in and since it seems to me that
re-raising that question might help me understand something a few people have
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asked me about and that I have asked myself – the relation between the Gold Stand-
ard’s 1987 account of the work of art as entirely embedded in its culture and having
therefore no critical distance from it and The Beauty of a Social Problem’s account (in
2015) of art as providing just the kind of opportunity for critical understanding that
The Gold Standard denied art could or did do (cf. Michaels 1987 and Michaels 2015).
And if, with respect just to those two books, this question is at most of limited inter-
est, it has, I think, a more general application. For if, as we have already seen, the
new historicism was understood right from the start to have an aesthetic, that aes-
thetic should also be understood to have a history. And we can very quickly identify
what will prove to be one salient aspect of that history by noting that the moment of
the new historicism’s emergence was the moment also of the emergence of neoliber-
alism and the take-off point in the U.S. for the new economic inequality. 1968 was the
most equal year on record; the Gini coefficient (0 is perfect equality; 1, one household
has everything) was .38; by 1983,when the first issue of Representations (at the time a
kind of founding organ of the new historicism) appeared, it had risen to a little over
.41; in 2018, it was .49, the highest ever recorded (so far).
Of course, to characterize the rise in economic inequality as belonging to the his-
tory of an aesthetic might in itself seem problematic – just another exercise in the
hermeneutics of suspicion which (no doubt because it never existed) has been essen-
tial to the rise of postcritique. But there are also more interesting objections. Think of
Adorno criticizing Benjamin for his “tendency to relate” – “immediately and perhaps
even causally” – some of the “features” of Baudelaire’s work “to adjacent features in
the social history of his time, preferably economic features” (Adorno 1980, 128–129).
What would it mean to “relate” formal features of the new historicist aesthetic (the
anecdote, the transition) “immediately” to an adjacent feature of our social history
like the redistribution of income upwards that began in the late 70s?
The possibility of answering this question – in “perhaps even causally,” I can feel
my own as well as Adorno’s fear of base and superstructure! – is further complicated
by the fact that probably none of the Berkeley new historicists was the slightest bit
aware of the supposedly determinative economic event that was taking place. So any
account of its relevance to them would have to contend with their ignorance of it. But
the interest in trying to raise it again is intensified by the fact that at least one of the
formal features, the transition, can be understood, as Jameson had already begun to
suggest, as a way of trying not to raise it. On his account, nothing is more character-
istic of the new historicist aesthetic than juxtapositions of literary features like Frank
Norris’s McTeague being both a miner and a dentist (two professions intertwined by
the fact that the miner takes gold out of the earth to put it into circulation, whereas
the dentist takes gold out of circulation to put it into people’s mouths) with economic
ones like the political battles over whether the U.S. should stick to the gold standard
or monetize silver (with its default consensus on the necessity of money with “intrin-
sic” value as opposed to dollar bills with none). And then with the effort to put both
the dentist and the gold-bug into relation with the popularity of trompe l’oeil paint-
ing (which seeks to describe representational paintings as, like dollar bills, a form of
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deception) and with the fact that Trina McTeague is a miser about whom it is impos-
sible to tell whether her love of money depends upon denying its status as a repre-
sentation or fetishizing its status as a representation. How can we theorize the con-
nection between trompe l’oeil painters and hard money Democrats, much less the
connection of any of them to the novel?
The crucial thing for Jameson is what is not said: it is not said (in fact, it is ex-
plicitly denied) that the novel is about the gold standard and no theory of mediation
that might explain how one could connect up the practice of dentistry with the vogue
for a certain kind of painting, or pamphlets on free silver to novels that never even
mention it is ever proffered. Indeed, as Jameson says, “elegance” consists in not pro-
viding these things. More generally, there’s no account of what makes one historical
context more relevant than another to the literary text – which is the problem that
Fineman understands the anecdote to deconstruct. Rather the very idea of the rela-
tion between text and context seems to be refused and replaced by the effort to pro-
duce a criticism in which history figures but precisely not as context, not as a kind of
explanatory background. In this criticism there is no background and not much in
the way of explanation either – everything is foreground, and is made relevant by
the mode of presentation rather than by some theoretical justification.
So, why? What was the attraction of that aesthetic? One answer would be that it
works to prove what was widely taken (not least by the new historicists themselves)
to be the new historicist point – that all these phenomena are so equally a part of
capital’s dispositif that it makes no sense to select one of them – literature – and con-
fer on it a distinctively oppositional potential. Jameson generously says that when
the transitions work, the reader is left with “a sense of breathlessness, of admiration
for the brilliance of the performance, but yet bewilderment, at the conclusion of the
essay, from which one seems to emerge with empty hands ‒ without ideas and inter-
pretations to carry away with us” (Jameson 1991, 188), a point that in a recent issue
of American Literary History is put with less charity but equal accuracy by Francesca
Sawaya when she refers to The Gold Standard in particular as “exasperatingly tauto-
logical and deterministic” (Sawaya 2019, 305). The tautology – the dentist is the miser
is the trompe l’oeil painter ‒ is what you get instead of the interpretation. On this
account, whether you are left breathless or exasperated, what you are being told is
that art cannot produce a reflection on capitalism, it can only participate in it
(that would be also the determinism).
For Jameson, however, it is the tautological transitions that matter rather than
the thesis they are supposed to serve. In fact, he focuses on the aesthetic precisely
because he regards the thesis as of secondary interest – it is a pretext for producing
the transitions, for motivating “the device” (Jameson 1991, 189). Hence, the question
we just asked – what is the attraction of the transitions? – cannot be answered by
invoking the argument they are supposed to prove.
How, then, can it be answered? Fineman reads the transition as a problem, not a
solution. The appeal of the anecdote is in its ability to “produce the effect of the real”
(Fineman 1989, 61) (which is what history demands) but, insofar as the real is iden-
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tified with what he calls “the occurrence of contingency” (61), the anecdote disrupts
what history also demands – a “logic of sequential and transitional necessity” (53).
Hence, he thinks, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the “experience of his-
tory” (53) as offered by the anecdote and the “estranged distance from the anecdotal
real” (63) required by the logic of historicism, and the power of the anecdote is pre-
cisely the problem it produces: it resists transition – it marks the moment in the con-
stitution of what he calls the “subject of history” (62) that is transcended but not
fully subsumable by the “logic” (53) of historicism.
But Jameson’s proof text (The Gold Standard) invokes the “logic,” not the “sub-
ject” of its history, and the juxtaposition with Fineman helps us to see that what it
was resisting (what made the tautology ‒ this is this, as opposed to this explains
this or this leads to this ‒ attractive) was precisely what Fineman valued. Fineman
valued the disruption of the relation between text and context because it was in
that disruption that the subject’s experience of the real emerged – the moment before
contingency is subsumed by historical necessity, the moment when you cannot say
why this is the right context in which to understand that, why this event is the back-
ground that helps us understand this text in the foreground. By contrast, The Gold
Standard sought not to disrupt the relation between text and context but to iron
out the difference between them, so that there would be no foreground or back-
ground,which is to say, no position from which some things looked closer and others
farther away, which is to say no point of view, which is to say, no subject. If Fineman
thought that history’s logic condemned you to an “estranged distance from the anec-
dotal real,” what The Gold Standard wanted from naturalism’s logic was neither dis-
tance nor proximity (which after all are both positions of the subject). It wanted not
the non-existence but the irrelevance of the subject.
Thus we have two versions of new historicist aesthetics, and although neither is
in any way current today, it is not hard to see that Fineman’s commitment to the sub-
ject – albeit in a domesticated and completely moralized form – has flourished. In-
deed, at the heart of what we now call postcritique is a version of that commitment
so complete it requires us to treat everything as at least what Latour calls a “quasi-
subject” (Latour 2014, 5–6) and hence, in Rita Felski’s words, to put “people, ani-
mals, texts and things on a similar ontological footing” (Felski 2015, 184) in order
to “emphasiz[e] their interdependence” (164) and thus “the agency of both texts
and readers” (165). And if, at the root of this ontological egalitarianism is Latour’s
studied obliviousness to the difference between natural and non-natural signs (to
use a Gricean example, the difference between the way the spots on your face
mean measles and the way the phonemes “measles” mean measles¹), its real rele-
 Perhaps studied obliviousness is not quite right, since the main point of Latour’s idea of agency is
that it is supposed to call into question distinctions like the one between natural and non-natural
signs. Sometimes he does this by insisting that meaning is “a property of all agents” (Latour 2014,
13) and thus central to both (which is uncontroversially true: “measles” means measles; spots
mean measles); sometimes he does it by suggesting that the “word” “meaning” “be dropped altogeth-
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vance for my purpose is not this conceptual confusion in itself but the way the actor-
network theory it enables underwrites, for Felski, a model of the social that begins
with the “sociology of the individual” and “ways of thinking about individuals”
that do not “flatten and reduce them” (Felski 2015, 171‒172).
There is a kind of aesthetic at work here too, not so much in the writing perhaps
as in the expression of taste – what Felski wants is a world made up of the novel’s
round characters, those who, in a humanistic version of Fineman’s insistence on
“contingency,” embody what E.M. Forster called “the incalculability of life” (Forster
1956, 78) and what Felski calls “the ever-present possibility of being surprised” (Fel-
ski 2019).² Thus, for example, as against a “melancholic Marxism” that sees “eco-
nomic interests” everywhere, she praises what she thinks of as sociology’s more La-
tourian concept of “society” as “highly variegated and differentiated, made up of
many kinds of institutions, communities, norms and behaviors.” And against what
she takes to be too easy a commitment to “the language of structure,” she complains
that Leavisites did not and Marxist literary critics (all nine of them) do not think
about “how structure is to be defined” or “what kind of analytical work it does” (Fel-
ski 2019).
But here the very crudest possible analytical work Marxism does – understand
society in terms of capital and labor ‒ is of some use. Postcritique’s picture of the
social is the intersubjective (or, to use one of Felski’s preferred terms, the “relation-
al”), which is also the neoliberal picture and is, in fact, its therapy for any members
of the working class who might have been made a little melancholic by the rising
inequality I mentioned above. The treatment is just to understand that in political
economy there really is no such thing as the working class. Indeed, from Foucault’s
analysis of how the concept of human capital turns the worker into a capitalist (and
thus turns his salary into a return on that capital) to the Uber contract that operation-
alizes Foucault’s analysis by turning employees into “independent contractors,” a
crucial feature of neoliberalism has been its commitment to making the structural
– structural instead of relational, instead of intersubjective ‒ antagonism between
capital and labor disappear. It thus replaces the problem of structural injustice – ex-
ploitation – with an array of individual injustices (as variegated and differentiated as
intersectional analysis can make them), but all marching under the banner of dis-
crimination. Theoretical sophistication here consists precisely in infinitely multiply-
er” and that we talk instead about “path-building, or order-making, or creation of directions” instead,
which relieves us from having “to specify if it is language or objects” we are analyzing and endows
“things” with the “dignity of texts” while “elevating” texts “to the ontological status of things” (La-
tour 1996, 10). But, whichever words we use and whoever gets to be the most dignified, the difference
between the spots (which are a symptom) and the word (which is a name) remains. As the fact that
using the word does not require us to be sick while having the spots does reminds us.
 For the complete quote, see Forster 1956, 78: “The test of a round character is whether it is capable
of surprising in a convincing way […]. It has the incalculability of life about it ‒ life within the pages
of a book.”
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ing the number of subject positions any of us might occupy, while at the same time
guaranteeing that they are just that – positions of the subject. And the success of this
program is demonstrated every time someone insists, for example, that the tension
between a class politics and an identity politics is specious because class is an iden-
tity too.³
Felski herself was an early adopter of class as identity (albeit a “negative” one) in
her important (and fun to read) article “Nothing to Declare: Identity, Shame, and the
Lower Middle Class” (Felski 2000). Here, her focus “on the psychic as well as the so-
cial, semiotics as much as economics” (34) is presented as a methodological rather
than an ontological commitment. But actor-network theory would do for literary
criticism what intersectionality has done for politics – take the idea of an essentially
impersonal structure right out of it. In this respect, it is striking that all the different
versions of postcritique especially have it in for Jameson, who keeps seeing not class
identity, but class struggle in texts where it does not belong. And it is striking also
that what Felski calls “everyday” reading and especially the kind of reading that
goes on in the classroom provide her with an alternative model for interpretation
as “the coproduction between actors” (12). You do not have to be a very suspicious
reader to notice that for university professors teaching our students the relational vir-
tues of what Latour calls “the care for phenomena” – sympathy, empathy, recogni-
tion – is redescribable (or really just describable) as teaching the sons and daughters
of the upper class the responsibilities appropriate to the beneficiaries of the class
system: how to appreciate their agency and use it humanely, how to exercise the priv-
ilege of checking their privilege.⁴ Obviously, using our privilege humanely is a virtue
(the alternative is Trump), but, also obviously, it is a way of living with inequality, not
combatting it, of keeping the essential antagonism of class out of the classroom as
well as out of the texts we read in that classroom. The point here is not that postcri-
tique is apolitical; it is rather that it is liberal, the professoriat’s contribution to mak-
ing sure that our wealthy students do not understand the system that has made them
 A characteristic instance would be Peter Frase (2014) acknowledging that class is “a structural re-
lation,” but only to remind us that it is “also an identity.” Which is to say, it also “exists in its socio-
logical sense,” which means – and here his relief at having made it to neoliberal high ground is al-
most palpable ‒ that “Classism is a real phenomenon” and that we should combat “classist
attitudes.”
 The most recent figures show that 80% of students from the top quintile of wealth enroll in 4-year
institutions, while students from the lowest quintile mainly enroll in two-year community colleges or
in for profits; only 28% find their way to 4-year colleges (see https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2019/05/23/feds-release-broader-data-socioeconomic-status-and-college-enrollment-and-completion).
When Felski teaches undergraduate classes at Virginia, two thirds of her students are from the top
20% (https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/college-mobility/university-of-virginia) (13 March
2020).
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wealthy, and that their conception of social justice remains fixed on technologies of
individualization: equality of opportunity, meritocracy, social mobility.⁵
Which is not to say that if we return to our original texts and our founding mo-
ment, the situation was much different. Actually, from this point of view, the new his-
toricism was already a kind of crucial first step in the wrong direction. Catherine Gal-
lagher (the other new historicist named by Jameson and writing in the same year as
Fineman) explicitly and acutely disarticulates new historicism from what Marxism
thought of as “the one conflict that counted: class conflict” (Gallagher 1989, 40)
and connects it instead to the New Left, which she characterizes as “invoking the
principle of individual and group [rather than class] liberation,” and which she iden-
tifies as emerging out of “the problem of the constitution of the subject” (41) as re-
formulated in what was increasingly called post-Marxism. And The Gold Standard is
no exception to this rule: although the word class appears with some frequency in it,
the concept of class (much less class struggle) is pretty much absent. In fact, we
could say that the thematics of the text – the impossibility or irrelevance of a certain
resistance, as embodied in a passage like the following – precisely exemplify its pre-
occupation with what Gallagher calls “the constitution of modern subjectivity” (46).
Dreiser didn’t so much approve or disapprove of capitalism; he desired pretty women in little tan
jackets with mother-of-pearl buttons, and he feared becoming a bum on the streets of New York.
These fears and desires were themselves made available by consumer capitalism, partly because
a capitalist economy made it possible for lower class women to wear nice clothes and for mid-
dle-class men to lose their jobs, but more importantly because the logic of capitalism linked the
loss of jobs to a failure of self-representation and linked the desirability of those women to the
possibility of mimesis. Carrie is desirable, in this reading, because she herself desires – “to re-
produce life,” to make herself into a representation. And this insatiable appetite for representa-
tion Dreiser identifies with sexual promiscuity, corporate greed, and his own artistic practice.
(Michaels 1987, 19)
This is precisely the kind of claim about the inescapability of the market that every-
one – including me – thought of as the main new historicist point. And it is not ex-
actly false. As long as you were looking for resistance to capitalism in the subject of
capitalism, you were never going to find it. But if we understand the new histori-
cism’s aesthetics (the aesthetics of the bridge passage between concrete instances
that turns explanation into tautology) as a refusal of text and context, of point of
view, and thus of the subject, then we can see that refusal as a placeholder precisely
 One reader of this text helpfully objected that it is unfair to single out postcritique in this way since
the same criticism could be made of virtually everything done in the humanities at American univer-
sities, or at least everything except Marxist criticism. I agree! (Except that he forgot to include the so-
cial sciences.) But I think it is still worth granting a certain pride of place to postcritique, which in its
allegiance to the idea that there is “no society” and that social analysis consists above all in “marvel-
ing at” and “attend[ing] to” the “ongoing connections, disconnections, and reconnections between
countless actors” (and their families?) (Felski 2011, 578) does a much more thorough job of making
class structure invisible even than intersectionality.
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for the non-intersubjective, non-relational structure of a capitalist society – for the
conflict between capital and labor. In other words, class is excluded from the new
historicism as a concept but gets into it as a ‘writing convention,’ and opposition
gets into it not as a political position but as an entailment of its conception of ‘ele-
gance.’ In this respect, we can not only say with Jameson that the polemical claim of
the new historicism – the work of art’s subsumption by the society it might be
thought to critique – is really there just to motivate the device, we can say also
that the device (the transitions) negates the motive. The new historicism had demon-
strated, Gallagher wrote, that “the things in texts” which oppositional critics had
hopefully identified as “subversive” and “destabilizing” were in fact “inscriptions
of the formative moments, not the disruptions, of the liberal subject” (Gallagher
1989, 45); the aesthetic of the transition negated this demonstration not exactly by
showing that it was mistaken (there was indeed nothing oppositional about the de-
stabilized subject) but by making it irrelevant.
Which is not to say that any of the Berkeley new historicists were politically in-
teresting except insofar as we were early adopters of what today would be called left
neoliberalism, and our interest in the history of the liberal subject was itself a com-
ponent in the making of the neoliberal subject. As I noted above, we had no idea that
we were participating in a profound transfer of wealth from the bottom 90% of the
population to the top 10%; our politics found expression in diversifying the western
canon not in organizing a faculty union. And if you think of politics as mainly an
expression of class interest, rightly so. We were not the faculty members who
would need a union; we would be more the beneficiaries of that transfer of wealth
than its victims. So both in its politics and in its intellectual commitment to the his-
tory of the subject, the new historicism belonged to that 90% of the world that, as
the joke goes, is perfectly explained by vulgar Marxism.⁶
But in its aesthetics, in its ‘writing practice,’ not so much. In its literary critical
form, vulgar Marxism – the debates over the gold standard made McTeague a dentist
– was basically what Adorno condemned as the insufficiently mediated “materialis-
tic determination of cultural traits,” and the ambition of the new historicist aesthetic
was to avoid the kind of separation between the two that would make the explana-
tion of the one by the other look attractive. But Adorno also thought we could bridge
this gap by running the whole thing through the “total social process” (Adorno 1980,
129) ‒ italics his, presumably in the spirit of “we absolutely need to do this although
we don’t quite know how to do it and aren’t completely sure what it is.”
One way, then, to see the new historicism is as a recognition of the problem
Adorno identified, a rejection of his suggestion that it could only be solved by “theo-
ry,” and the creation instead of an aesthetic designed not exactly to solve it, but to
make it go away. That such an effort was bound to fail is obvious, just as the ongoing
attraction to the idea that something is indeed explained by juxtaposing (but not de-
 The joke is that sociology is interested only in the remaining 10%. Hence Felski’s “sociology envy.”
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riving) our literary critical ambitions with (not from) our economic ones is also ob-
vious. Jameson said that The Gold Standard differed from “standard New Historicist
practice” in its commitment to a “total” (albeit “absent”) “system,” “the market”
(Jameson 1991, 212). Perhaps the relevant point here is just – Jameson’s point –
that the commitment to totality is the thing that is needed (even when you cannot
totally figure out how it works) and that The Gold Standard’s periodic imagination
of this totality as necessarily “asphyxiating” (212) was a kind of sentimentalism.
If that is right, then the new historicist thematic was just the sad version of
“there is no alternative” (postcritique would be not exactly the happy but the mind-
ful version), and it is the contradictory relation this thematic had with its aesthetic
that makes new historicism interesting. Why? Because by linking the history of the
subject to the problem of the transition, new historicism also made it possible to
see the replacement of the structural by the intersubjective, the formal by the rela-
tional, as a problem, and in this, it was itself, despite its mockery of the subversive
and the oppositional, a kind of critique. Even, although none of its practitioners was
a Marxist, a kind of Marxist critique, and especially by contrast to the ways in which
most of what passes for critique has in fact been as embarrassingly uncritical as post-
critique is proudly uncritical.
The title of the conference for which this paper was written and of the book for
which it is being revised is Poetic Critique. My own way of understanding the “poetic”
in that title has not been in terms of generic alternatives (not poetry or fiction or
memoir as critique), but in terms of an aesthetic that might be made possible in
the genre of literary criticism itself. By aesthetic – following Fineman and Jameson –
I have obviously meant something other than a method and also something more
than a style, including a prose style. Obviously, I have not meant an aesthetic instead
of a politics. But I also do not mean an aesthetic as a politics. Here we can see the
very strict limits of poetic critique – a Marxism without Marxists had no political fu-
ture, and the last half century has made it very clear that a class aesthetic cannot do
the work of a class politics.
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Yi-Ping Ong
Poetic Criticism and the Work of Fiction:
Goethe, Joyce, and Coetzee
It is a hot June day in Dublin, mid-afternoon. A young,would-be, but as yet unknown
poet locks horns with his elders in the age-old fight for dominance. More of a skir-
mish than a flat bid to wrest command from the heads of the pack: this is how
they see it. They keep his forays in check with nudges and nips, but otherwise
they tolerate him.
We begin in the middle of things. A dust-cloaked office of the National Library.
The Director is holding court: “And we have, have we not, those priceless pages of
Wilhelm Meister. A great poet on a great brother poet” (Joyce 1986, 151). On he drones,
dull notes creaking in the dim air, before he is called away by his work. As soon as he
leaves, the young poet takes his shot: “Monsieur de la Palice […] was alive fifteen mi-
nutes before his death” (151). A jeer like this from a mere underling, no matter how
light, will not be let to stand. Instantly a sharp voice cracks back with “elder’s gall”:
“Have you found those six brave medicals […] to write Paradise Lost at your dicta-
tion? The Sorrows of Satan he calls it” (151). This last aside is directed not to the
young man, but to a fellow elder. Taking up his cue, the other joins in: “All these
questions are purely academic […]. I mean, whether Hamlet is Shakespeare or
James I or Essex. […] Art has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences. […]
All the rest is the speculation of schoolboys for schoolboys” (151). The challenge
of youth to the authority of the elders is dispatched.
This opening frames the episode of Joyce’s Ulysses (1918) that is best known for
Stephen Dedalus’s pyrotechnic and at times bizarrely far-fetched account of how to
read Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Many critics take his reading as a veiled guide to how
Joyce himself intends Ulysses to be read. Falling exactly at the midpoint of the
novel, there is no question that the episode is crucial. But if Joyce had wanted to
highlight Stephen’s theory of art as a key to his own creation, why did he stage it
like this – as part of an academic pissing contest?
If we look back, to Goethe’s execution of a similar scene inWilhelm Meister’s Ap-
prenticeship (1795–1796), and forward, to another scene in Coetzee’s Elizabeth Cost-
ello (2003), we might discover further clues. All three texts exemplify what Schlegel
calls, in his essay “On Goethe’s Meister” (1798), “poetic criticism”: a work of art that
“come[s] into being when a poet in full possession of his powers contemplates a
work of art and represents it in his own” (Schlegel 2003, 281). Schlegel is here de-
scribing the sections of Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship between Book 4, chapter
13 and Book 5, chapter 12 that contain Wilhelm’s elaboration upon and re-staging
of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. These are the same pages of Goethe’s novel that Joyce’s ep-
isode alludes to at its opening – an early hint that Joyce will set his occasion for po-
etic criticism beside Goethe’s. Both texts contain a reading of Hamlet. Both feature
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Hamlet-like protagonists who represent themselves to others in and through the act
of reading Shakespeare’s play. Finally, in Coetzee’s novel, although the performance
of Elizabeth Costello focuses on Kafka’s ape and not on the Prince of Denmark, Cost-
ello herself is a novelist whose claim to fame lies in her re-writing of Joyce’s Ulysses
from the point of view of Molly Bloom.
How should we read these loosely concatenated texts of poetic criticism? This
question is complicated by the fact that, in all three cases, the crucial act that estab-
lishes the work as an instance of poetic criticism is carried out by a fictional charac-
ter.Wilhelm’s production of Hamlet, Stephen Dedalus’s dazzling performance in the
library, and Elizabeth Costello’s speech on Kafka: all embody Schlegel’s claim that
“[p]oetic criticism does not act as a mere inscription, and merely say what the
thing is” but rather “want[s] to represent the representation anew, and form once
more what has already been formed” (Schlegel 2003, 281). These exemplary instan-
ces of poetic criticism interpret the texts they represent by re-enacting the dynamics
found in these texts.Yet these acts of poetic criticism are not stand-alone works. Each
is represented within the compass of a larger narrative, one that stages the making of
the character-qua-critic as well as the conditions surrounding and inflecting their
key performance. Time and time again, the art of poetic criticism accomplishes itself
by way of a novelistic form that embeds an act of critical response to another work of
art within the narrative of a central figure’s life.What do these fictions of the lives of
critics tell us about the form and meaning of poetic criticism?
From its origin in “On Goethe’s Meister,” the concept of poetic criticism is inter-
twined with the attempt to reorient the purpose and meaning of literary criticism.
Schlegel’s essay marks a seminal turn in Romantic literary history, when the critic
breaks free from his traditional role as “a judge who applied neoclassical aesthetic
standards, derived most notably from Aristotle and Horace, to the understanding
and assessment of a work of art” (Norman 2018, 196). Schlegel – and, after him, No-
valis, Schleiermacher, and Tieck – reenvisions the act of criticism as intimately
bound up with the self-understanding of the literary work. Criticism amplifies, re-
flects, and intensifies the self-reflexive understanding that is internal to the individ-
ual work of art, and as such it must itself assume a “mode of literary self-knowledge”
(204). It must become, in Schlegel’s term, poetic. In my interpretation of these texts
of poetic criticism, what emerges is a form of criticism as critique: criticism qua in-
vestigation of the nature and limits of self-reflection. This self-understanding is por-
trayed in and through the protagonists who engage in acts of literary criticism within
the work of fiction. In Goethe, Joyce, and Coetzee, the fictional critic encounters a
profound form of self-knowledge that is not solely generative, but also potentially de-
structive. The act of criticism does not, as Schlegel would have it, merely amplify, re-
flect, and raise self-understanding to a higher power. It also deflects, avoids, and dis-
avows, defending the critic from the danger and pain that is inherent in knowing him
or herself. This ambivalent tension is revelatory not only of the nature of criticism,
but also of the structure of fictions that would seek to portray it.
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In this essay, I seek to renew our understanding of Schlegel’s account of poetic
criticism by re-embedding the characterological act of criticism within the more pro-
saic frame in which it is originally represented. The narratives of Goethe, Joyce, and
Coetzee all draw attention to the conditions and motivations that underlie these var-
ious performances. Key aspects of the act fall away if we attempt to theorize poetic
criticism in isolation from its fictional context. The frame of fiction opens up new
questions about why figures such as Wilhelm Meister, Stephen Dedalus, and Eliza-
beth Costello might seek to interpret and re-enliven literary works. These questions
in turn connect the form of poetic criticism with deeper currents and tensions at
play in the fictions themselves. They reveal the inner conflicts that animate charac-
terological acts of criticism, and illuminate the power and significance of these acts
anew.
1 Goethe
The question of how to describe the instance of poetic criticism within its original
fictional context straightaway raises an important problem, namely, how to circum-
scribe the boundaries of the critical act. Is it limited to the character’s own act of in-
terpretation and re-presentation of another work of art? Or is it the text’s representa-
tion of this act, and if so, does the significance of the act ripple outward to other
seemingly unrelated episodes, so that a full consideration of its meaning would re-
quire us to trace its implications throughout the novel as a whole? Finally, does the
inherently metafictional structure of the act attempt to breach the implicit bounded-
ness of the work, and implicate the reader of the text in a deliberate way? These over-
arching questions frame the problem at hand. Setting them aside for the time being,
however, let us turn to the chief paradigm of poetic criticism in Schlegel’s seminal
text. At the heart of his discussion lies the extended subplot of Wilhelm Meister’s Ap-
prenticeship, comprising over a quarter of the novel, in which the protagonist not
only presents extended interpretations of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, but also produces
and acts in his own version of the play. Wilhelm is frankly obsessed with Shake-
speare’s genius, pouring his heart and soul into scrutinizing the intentions of the
playwright, the structure of the play, and the inner life of Hamlet. He lives and
breathes the play to the point that the reality of everything else in his life falls
away. Indeed, it is at this juncture that Wilhelm makes a decisive commitment to de-
vote his life to the theater.
The narrative building up to this climax, however, sheds a somewhat different
light on the state of mind in which Wilhelm first encounters Hamlet. Shakespeare
does not appear in Wilhelm’s life by chance. He is planted there by Jarno, an
older man upon whom Wilhelm has projected his craving for mentorship and guid-
ance. The novel portrays this yearning for approval and direction as naïve and indis-
criminate.Wilhelm desires recognition from just about anyone who presents himself
to be better than those around him.When a prince arrives at the baron’s castle where
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Wilhelm’s troupe is performing,Wilhelm immediately seizes the opportunity to ingra-
tiate himself with a potential patron. The scene of their encounter stages an early act
of literary criticism that is purely instrumental, deployed solely for the purposes of
self-advancement:
Wilhelm had been advised to praise Racine, the prince’s favorite dramatist, when an appropriate
opportunity presented itself, and thereby put himself in the prince’s good graces. He found such
an occasion one afternoon, when he had been summoned to appear with the others, and the
prince asked him whether he too had studied the great French dramatists. Wilhelm said that
he had. He did not notice that the prince had already turned to speak to someone else, without
waiting for an answer. Almost interposing himself, he claimed the prince’s attention by declar-
ing that he had indeed a very high opinion of French drama and had read its masterpieces with
great appreciation; and he had been delighted to hear that the prince paid great respect to the
talents of a man like Racine. “I can well imagine,” he went on to say, “that persons of noble
station will appreciate an author who portrays so excellently and correctly the circumstances
of high social rank.” (Goethe 2016, 475)
Here follows a lengthy and fawning monologue on Racine’s portrayal of “‘the gods of
this earth,’” “‘kings adored by whole nations, courtiers envied by multitudes’” (476).
Wilhelm concludes his paean by noting, “‘The report that Racine died of grief be-
cause Louis XIV showed his dissatisfaction by no longer looking at him – that to
me is the key to all his works. It was impossible for such a talented writer, whose
whole life, and his death, depended on the eyes of a king, not to write plays worthy
of the admiration of a king – and of a prince’” (476). By this point, needless to say,
the prince is no longer looking at Wilhelm. But Wilhelm persists. Interpreting Racine
through the lens of his own desperate bid for royal attention, Wilhelm performs his
critical admiration of the poet as an act of obsequious flattery to the greatness of his
audience, who is in turn cast as the “‘prince’” to Wilhelm’s “‘talented writer.’” The
reading of Racine becomes a means of rendering his own self legible to another.
It is at this moment that Jarno, who just so happens to have overheard the entire
speech, pulls Wilhelm aside and demands, “‘Have you never seen a play by Shake-
speare?’” (476) Wilhelm admits that he has not. The playwright’s dubious reputation
is, he goes on to confess, a reason to keep avoiding him: “‘what I have heard about
his plays has not made me eager to know more about such strange monstrosities’”
(476). Cautioning him not to “‘take offense’” at what he reads, but rather to rely
on his “‘own true judgment,’” Jarno sends him the plays (476).
When Jarno and Wilhelm meet again,Wilhelm hastens to thank him for his role
in “providing him with such an experience” (484). Jarno expresses pleasure with
himself for his pedagogical insight and with Wilhelm for having the sensibility to ap-
preciate Shakespeare, while Wilhelm expresses his admiration of Shakespeare in
ever more effusive and ardent terms, assuring Jarno that he has been as deeply
moved by the poet as the older man had hoped.
“I cannot remember a book, a person, or an event that has affected me as deeply as these won-
derful plays that you so kindly brought to my attention. They seem to be the work of some spirit
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from heaven that comes down to men and gently makes them more acquainted with themselves.
They are not fictions! One seems to be standing before the huge open folios of Fate in which the
storm winds of life in all their turbulence are raging, blowing the pages back and forth. I am so
astonished by the forcefulness and tenderness, the violence and the control of it all, that I am
completely beside myself and long for the time when I will be able to continue reading.” (484)
“‘Bravo!’” declares Jarno at the end of Wilhelm’s speech: “‘that’s just what I wanted;
and the results that I hoped for will not be long in coming’” (484). Both play their
roles to perfection: caring yet superior guide, impassioned yet solicitous pupil.
Their exchange sets into sharp relief the lived context of Wilhelm’s first response
to Shakespeare. Having longed for the favor and esteem of Jarno from the moment he
laid eyes on him, he is finally in a position to get the attention he seeks. His success
in doing so is confirmed without delay. Jarno, reassured and perhaps flattered by
Wilhelm’s reaction to his favorite playwright, affirms his mentorship of the young
man by making him a promise of future advancement: “‘if you are prepared to put
your talents and abilities at our service […] then I would have an opportunity to
put you in a position which you will not regret having occupied for a time’” (485).
Wilhelm is elated. His dreams of bringing his innermost yearnings to fruition in
the world seem at last to be within reach.
Schlegel does not remark upon these details of the narrative frame surrounding
Wilhelm’s reading of Shakespeare. Insofar as the scene provides one of the most di-
rect articulations of Shakespeare’s value and significance within the novel as a
whole, however, it bears further scrutiny. By framing Wilhelm’s encounter with
Shakespeare in light of his relation to Jarno, and furthermore ironizing this encoun-
ter by closely juxtaposing it with his praise of Racine to the prince, mundane and
banal motives for reading a work of art in a particular way at a particular time are
allowed to surface. The human situation of the critic is foregrounded.Wilhelm’s read-
ing of Shakespeare appears to emerge as much out of his desperate need for guid-
ance and admiration as it does from any sort of spontaneous, deep, or disinterested
love for the work itself. Shakespeare is a means for uniting Jarno and Wilhelm. As
soon as Jarno has declared his mentorship of Wilhelm, Shakespeare drops away
and the real subject of their discussion emerges: “Wilhelm, extremely grateful for
this, now felt in the mood to tell his friend and benefactor his whole life story”
(485). Thus Wilhelm’s reading of Shakespeare opens inevitably into the life story
of Wilhelm, which of course the novel tells better than Wilhelm could ever tell him-
self.
Why does Goethe’s luminous act of poetic criticism congeal around the dull ker-
nel of Wilhelm’s personal ambition? Without casting any suspicion on Goethe’s use
of Shakespeare, which relies on a complex metafictional staging of the relation be-
tween mimesis and existence, it is fair to say that Wilhelm’s use of Shakespeare in
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this initial encounter is somewhat less subtle.¹ Wilhelm appears entirely to believe,
or to have convinced himself, in the transformative powers of Shakespearean plays.
But if Jarno had asked him to read any number of playwrights, his response would
no doubt have been as adulatory. Just as in his previous encounter, in which he
“would gladly have gone on talking and proved to the prince that he had read the
prince’s favorite poet with profit and emotional involvement” (476), so too would
he have generated a response to any poet marked as Jarno’s favorite in the terms
that he thinks Jarno would wish to hear.What might appear as an ardent, spontane-
ous critical response when taken in isolation is hence revealed by the narrative frame
to be highly conditioned by the structural position of the critic.
The trope of self-advancement continues to figure prominently in the scenes that
stage Wilhelm’s extended commentary on and performance of Hamlet. His early
identification with the role of Hamlet appears to arise from the same desire to affili-
ate himself with nobility. In his reconstruction of Hamlet’s formative years prior to
the death of his father,Wilhelm lays inordinate stress on the marks of Hamlet’s aris-
tocracy:
“This sensitive, noble scion, this flower of kingship, grew up under the immediate influences of
majesty; concepts of right and of princely dignity, the sense of what is good and what is seemly,
developed in him simultaneously with an awareness of being born into high station. He was a
prince, he was born a prince, and he was desirous of ruling so that good men should be unim-
peded in the exercise of goodness. Winsome in appearance, courteous by nature, pleasing by
temperament, he was fashioned to be a model of youth and a delight for everybody.” (500)
The fact that Wilhelm himself desires to achieve and to be regarded in terms of this
noble ideal is made clear by the letter that Wilhelm writes to Werner, in the chapter
immediately preceding the episodes in which he embarks on the production of Ham-
let in earnest. In his letter, Wilhelm lays out his view of the differences between the
nobleman and the burgher. For the nobleman, the full development and expression
of personality is in harmony with the public nature of his role,whereas for the burgh-
er, personal development is deformed by the necessity of developing his talents and
knowledge for material profit. Explaining his choice to become an actor, Wilhelm
writes to Werner: “‘I have an irresistible desire to attain the harmonious development
of my personality such as was denied me by my birth […]. On the stage a cultured
human being can appear in the full splendor of his person, just as in the upper
classes of society. There, mind and body keep step in all one does, and there I will
be able simultaneously to be and to appear better than anywhere else’” (547–
548).² The letter elides a crucial fact. The newly inherited fortune that makes Wil-
 For an account of the metafictional significance of Goethe’s representation of acting in the produc-
tion of Hamlet, see Pirholt 2012, 46–50.
 Christian Garve’s Über die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen (1792), cited in a
footnote of Schiller’s 1795 essay On the Necessary Limits of the Beautiful, especially in the Presentation
of Philosophical Truths, is considered by scholars to have been a probable source for “Goethe’s treat-
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helm’s new career possible derives entirely from the bourgeois labor of his dead fa-
ther.
This, then, is the context in which Wilhelm pursues his readings and re-staging
of Hamlet. Believing that inner refinement of spirit and taste will enable him to tran-
scend the bonds of class identity, he cannot admit that he is tied to a profession de-
pendent upon noble patronage, let alone funded by the wealth of a social class that
he despises. Wilhelm is in a bind. He cannot be who he wants to be. But he cannot
stop himself from wanting to be it. His inner conflict, revolving around issues of self-
realization and external determination, in turn inflects his reading of Shakespeare’s
play.Wilhelm’s Hamlet is too pure for actuality, beset by a destiny he cannot control.
Like the prince of his imaginative reconstruction,Wilhelm is a vulnerable young man
who doesn’t quite know how to carve a path for himself in the world. His dependence
on others does not square with his aspiration to be an artist, free, transcendent of
petty need.What he needs to work out is how to bypass this paradox of his situation
– namely, the requirement that, on the one hand, he perform himself as totally free
and disengaged from the world (recall Jarno’s directions to Wilhelm on how to read
Shakespeare: “‘you could not employ your time better than by disassociating your-
self from everything else and, in the solitude of your own room, peering into the ka-
leidoscope of this unknown world’” [476]), and that, on the other hand, he simulta-
neously come to terms with the reality of being conditioned by his fundamental
dependency. This paradox, which eventually comes to embody the central conflict
of the Bildungsroman between striving for autonomy and acceptance of heteronomy,
is not here resolved by what Franco Moretti calls the “interiorization of contradic-
tion” (Moretti 1987, 10) but rather by its exteriorization in drama.
Wilhelm’s reading of Hamlet’s personality discloses a further aspect of his psy-
chology that has not been widely emphasized by previous critics. Wilhelm is often
taken to be describing himself when he sets out “‘the key to Hamlet’s whole behav-
ior’” (Goethe 2016, 518). But what, exactly, is this key? When Wilhelm elucidates the
“‘fine, pure, noble and highly moral person,’” who “‘devoid of that emotional
strength that characterizes a hero, goes to pieces beneath a burden that it can neither
support nor cast off,’” it is not immediately clear what his own burden might be. In-
deed, the burden that he contends with throughout the novel is not presented in the
form of any weighty external responsibility towards others, but rather in the knowl-
edge of who he is: a knowledge that he cannot avow without imploding the fragile
structure of his very self. As in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the “‘oak tree planted in a pre-
cious pot which should only have held delicate flowers’” must be controlled, mas-
tered, and overcome by the greater vessel of the work of art that surrounds and con-
tains it, while at the same time exposing via the character life it portrays its own
vulnerability to the power and force of what has taken root in it.
ment of the role that art and the aesthetic might play in the attempt of the Bürger to rise in the socio-
cultural scale” (Wilkinson and Willoughby 1968, 103).
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The nature of poetic criticism is hence inextricably linked to the nature and lim-
its of the self-understanding that the work of art can tolerate within itself. “‘His feel-
ing of insignificance,’” says Wilhelm of Hamlet, “‘never leaves him’” (517). The sol-
ution that Wilhelm arrives at is embodied in every line of his interpretation and
reenactment of Hamlet. In the act of re-writing and acting, thus dying, within the
play, he solves the dilemma of whether to be Hamlet or Shakespeare by being
both. He realizes his childhood dream of being in the play and outside of it at
once, splitting his desires for total control and total immersive transport, shielding
himself from the compromises and banality of life that the narrative in which he
is embedded shows all too readily. Is his attempt at self-deliverance successful? Per-
haps that is the wrong question. At the close of Book V, after the all-consuming pro-
duction of Hamlet is staged, a fire breaks out in the house where he is living, an ac-
tress dies of a broken heart, and Wilhelm sets off on new adventures.
2 Joyce
Seen in light of the larger narrative frame that surrounds it, it is difficult to under-
stand how Wilhelm’s reading of Shakespeare might be attributed to the novel’s au-
thor in any straightforward way.Yet this was the dominant view throughout the nine-
teenth century, and it is announced as such in the opening of the library scene of
Joyce’s Ulysses. The episode begins with an unnamed voice uttering the lines we
have already quoted: “And we have, have we not, those priceless pages of Wilhelm
Meister. A great poet on a great brother poet” (Joyce 1986, 151). The speaker who in-
vites us to see Wilhelm as articulating Goethe’s own stance on Hamlet is significantly
not Stephen Dedalus, but rather Thomas Lyster, director of the National Library of
Ireland in Dublin between 1895 and 1920. Along with John Eglinton, born William
Kirkpatrick Magee and anointed by Yeats as “our one Irish critic,” and George Wil-
liam Russell, a “prophet, poet, philosopher, artist, journalist, economic theorist” (Gif-
ford and Seidman 2008, 35) known as AE, his is a voice of established authority
throughout the episode. These titans, gatekeepers of Ireland’s literary scene, mark
their turf with ease. The young poet must be subdued – always with laughter and
wit, for a light touch shows mastery – but nonetheless, made to know his place in
the hierarchy.
The scene in the library thus reveals that Stephen must deliver his famous inter-
pretation of Shakespeare between the gaps of another conversation, one from which
he is left out. His audience is more preoccupied with displaying their own intelli-
gence and bolstering one another’s egos than they are with paying heed to a
young upstart. Stephen is time and again made conscious of his exclusion. As
they natter away about their gatherings – this evening at George Moore’s house to
celebrate the work of new poets, the Hermetic Society on Thursday – they hardly
even notice that he is there, much less wanting to be recognized. They single out oth-
ers of his generation for praise and advancement, all the while overlooking him:
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Young Colum and Starkey. George Roberts is doing the commercial part. Longworth will give it a
good puff in the Express. O, will he? I liked Colum’s Drover. Yes, I think he has that queer thing
genius. Do you think he has genius really? Yeats admired his line: As in wild earth a Grecian
vase. Did he? I hope you’ll be able to come tonight. Malachi Mulligan is coming too. Moore
asked him to bring Haines. (Joyce 1986, 158)
Stephen thinks to himself as he listens to them: “Cordelia. Cordoglio. Lir’s loneliest
daughter” (158). Cordelia, King Lear’s dispossessed youngest daughter; Cordoglio,
Italian for “deep sorrow”; and Fionnuala, daughter of the Irish sea god, Lir, whose
place was usurped by his son: this net of allusions places Stephen in a constellation
of loss, tragic rivalry, and exclusion (Gifford and Seidman 2008, 215).
Stephen feels that his genius, such as it may be, is unrecognized by his audience.
But the scene draws our attention to something else. What is at stake for him in the
library is not a purely intellectual need for esteem, but something much more viscer-
al: the need of a pup to be chosen and mentored by the alphas, so as to ensure his
survival and the continuance of his progeny. In his case, the offspring are intellectu-
al: “Coffined thoughts around me, in mummycases, embalmed in spice of words. […]
And I heard the voice of that Egyptian highpriest” (Joyce 1986, 159). The walls of the
National Library that surround him are a stark reminder of what it means to exist in
this world, a literary world into which he wishes to gain entrée. Here each thought
that survives is entombed, granted immortality, because real people with egos and
institutional power elect to valorize, preserve, and sustain it.
But Stephen is not in favor with the high priests. He is reduced to an attendant, a
suppliant, in their temple. He must bow and scrape to beg George Russell to deliver
Deasy’s letter to the editor of the Irish Homestead. He must say his own views “super-
politely” (152). He must watch silently as rivals are promoted above him (“They make
him welcome” [162], he thinks when his companion and antagonist Buck Mulligan
enters). And always, he must offer his submission and deference – “Flatter. Rarely.
But flatter,” he thinks, as he works a gratifying allusion to Eglinton’s work into his
speech and watches the older man’s face “quick with pleasure, look[] up shybright-
ly” (171).
The play within the play, then, is more than a pretext for Stephen to deliver a
reading of Shakespeare that sheds light on the novel in which it is implanted. Let
us return for a moment to Lyster’s characterization of Goethe on Shakespeare at
the opening of the chapter: “A great poet on a great brother poet.” Stephen argues
that for Shakespeare, brothers are rivals and usurpers. Poets are opportunistic sello-
uts, willing to curry favor with those in power if it might lead to a consolidation of
their worldly position. What, then, are great poets?
Stephen’s Shakespeare is a man whose late tragedies are fueled by crisis and
misery: grief at the loss of his son, bitterness at the unfaithfulness of his wife with
his own brother. But he is also a contriver, a chancer, a man without scruples in
near single-minded pursuit of social and financial gain. As Stephen puts it, “his
Poetic Criticism and the Work of Fiction: Goethe, Joyce, and Coetzee 163
name is dear to him, as dear as the coat and crest he toadied for” (172). The bard, he
alleges, is “lead[] astray” by “the sense of property” (168):
He drew Shylock out of his own long pocket. The son of a maltjobber and moneylender he was
himself a cornjobber and moneylender, with ten tods of corn hoarded in the famine riots. […] He
sued a fellowplayer for the price of a few bags of malt and exacted his pound of flesh in interest
for every money lent. How else could Aubrey’s ostler and callboy get rich quick? All events
brought grist to his mill. Shylock chimes with the jewbaiting that followed the hanging and quar-
tering of the queen’s leech Lopez […] Hamlet and Macbeth with the coming to the throne of a
Scotch philosophaster with a turn for witchroasting. The lost armada is his jeer in Love’s Labour
Lost. His pageants, the histories, sail fullbellied on a tide of Mafeking enthusiasm. (168)
The keen instinct that turns his art like a sail in response to the winds of his royal
patrons’ whims, and every transaction to his own advantage – from whence is this
born? Stephen gives no account. The elision is all the more curious, since Shake-
speare’s biographer George Brandes, who is cited by Stephen throughout the epi-
sode, states explicitly that “it was [Shakespeare’s] constant ambition to restore the
fallen fortunes of his family” (Brandes 1898, 166), after seeing his father imprisoned
for debt and stripped of his position as Alderman in his youth (12). According to
Brandes, Shakespeare “never for a moment lost sight of Stratford, and […] had no
sooner made a footing for himself in London than he set to work with the definite
aim of acquiring land and property in the town from which he had gone forth penni-
less and humiliated. His father should hold up his head again, and the family hon-
our be re-established” (15).
The missing explanation in Stephen’s fiction of Shakespeare is not omitted from
Joyce’s fiction of Stephen. The young poet’s hardships due to his father’s financial
troubles are detailed in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.³ His debts to friends
and acquaintances are enumerated meticulously throughout Ulysses. In this episode
alone, he notes the pound lent to him by Russell (Joyce 1986, 155), the two shillings
by Fred Ryan (176), and the boots by Mulligan, to whom he owes an additional nine
pounds: “His boots are spoiling the shape of my feet” (173), he thinks, looking down
midway through this performance. “Buy a pair. Holes in my socks. Handkerchief too”
(173). Financial need permeates the performance in the library, which ends not with a
discussion of the intellectual or aesthetic merits of the theory but with the elders’
ruling that Stephen shall extract neither profit nor fame from it.⁴ “I don’t see why
you should expect payment for it,” chides Eglinton, ending their exchange on a
note of personal insult: “You are the only contributor to Dana who asks for pieces
of silver. Then I don’t know about the next number. Fred Ryan wants space for an
article on economics” (176). If Stephen’s performance had been pitched at selling
 For a discussion of the significance of these hardships, see Hepburn Fall 2004–Summer 2006, 197–
218.
 For an extended analysis of the relation between Stephen’s debts and his reading of Shakespeare’s
usury, see Osteen 1995, 214–227.
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himself or his theories to this audience, it has clearly flopped – not because of the
value of the ideas themselves, but because his reputation as a debtor has removed
him from social recognition, just as it removed his own father and Shakespeare’s fa-
ther before him.
Critics rarely draw attention to these aspects of the situation in which Stephen
deploys his portrait of Shakespeare. The episode is read primarily as a guide to inter-
preting Ulysses as a work of art in which Joyce places himself as both father and son.
The key is presumably given in the climax of Stephen’s performance, which brings
together his claim that Shakespeare imprints the incidents of his life’s drama
upon his plays with a quasi-Sabellian view of Trinitarian being. This highly abstract
theory of creation holds that the poet, like the divine “Father [who] was Himself His
Own Son” (171), sublimates himself above and beyond needing others and ultimately
becomes one with himself through this creation: “We walk through ourselves, meet-
ing robbers, ghosts, giants, old men, young men, wives,widows, brothers-in-love, but
always meeting ourselves” (175). The fictional frame in which this mystical theory of
art is embedded, however, reinscribes Stephen within the earthly tragedy of an alien-
ated, dispossessed figure, even as he asserts his aspirations to rise above his situa-
tion through the performance that articulates it. Stephen finds exiled heroes every-
where because he is excluded from the inner circle he dreams of entering. He is
not in tune with the intellectual fads of his time. He likes Aristotle and not Plato.
He has holes in his socks. Lonely, stricken by poverty-consciousness, he seeks an ab-
stract ghostly father within himself because he cannot connect to his own. His read-
ing of Shakespeare is confirmation of his own orphanhood and alienation, even as it
attempts to transcend it.
Stephen’s articulation of his theory of creation is immediately preceded by the
strangest tangent in his entire performance. Fatherhood, he abruptly declares after
noting that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet in the months after his father’s death, is
“founded […] [u]pon uncertitude, upon unlikelihood” (170). Paternity is but “a
legal fiction” (171). There is no paternal correlate to the undeniable physical bond
of mother and child – a father only knows himself to be a father by his marriage cer-
tificate. Fathers and sons are forever “sundered by a bodily shame” (171), the shame
of their disconnection. All sons, in the end, are rivals to and usurpers of their fathers.
Stephen’s disjointed and obsessive rant culminates in his claim that the fundamental
leitmotif of Shakespeare’s work is the unfaithful wife who renders her husband’s pa-
ternity unsure. What connects this sudden digression on paternity, which erupts
seemingly out of nothing, and the aforementioned context for his lecture in the li-
brary? Protection and survival, once again. No father will protect the child born
out of wedlock. But even the rightful heir is separated from the alienation and dis-
placement of the bastard by the avowal of the father. Denying the defenselessness
of the child in the face of the father’s whim, Stephen seeks to find the means of se-
curity and self-creation in his own solipsistic imagination. Publicly, he announces
that “[f]atherhood, in the sense of unconscious begetting, is unknown to man”
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(170). But inwardly, what he finds unknowable in himself is the fact of his own vul-
nerability and dependence upon a father who is merely human.
Something that the character does not want to know, to own about themselves:
this is the dark seed that unfurls into the flower of poetic criticism in both of these
novels. In Joyce and in Goethe, we find a character thinking about a character think-
ing about a character: a character (Stephen Dedalus) who creates a character (Shake-
speare) who creates a character (Hamlet) who stages a play that mirrors his own sit-
uation. In each case, as Stephen himself intimates, the creation of character is a
strategy to overcome a block. The character within the frame of fiction is under an
unacknowledged threat or pressure of existence. He seeks to protect himself and
to advance his aims in and through this act of critical reinvention and artistic imag-
ination. Yet within the act there remains a trace of the fatal block: the impossibility –
or as we might call it, the necessary fictionality – of overcoming it. The peculiar
power and magnetism of these scenes of poetic criticism derives in part from the
inner conflict of the character that galvanizes the act of criticism, spurring the char-
acter on to generate an ever more elaborately ramified re-presentation of the conflict,
and prolonging the energy of grappling with its equivocal consequences. As we shall
see in Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello, the final instance of poetic criticism we shall an-
alyze, this structure of intensification gives rise to a kind of metafictional echo. The
character returns ultimately to themselves in the form of the other-self of their invent-
ed fiction.
3 Coetzee
In the lecture hall of a small American college, a novelist from Australia mounts the
podium and unfolds her notes. Her argument meanders, confusing her listeners.
Each gesture is obliquely self-canceling. She declares herself obsessed with the im-
mortality of her books, yet notes that the great libraries of the world that hold them
will one day “‘crumble and decay’” (Coetzee 2003, 17). She evokes Kafka’s ape,whose
performance she views as a kind of “‘test,’” “‘an examination, a viva voce,’” but she
denies that she too is a speaking ape before an academy (18). Repeatedly she tests
her authority to say what the text of Kafka’s “A Report to an Academy” means,
and then just as abruptly withdraws it: “‘That is not the point of the story, say I,
who am, however in no position to dictate what the point of the story is’” (19). By
way of conclusion, she expresses her gratitude for the literary award they have be-
stowed upon her work, and reminds her audience in the very same breath of the
fact that she “‘will cease to be read and eventually cease to be remembered’” (20).
The applause begins, tentative at first, then rising. She smiles, savoring the moment.
Just as the dean of the college rises to announce the end of the event, a voice inter-
rupts him: “‘Excuse me! […] Excuse me! I have a question for the speaker. May I ad-
dress the speaker?’” (20–21) The novelist does not respond. “Frostily she gazes into
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the distance” (21). The hosts are embarrassed; the would-be questioner, irked. The
ceremony ends on a note of awkwardness and discord.
Embedded within the opening episode of J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello, this
scene stages an act of literary criticism that subverts the intended purpose of the oc-
casion. Indeed, the novel’s own chapters are provocatively identified as “Lessons,”
and several of these “Lessons” (including this one) were read aloud by Coetzee in
lieu of conventional lectures at academic institutions. The performance of fictions
which themselves stage performed acts of criticism, often via lectures by Elizabeth
Costello that explicate literary and philosophical texts, raises several questions:
the question of what it means to read a text, of what it means to be instructed by
one, and, moreover, of what happens when our desire for instruction is supplanted
by a work of fiction.
Although Elizabeth Costello is often taken by critics to be a mouthpiece for her
author’s views and her lectures read as thinly fictionalized accounts of his own eth-
ical stance, the text itself complicates this interpretation by framing her lectures
within a narrative that brings into play other conflicts and energies. Costello’s perfor-
mance of the lecture described above is embedded within a narrative of her visit to
Altona College. As is also the case with Lessons 3 and 4 of the novel (delivered by
Coetzee on the occasion of the Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, and later
published separately as The Lives of Animals), the frame narrative surrounding the
occasion for her talk is largely focalized through the eyes of her son, John. John is
a young professor at a college in Massachusetts. His only reason for accompanying
his mother on this trip to collect her prize is, he thinks, “simply to protect her” (30).
But is that all?
He is here with her, out of love. He cannot imagine her getting through this trial without him at
her side. He stands by her because he is her son, her loving son. But he is also on the point of
becoming – distasteful word – her trainer.
He thinks of her as a seal, an old, tired circus seal. One more time she must heave herself up on
to the tub, one more time show that she can balance the ball on her nose. Up to him to coax her,
put heart in her, get her through the performance. (3)
It is, in John’s mind, a play in several acts: dinner with the jury, an interview, a radio
show, an awards ceremony, and an acceptance speech. He is present for all of them
as a minor character, albeit as her loving and supportive son. Yet the allusion in this
passage to his role as a “trainer” recalls the trainer of Red Peter in Kafka’s story. The
role is not without its occupational hazards. As Red Peter recalls, his first trainer,
driven insane by the spectacle of the ape’s self-flagellation, “soon gave up teaching,
and had to be carted off to a mental hospital” (Kafka 1993, 292).
Elizabeth Costello begins her speech about Kafka’s “Report” by reminding her
audience of its poetic form: “‘If you know the story, you will remember that it is
cast in the form of a monologue, a monologue by an ape. Within this form there is
no means for either speaker or audience to be inspected by an outsider’s eye’” (Coet-
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zee 2003, 18). Her refusal of the would-be interlocuter’s question at the end of her
speech reminds us that her appearance, too, is staged as a monologue. Kafka, in
fact, composes several incomplete draft versions of “A Report to an Academy,” in
which he experiments with focalizing the narrative from various points of view:
the point of view of an anonymous visitor to Red Peter, of an audience member
who has just witnessed one of his performances, and of Red Peter’s trainer, “an hon-
orary doctor of great universities” (Kafka 2005, 259). All of these spectatorial perspec-
tives on Red Peter – the audience member, the trainer, the visitor – fall away in the
final version of “A Report.” Red Peter speaks in the first person throughout Kafka’s
text, in which no other voices are heard.⁵
In contrast, Elizabeth Costello’s utterances are staged within a narrative that is
focalized largely from the “‘outsider’s eye’” (Coetzee 2003, 18), furnished in this epi-
sode by her son’s point of view. His perspective on his mother is notably ambivalent.
There is, of course, blind loyalty and gratitude for having been given life, for having
been kept alive by his parent when he was at his most vulnerable and dependent.
But there are also memories of abandonment, neglect, and rejection:
For as far back as he can remember, his mother has secluded herself in the mornings to do her
writing. No intrusions under any circumstances. He used to think of himself as a misfortunate
child, lonely and unloved. When they felt particularly sorry for themselves, he and his sister
used to slump outside the locked door and make tiny whining sounds. In time the whining
would change to humming or singing, and they would feel better, forgetting their forsaken-
ness. (4)
Like Red Peter’s choice to seek a way out of his captivity, Elizabeth Costello’s choice
to seek transcendence through art, to devote her life to courting the acceptance and
applause of the academy, is a choice that involves strategy, performance, and – at
least from her own child’s point of view – a betrayal of natural bonds. His memories
of his mother’s working life are colored by pain. Yet he recalls that as he and his sis-
ter’s lamentations proceed from animal whining to human singing, their anguish
abates.What takes the place of pain is voice: voice that proceeds from a kind of lone-
liness, just as in Kafka’s story.⁶ This voice even develops until the point that John
joins the author within her innermost sanctum. The passage above continues:
Now the scene has changed. He has grown up. He is no longer outside the door but inside, ob-
serving her as she sits, back to the window, confronting, day after day, year after year, while her
hair slowly goes from black to grey, the blank page. What doggedness, he thinks! She deserves
 For an extended discussion of the significance of the monologic voice of “A Report,” see Ong 2016,
220–230.
 Red Peter describes the utterance of his first words in human language as the moment at which he
enters into human society: “And then what a victory it was both for him and for me when one evening
in front of a large group of spectators […] I curtly exclaimed ‘Hey!’ breaking out in human sounds,
plunging into human society with that cry, and feeling its echo, ‘Listen, he’s talking!’ like a kiss
over my entire sweat-soaked body.” (Kafka 1993, 291)
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the medal, no doubt about that, this medal and many more. For valour beyond the call of
duty. (4–5)
In this change of scene, John places himself beside the writer, his mother, but also in
a sense above her, in the position of a judge who can say what she deserves. He has
become, in other words, a critic: one who endows her labor with value and signifi-
cance. The motif repeats throughout the narrative. At her radio show, he watches
from “the control booth” (11); he defends her to the critic Susan Moebius, offering
his own interpretation of her work; in the airport, he questions his mother, in
what is the final interview of the visit, about the meaning of her lecture.
His efforts to understand her are also, as the locus of his perspective in the con-
trol booth suggests, attempts to rewrite her from his own point of view: to see her in a
way in which she cannot see herself, to know her. But why? In his own mind, he has
come with her on this visit in order to protect her from the academics, the journalists,
and the critics who seek to grasp the secret at the heart of her work. They dissect her
utterances, invade her privacy, and continually bait her to reveal her personal opin-
ions and private experiences. Costello herself is adept at evading them: “Her strategy
with interviewers is to take control of the exchange, presenting them with blocks of
dialogue that have been rehearsed” (9). She controls the highly scripted version of
her authorial persona that is available for public consumption. “She can come
home with her true self safe,” John thinks as they prepare to leave the college, “leav-
ing behind an image, false, like all images” (30).
When the critic Susan Moebius goes so far as to question John in bed about his
mother after she seduces him – “Research: will that be her name for it afterwards?
Using a secondary source?” he thinks as they kiss in the hotel elevator (24) – he al-
lows himself to entertain the thought that perhaps his mother’s authorial control
over her image is an illusion to protect her from the knowledge of what she is “really
like”:
What is the truth of his mother? He does not know, and at the deepest level does not want to
know. He has opinions of his own, but he will not speak them. This woman, he would say if
he were to speak, whose words you hang on as if she were the sibyl, is the same woman who,
forty years ago, hid day after day in her bedsitter in Hampstead, crying to herself, crawling out
in the evenings into the foggy streets to buy the fish and chips on which she lived, falling asleep
in her clothes. She is the same woman who later stormed around the house in Melbourne, hair fly-
ing in all directions, screaming at her children, ‘You are killing me! You are tearing the flesh from
my body!’ (He lay in the dark with his sister afterwards, comforting her while she sobbed; he was
seven; it was his first taste of fathering.) This is the secret world of the oracle. How can you hope
to understand her before you know what she is really like? (30–31)
Throughout the episode, John has described himself as his mother’s creation (“‘Out
of her very body I came, caterwauling,’” he declares to Susan, “‘[f]lesh of her flesh,
blood of her blood’” [28]) and his mother’s character (for “[h]e is in her books, or
some of them” [5]). In this moment, however, he shows that he too has a certain au-
Poetic Criticism and the Work of Fiction: Goethe, Joyce, and Coetzee 169
thorial power: a capacity to produce this other, rival image of his mother. Subverting
his mother’s image with his own perspective on her, he strips her of “her lady novel-
ist’s uniform” (4), her scripted ease, her sphinx-like mystery and invulnerability. The
divine author has a mortal body that is exhausted, in need; a body from which flesh
can be torn, and in which fear of dying and rage at being consumed by the needs of
other bodies resides. Yet this power over his mother, the power to reenvision her,
comes at a cost. The sacred myth of mother love (what Stephen Dedalus calls “the
only true thing in life” [Joyce 1986, 170]) is destroyed by John’s recollections. What
emerges in its place is a raging, self-centered, wounded, limited, and neglectful
mother.What can she tell John of his own value and importance? Is he waiting faith-
fully for his mother to finally receive the recognition she craves, so that she can at
last turn to him and love him?
The ambivalence of her son’s desire – on the one hand, to recognize his mother’s
vulnerability and need, and, on the other hand, to mask it by presenting her to the
world (and even to himself) as a renowned novelist whose sole ambition is immortal
fame – suggests that the dynamics underlying the reception of these interpretive per-
formances are equally at stake in their fictional representations. At the end of her
visit, John accompanies his mother on the flight home:
She lies slumped deep in her seat. Her head is sideways, her mouth open. She is snoring faintly.
Light flashes from the windows as they bank, the sun setting brilliantly over southern California.
He can see up her nostrils, into her mouth, down the back of her throat. And what he cannot see
he can imagine: the gullet, pink and ugly, contracting as it swallows, like a python, drawing
things down to the pear-shaped belly-sac. He draws away, tightens his own belt, sits up, facing
forward. No, he tells himself, that is not where I come from, that is not it. (Coetzee 2003, 33–34)
As their bodies descend, spiraling, to the ground, John’s body is momentarily orient-
ed between the western sun to his left and his mother’s body to east. The scene re-
calls Kant’s essay “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?” (1786), in which
the very possibility of cardinal orientation (and hence of the intelligibility of the
world to us) is grounded in a felt bodily intuition of the difference between the
right and left sides of one’s body.
In the proper meaning of the word, to orient oneself means to use a given direction […] in order
to find the others – literally, to find the sunrise. Now if I see the sun in the sky and know it is
midday, then I know how to find south, west, north, and east. For this, however, I also need the
feeling of a difference in my own subject, namely the difference between my right and left
hands. I call this a feeling because these two sides outwardly display no designatable difference
in intuition. If I did not have this faculty of distinguishing, without the need of any difference in
the objects, between moving from left to right and right to left and moving in the opposite di-
rection and thereby determining a priori a difference in the position of the objects, then in de-
scribing a circle I would not know whether west was right or left of the southernmost point of
the horizon, or whether I should complete the circle by moving north and east and thus back to
the south. Thus even with all the objective data of the sky, I orient myself geographically only
through a subjective ground of differentiation; and if all the constellations, though keeping
the same shape and position relative to one another, were one day by a miracle to be reversed
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in their direction, so that what was east now became west, no human eye would notice the
slightest alteration on the next bright starlit night, and even the astronomer – if he pays atten-
tion only to what he sees and not at the same time to what he feels – would inevitably become
disoriented. (Kant 1998, 4–5)
Kant’s mention of the “astronomer” who “become[s] disoriented” from having lost
the feeling of his own body sheds light on the figure of John, an “assistant professor
of physics and astronomy,” who earlier on in this Lesson loses his sense of orienta-
tion when navigating the corridors of the hotel (Coetzee 2003, 60). Now, as he glimp-
ses the body of his own mother beside him, he is disgusted by a vision of the snake-
like innards of his origin. He denies what the poet Allen Grossman calls in his read-
ing of Kant’s text “the perishing basis of our common life, our corporeal singularity,
our physical subject nature, our body as it is the bearer of recognition and intelligi-
bility” (Grossman 2009, 8): the basic form of pre-cognition that is his birthright, and
with it the (re)cognition of the embodied condition of his mind.
At the same time, it is not bodily intuition that gives him this vision of his moth-
er, but imagination. To imagine what she is like inside mirrors what an author would
do to a character, and indeed what critics have tried to do to Elizabeth Costello
throughout her visit in an attempt to understand her works. The scene thus empha-
sizes a theme that we have seen already to varying degrees in Goethe and Joyce. A
character who seeks to interpret a fictional character, to master the work of art in
which the fictional character is embedded, is eventually driven to decipher the mys-
tery of the author.⁷ Coetzee’s text amplifies the mutual entanglement of these differ-
ent positions, insofar as it takes the form of a novel bearing the same title as the
name of its main character, who is a novelist, and whose son bears the same first
name as the author of the novel in which he appears as a character. The son becomes
a critic of his mother, in whose body he literally came to life, and of her novels, in
which he figures as a character; he is, as he thinks in another episode, “written
into her books in ways that he sometimes finds painful” (Coetzee 2003, 60). But
as the scene on the flight suggests, John’s imaginative reconstruction of his moth-
er-and-author’s life ends in sudden, involuntary recoil. He is torn between the desire
to know his mother and an almost instinctive urge to deny this knowledge. He does
not seem to want to acknowledge that knowing Elizabeth Costello amounts, in the
last analysis, to knowing himself.
In different ways, each of these texts invite us to understand acts of poetic criti-
cism as bound up with the search for an indirect dialogue, a form of existential self-
examination, in which the encounter with another work of art becomes an occasion
for reading the self. Every attempt at self-knowledge, however, also belies an attempt
to hide or refashion the self. Whereas Schlegel’s idea of poetic criticism emphasizes
 Describing the process by which he interpreted Hamlet, Wilhelm Meister declares: “‘An actor, on
the other hand, must be able to account for his praise or disapproval of a play. And how is he to
do that if he does not penetrate to the author’s mind and intentions?’” (Goethe 2016, 499)
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the creative power of the author to reshape and represent a work of art within their
own creation, these fictions of poetic criticism cut against a certain ideal of mastery.
The disowning or displacement of what belongs to these characters surfaces again
and again in each of these scenes. Wilhelm approaches his condition of passivity
and ineffectuality through Hamlet, but at the same time lays emphasis on Hamlet’s
inherent aristocratic identity, burying his own dilemma over how to take on the im-
possible task of becoming noble. Similarly, Stephen Dedalus reimagines a Shake-
speare whose opportunism and ambition matches his own. At the same time, he re-
presses the shame of the son at his father’s failure, and the impossibility of knowing
himself in the absence of his father. Elizabeth Costello attempts to own her impossi-
ble relation to reality by enacting the performance of Kafka’s ape, but she leaves out
the fundamental motive at the heart of Red Peter’s narrative – namely, the adoption
of a purely performative identity that drives him nearly insane in order to avoid end-
ing up dead or imprisoned. The inner conflict at play for each character cannot be
resolved in the imaginative attempt to revivify another work of art. It must be
lived out, not thought out, in each of these character’s lives, as other events beyond
their control and beyond the domain of their intellectual and artistic efforts become
nodes for its refraction, resolution, and reawakening. At the same time, the paradox
at the heart of each character’s conflict has a dynamic energy that carries throughout
the plot, permeating the character system and inflecting events that lie outside any
one person’s locus of agency. The novel represents what appears to be a conflict that
is internal to one character as formative of a whole world: a rival world, in which the
conflict and reconciliation of mutually exclusive aims that would otherwise not be
legible within the reality surrounding it can be staged.
Many other resonances between these episodes emerge from their juxtaposition.
Each of these figures are, in distinct ways, spurred by a sense of loneliness, aliena-
tion, and a lack of attunement to the values of the world in which they live. They
share a powerful sense of wanting to be known, recognized, valued, and even
loved in spite of this alienation. Neither Goethe, Joyce, nor Coetzee attempt to ironize
this impulse – on the contrary, it is the force of this longing that brings these char-
acters face to face with the possibility of non-being or meaninglessness when con-
fronting the other, and that gives rise to the concurrent desire for control over how
they are to be understood by others. The interplay between the authoritative, disem-
bodied voice of criticism and the emergence of the character’s body into a public
realm that is conditioned by socioeconomic forces is hence foregrounded in the stag-
ing of each of these performances of poetic criticism.What is at stake in these scenes
appears to be a very difficult and painful form of self-knowledge that has to be highly
protected by the mediation of art – almost as if the more wounding the knowledge,
the more layers of protection must be marshaled to bring it into the world. The expo-
sure of vulnerability and lack of control within these narratives is bound up with the
dialectical relation between authorial and characterological modes of being, be-
tween the one who controls all and suffers nothing and the one who controls nothing
and suffers all. This relation in turn highlights the intractable problem of finding a
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way to live with powerlessness, contingency, commonness, suffering, and meaning-
lessness.
Ultimately, however, I am less interested in developing a general theory or ac-
count of the significance of poetic criticism than in taking seriously the idea that a
conceptual definition might miss the manner of its embodiment within the fictional
text. Why do we read these fictions? What, in the end, do we want from them? In
staging acts of poetic criticism, Goethe, Joyce, and Coetzee pose the question of
what it means to encounter a work of art, of what it means to be a reader. To fully
respond to this question, it becomes necessary to create another work of art. This
other fiction – a ‘poetic’ fiction in Schlegel’s sense – highlights the tension between
three interwoven fields of representation: the work of art that is encountered, the fic-
tional interpretation generated by the character encountering it, and the fictional life
of the character in which this encounter is embedded. In the interplay of these rep-
resentations, the reader is caught. For, as these works of poetic criticism reveal, the
ego of the fictional reader/critic both spurs the work of criticism and is the block to
understanding the work of art to which the critic is exposed. The narratives in which
these acts of criticism are embedded underscore the energies of the critic’s ego in en-
abling and limiting the act of criticism, in part by narrating the conditions under
which the fictional critic submits to suffering alongside the character whom they
read while simultaneously developing various forms of self-protection to cope with
their difficulties in reality. To expose oneself to a work of poetic criticism, then, is
to be radically disarmed, undefended against the needs of a fictional character in
confronting a work of art. Is this what we desire of art? Of criticism? As Toril Moi
puts it, works of art demand acts of acknowledgment that “reveal us: who we take
ourselves to be, how we picture our relationship to the other” (Moi 2017, 207) –
and, crucially, how we may fail in our attempts to respond to the other. “I write criti-
cism to find out about myself,” claims Michel Chaouli, “including about the limits of
my cognitive and affective resources” (Chaouli 2013, 333). Intimacy with a work of art
involves openness to exposing one’s limits in the encounter. The fiction of poetic
criticism yields a form in which these attempts and limits meet. In so doing, they
give rise to yet another work of art.⁸
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Simon Schleusener
Surface, Distance, Depth: The Text and its
Outside
Introduction
In this article, I will refer to the concept of poetic critique rather loosely, and certainly
not with any intention to adequately capture what Friedrich Schlegel originally had
in mind (cf. Schlegel 2003). While the notion is closely connected with the literary
program of early German Romanticism, it is my sense that there is a special allure
to it that prompts its reactivation in the context of present-day theory. In particular,
the idea of poetic critique appears to me as opening up a sort of ‘third space,’ or
functioning as a ‘line of flight,’ that counteracts the false alternative that has brought
much of the current methodological discussions in cultural and literary studies to an
effective dead-end. Indeed, if one follows much of the contemporary debate about
‘critique and postcritique’ (Anker and Felski 2017), one might get the impression
that the choice for practitioners in literary studies is as follows: between, on the
one hand, a kind of reading that is steeped in the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ (Ric-
œur), that is paranoid, symptomatic, judgmental, and overly moralizing, while more
or less uninterested in questions of aesthetics, attachment, and form; and, on the
other hand, an essentially affirmative or aestheticist reading, devoid of social or po-
litical context, that is exclusively interested in the surface of texts, in their formal
properties, affective capacities, and enchanting qualities.With regard to this unsatis-
factory alternative, the concept of poetic critique represents both a rejection and a
displacement along the lines of the famous formula of Melville’s Bartleby: “I
would prefer not to.”¹ For what it suggests, in my understanding, is a very different
encounter with art and literature – one that does not see the desire to do justice to
the work of art and the goal of exploring historico-political contexts and ideological
contents as an irreconcilable either/or choice.² In other words, my use of the concept
of poetic critique is meant to resist both postcritique’s quasi aestheticist refusal to
take into account the text’s outside and the ‘anti-poetic’ implications of some
forms of contemporary political critique.
What this text seeks to do, then, is engage with the current discourse on critique
and postcritique and present an alternative. In a nutshell, the essay’s goal is to use
 According to Gilles Deleuze, the formula represents neither an affirmation nor a negation, but the
“devastating” repudiation of a false choice (cf. Deleuze 1997, 71).
 What this further entails is the insight that in order to do justice to a literary text, it is equally nec-
essary to do justice to its outside (the famous Derridean hors-texte) too. For the idea that the text’s
outside must be understood as an essential dimension of the text itself, cf. Schleusener 2018a.
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the postcritical intervention as an opportunity to think anew about the proper means
of engaging, simultaneously, with literature and politics, art and society. The premise
here is that a return to some reductively formalist or aestheticist principle would be
an unfortunate regression, but that there are better and worse ways of reading liter-
ature critically and politically. In the first chapter, I will explore the theoretical land-
scape of postcritique, discussing two of the major elements of the sort of ‘critique of
critique’ most boldly represented by Rita Felski (2015): First, the claim that what
makes contemporary critique so tiresome and problematic – in other words: what
represents its limits – is its reliance on the logic and hermeneutics of suspicion.
And second, the implicit assertion that what is wrong with critique methodologically
is its taking for granted ‘abstract totalities’ such as society, capitalism, or modes of
production – a premise postcritics typically counter by appropriating models that are
more descriptive or empiricist, such as Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory.
In the second chapter, I will concentrate on the distinction between symptomatic
and surface reading (as drawn by Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus), discussing the
theoretical premises of the latter in view of one of postcritique’s prime targets, name-
ly Fredric Jameson. As an alternative to both the short-sighted advice to merely focus
on the surface of the text itself (and thereby abandon any discussion of its outside)
and a strictly allegorical reading (or “rewriting”) as suggested by Jameson (cf. James-
on 2002, x), I will draw attention to the work of Siegfried Kracauer and, in particular,
his analysis of the ‘mass ornament.’ While Kracauer thoroughly investigates his sub-
ject matter’s “surface-level” (Kracauer 1995, 75), he simultaneously pays attention to
its socioeconomic context or constellation. Such a reading needs to operate both
from up close and from a distance, like a camera repeatedly switching between
close-up and long shot. Rather than focusing on the opposition between ‘close’
and ‘deep’ analysis (Love 2010) or ‘latent’ and ‘manifest’ meaning, this sort of en-
gagement with culture, art, and literature simultaneously aims at precision (hence
its closeness to the surface of its object) and distance – a distance that should neither
be confused with Franco Moretti’s approach of digital quantification (cf. Moretti
2013) nor with ‘critical distance,’ in the sense of the critic maintaining her distance
in order to keep her hands clean. Instead, to look at a text from a distance here sim-
ply means that one chooses a perspective from which it is possible to also perceive its
particular outside.
In my third and final chapter, I will demonstrate the effectiveness of the sort of
reading outlined with respect to Kracauer in view of a concrete literary example,
namely Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick. Here, in distinction to the dominant (allegori-
cal) readings of the book, I pay close attention to what is on the surface of the novel:
whales and whaling. What I seek to demonstrate, however, is that this non-allegori-
cal focus on the book’s manifest subject matter does precisely not imply an abandon-
ment of the text’s outside – its socioeconomic and political context. Instead, I will
draw attention to the fact that Melville’s treatment of whaling is not just inextricably
linked to the book’s peculiar, proto-modernist aesthetic form, but also seamlessly in-
volves the reader with questions of political economy and socioeconomic history.
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Postcritique’s Political Unconscious
There is a structural obstacle that complicates any effort at responding to postcri-
tique critically. For if one rejects postcritical claims regarding the alleged negativity,
suspiciousness, self-righteousness, and parasitic nature of critical practice, how can
one make sure not to get caught in a performative contradiction and confirm the ac-
cusation? As Benjamin Noys puts it:
This is the difficult spiral in which the critics of anti-critique find themselves. To engage in the
critique of anti-critique is to feed and reinforce the claims of anti-critique, which suggests that
critique can never escape attachment to what it criticises and ascend to a new joyous, creative,
and productive alternative. To continue to engage in critique, especially the critique of anti-cri-
tique, is to feel outdated and, sometimes, miserable, two clichés that surround the critic. By def-
inition, the critic is secondary to what they criticise, hence already dated, and dissatisfied with
what they criticise, hence miserable. (Noys 2019, 31)
Obviously, this article will not be able to escape this trap. Although its aim is ulti-
mately to present a version of critique that manifests itself as a “productive alterna-
tive,” there will also be a lot of “miserable” negativity and criticizing. But if, as Eve
Sedgwick claims, suspicion and paranoia are contagious (Sedgwick 2003, 127), then
this malady neither spares the critic nor the post- or anti-critic. The perfect example
here is Felski’s The Limits of Critique, a book that seems to perform the ultimate con-
tradiction: a sweeping attack on the hermeneutics of suspicion that – how could it be
otherwise? – is motivated by suspicion; an anti-dialectical polemic that performs “a
negation of a negation” (Felski 2008, 1); a lament about critique’s “secondariness”
that is itself utterly dependent on “words that come from elsewhere” and “the think-
ing of others” (Felski 2015, 121‒122);³ a manifesto against the notion of totalization
that subsumes Marxism, psychoanalysis, postcolonialism, deconstruction, New His-
toricism, and much of feminism, Gender Studies, and Queer Theory under a single
category; a repudiation of the striving for “a panoramic vision of the social order”
(157) that offers a panoramic vision of the theoretical landscape; an approach that
rejects the desire to reveal a text’s hidden meanings and hidden agendas, yet praises
actor-network theory’s ability to highlight what lies “hidden among thick blades of
grass” (158). In short: a “critique of critique.”⁴
To be sure, Felski is well aware of the difficulties of expressing her “dissatisfac-
tion with critique” (192) in the appropriate (postcritical) manner. Claiming that she
 By definition, this obviously applies to postcritique on the whole, just as it applies to countless
other currents in contemporary theory that all use the prefix ‘neo-’ or ‘post-’ (‘post-postmodernism’
being a particularly striking example).
 Felski of course rejects that label but confirms the difficulty of avoiding it in practice: “As a critic
schooled in suspicious reading, I am hardly immune to its charms, yet I have tried, as much as pos-
sible, to avoid being drawn into a ‘critique of critique.’” (Felski 2015, 192)
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has “tried to avoid critiquiness by opting for different shadings of style and tone,”
she also acknowledges that such an attempt “can have only a partial success,” for
“in the act of disagreeing with certain ways of thinking, we cannot help being
drawn into the negative or oppositional attitude we are trying to avoid” (192). Her
book’s “questioning of critique” (8) thus appears like a somewhat curious exercise:
while at times it reads like an outright rebuttal bluntly denouncing “crrritique’s” de-
structiveness (117‒150) or proclaiming that “context stinks!” (151‒185), there are other
passages in which the whole methodological discussion becomes oddly defensive,
suggesting that there is nothing wrong with critical suspicion per se, as long as it
is understood to be just one of many ‘uses of literature’ (Felski 2008). “It is one
way of reading and thinking among others: finite, limited, and fallible” (Felski
2015, 192). At a time, then, when others have lamented an “affirmationist consensus”
(Noys 2010, ix) in continental theory, and after her own book discusses an enormous
array of diverse postcritical currents – from actor-network theory and the new formal-
ism to reading practices like surface reading, just reading, or reparative reading –
Felski’s manifesto, in its somewhat belated effort to dethrone critique, paradoxically
calls for a pluralism that already exists.
This confusing mélange of fervent anti-critical polemic, wide generalization, and
rhetorical maneuvering is also expressed in Felski’s take on the political. Throughout
her book, she argues that postcritical is not uncritical, vehemently denying that “any
questioning of critique can only be a reactionary gesture or a conservative conspira-
cy” (Felski 2015, 8). At the same time, however, The Limits of Critique offers practi-
cally no hints as to how a postcritical engagement with politics would actually
look like.⁵ Moreover, what is curiously lacking in the book is any meaningful discus-
sion of the fact that many of the issues Felski raises – like the question of autonomy
and form or the role of aesthetic experience – are hardly foreign to the critical tradi-
tion per se. This certainly does not mean that she has no point in drawing attention
to a routinization of critical maneuvers, claims to moral superiority, or excessive sus-
picion in some currents of contemporary criticism and theory. But instead of analyz-
ing the concrete conditions of these phenomena, she blames them on ‘critique’ as a
whole, on the tradition’s collective affiliation with a generalized version of the her-
meneutics of suspicion.⁶ While she laments that in contemporary literary studies
all value is assigned “to the act of reading and none to the objects read” (Felski
2008, 3), she herself puts all the emphasis on the act of critiquing and none on
 In fact, when the political is mentioned at all, it is typically in the form of passive-aggressive jibes
against the banality of political critique. Cf. Felski 2015, 17‒18: “Anyone who attends academic talks
has learned to expect the inevitable question: ‘But what about power?’ Perhaps it is time to start ask-
ing different questions: ‘But what about love?’ Or: ‘Where is your theory of attachment?’”
 What should be kept in mind here is that next to Marx and Freud, Ricœur also counts Nietzsche
among his “masters of suspicion” (Ricœur 1970, 33), something which complicates Felski’s associa-
tion of critique and the hermeneutics of suspicion with negativity. On the Nietzschean notion of af-
firmation – his ‘affirmation of affirmation’ – cf. Deleuze 1983.
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the objects of critique. But take, for instance, the recent utilization of some aspects of
postmodern and critical theory in the context of rightwing populist (‘post-truth’) dis-
course (cf. Schleusener 2018b). Is the key problem of such appropriations really the
hermeneutics of suspicion? Or is it the flawed political analysis underlying this meth-
odological choice? Here, Felski’s lack of differentiating between various versions of
critique – which she transforms into mere cases of a uniformly suspicious hermeneu-
tics, irrespective of whether or not their particular suspiciousness is appropriate –
seems to underline the limits of her own approach.
In this respect, Felski’s perspective differs significantly from that of Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick, who is often described as a pioneer of postcritique. But Sedgwick’s mid-
90s ‘critique of critique’ was not simply directed against routinization and predicta-
bility per se. It was also premised on the idea that the problem with a certain kind of
critique was its political uselessness in a changed ideological context. For instance,
she argues that a Foucauldian genealogy and critique of the welfare state – in the
1980s and 1990s advocated by New Historicists like D.A. Miller – only played into
the hands of the neoliberal dismantling of health care coverage and other public
services:
Since the beginning of the tax revolt, the government of the United States […] has been positively
rushing to divest itself of answerability for care to its charges, with no other institutions propos-
ing to fill the gap. This development, however, is the last thing anyone could have expected from
reading New Historicist prose,which constitutes a full genealogy of the secular welfare state that
peaked in the 1960s and 1970s, along with a watertight proof of why things must become more
and more like that forever. (Sedgwick 2003, 141‒142)
Sedgwick, then, laments that a critique of ‘disciplinary society’ comes to nothing (or
worse) under neoliberal circumstances, when public welfare as such is increasingly
at stake.⁷ Along these lines, she also reflects on the relationship between the neoli-
beralization of American society and the practice of critique, highlighting
the dreary and routine forms of good dog/bad dog criticism, by which, like good late-capitalist
consumers, we persuade ourselves that deciding what we like or don’t like about what’s happen-
ing is the same thing as actually intervening in its production. (Sedgwick 2006, 619)
Or similarly:
The “subversive or hegemonic?” structure of inquiry requires a wholesale reification of the sta-
tus quo. One’s relation to it becomes reactive, like that of a consumer: accepting or refusing this
or that manifestation of it, dramatizing extremes of compulsion and voluntarity. (Sedgwick and
Frank 1995, 501)
 On this argument, cf. also Zamora and Behrent 2016.
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Despite Felski’s claim that postcritical is not uncritical, these sorts of contextualiza-
tion are entirely absent from The Limits of Critique. Indeed, if Sedgwick notes that, in
retrospect, certain theories and theoretical attitudes of the late 1980s and 1990s, de-
spite their pronounced radicalism, manifest themselves not as resistant to, but, to the
contrary, as reflective of the realities of the new neoliberal order, one could justifia-
bly argue that this is even more the case with the postcritical turn of the late 2000s.
Again, this does not bear upon the (re‐)emphasis of aesthetics, form, attachment,
and affects per se, but rather involves what, in loose analogy to Jameson, can be
called postcritique’s ‘political unconscious’: its seeming indifference to (or non-con-
sideration of) the political implications of its discursive positioning.⁸
This concerns not only postcritique’s methodological choices and its tendency to
sideline history, politics, and economics, but also its narrative of what is problematic
about contemporary critique. For one thing, what that narrative misses is the ‘great
transformation’ that occurred in the history of critical thought since around the time
of the neoliberal revolution to which Sedgwick draws attention in her essays from the
1990s. While Felski treats Jameson as the dominant representative of contemporary
critique and symptomatic analysis, what she fails to mention is the significant de-
cline of precisely the kind of Marxism Jameson represents in the early 1980s,
which saw the rise of poststructuralism and American-style cultural studies, includ-
ing disciplines like gender studies, ethnic studies, and queer theory. As many authors
have noted, what went along with this development was not only a growing avoid-
ance of economic issues in cultural and critical theory, but also a shift from ‘struc-
ture’ to ‘identity’ (cf. Michaels 2006) and from ‘redistribution’ to ‘recognition’ (cf.
Fraser 1995).
In the context of the postcritical turn, this development is given a whole new
twist. Now, recognition, functioning as the dominant (cultural) currency in a theoret-
ical environment that has largely abandoned structural analysis and the concept of
social totality, tends to be extended to apply to the non-human realm as well. This is
most obvious in the context of posthumanism and the new materialism, for example
in the writings of Jane Bennett. While Charles Taylor and others had advocated re-
specting the identities of those who are marginalized due to their cultural difference
(cf. Taylor 1992), Bennett extends this logic, calling on us to also “respect” (Bennett
2010, ix) non-human actors marginalized due to their ontological difference. Felski,
having at numerous occasions voiced her sympathy for Bennett’s ideas,⁹ goes in a
similar direction. Following Latour and ANT (Felski 2015, 162‒172), she places “peo-
ple, animals, texts, and things on a similar ontological footing,” conceptualizing art
works and texts as “non-human actors” that “help to modify states of affairs,” “are
 On a related note, cf. also what Foucault has addressed in terms of the ‘unthought’ (Foucault 1994,
322‒328).
 For instance, Felski is quoted on the back cover of Bennett’s Vibrant Matter, praising the book as
“an invigorating breath of fresh air” (Bennett 2010).
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participants in chains of events,” and “help shape outcomes and influence actions”
(164). What she deems necessary is
a recognition – long overdue – of the text’s status as a coactor: as something that makes a differ-
ence, as something that makes things happen. […] And once we take on board the distinctive
agency of art works – rather than their imagined roles as minions of opaque social forces or he-
roes of the resistance – we cannot help orienting ourselves differently to the task of criticism.
Such a shift is desperately needed if we are to do better justice to what literature does and
why such doing matters. (12‒13)
Like Bennett, Felski thus attempts to restore to nonhuman actors – texts, in this
case – a form of recognition that is lacking in readings in which they are subject
“to interrogation” (Felski 2015, 173). The goal is “to do better justice” to texts,
which implies that they were treated unjustly in the critical readings of the past.
To be sure, justice is always better than injustice – and if Felski means that the reader
should pay close attention to what a text says, and what it does by saying it, hardly
anyone would disagree. Yet, one may again wonder about the broad generalization
here: Should all texts simply be applauded for being “coactors”? Or do some, per-
haps, deserve to be interrogated? And what about the specific use or function of
one’s reading: are diagnostic readings by definition unjust, because they link the
text to “opaque social forces”? Once again, Felski does not really offer much in
terms of a constructive combination of political analysis and ‘close’ or ‘just’ reading
here.
Yet, in describing texts as coactors that participate “in chains of events,” Felski
indeed links the text to its outside, suggesting that reading and writing are not just
philological activities, but that they are situated in the realm of the social – connect-
ed to, and affecting, other actors and actions, events and states of affairs. In terms of
its specific concept of the social, however, Felski’s network or assemblage model
leaves a lot of questions open. One may ask, for instance, how, precisely, texts do
what they do, and what their specific agency and role is in “what literature does.”
Another question may concern the role of said “opaque social forces”: wouldn’t
they need to be included in the assemblage too – even if, as Felski suggests, they
might be merely “imagined”? Or more generally, is there a way to specifically deter-
mine what needs to be included and what doesn’t, and how all the assembled actors
and coactors (such as authors, readers, critics, writing programs, schools, universi-
ties, bookshops, online markets, etc.) relate to each other? Are they all equally influ-
ential, or do they differ in impact and strength? And finally, what are the specific cri-
teria for determining whether what literature does “matters” and for whether what
we say about literature “does justice” to it?
The promise of a network model such as the one used here, for Felski and others,
is that it allows the critic “to forgo theoretical shortcuts” (Felski 2015, 158), that is,
abstract generalizations or the presupposition of the existence of “opaque social
forces” (13). The problem, however, is that the task of completely avoiding such
shortcuts is by definition impossible: since it is hardly feasible to include all the ac-
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tors and coactors involved in a given assemblage, any author – critic as well as post-
critic – will necessarily make a selection. In principle, there is no given limit as to
what a network may include, since, as Felski explains, nonhuman actors can basi-
cally be anything: “Speed bumps, microbes, mugs, baboons, newspapers, unreliable
narrators, soap, silk dresses, strawberries, floor plans, telescopes, lists, paintings,
can openers” (163). Consequently, a network model that desperately seeks to avoid
all shortcuts and selections would simply end up with endless arbitrary enumera-
tions, lists, or catalogues of ontologically diverse, random content. How, then, are
the selections being made here? It seems that the more the author refrains from ‘the-
oretical’ shortcuts – whose principles could be discussed and refuted – the more he
or she will rely on ‘phenomenological’ ones, that is, individual acts of apperception.
Along these lines, Jane Bennett presents an assemblage in her Vibrant Matter that
includes the following items:
one large men’s black plastic work glove
one dense mat of oak pollen
one unblemished dead rat
one white plastic bottle cap
one smooth stick of wood
(Bennett 2010, 4)
From the perspective of a postcritical theory, the advantage of this image (or poetic
collage) is certainly its concreteness, its ‘close’ or ‘thick’ description of what is con-
cretely given, what is perceived by the subject at a specific point in time and space –
in Bennett’s case, on “a sunny Tuesday morning on 4 June in the grate over the storm
drain to the Chesapeake Bay in front of Sam’s Bagels on Cold Spring Lane in Balti-
more” (4). From the perspective of a political ecology – which Bennett’s approach
imagines itself to be – there is, however, something deeply frustrating about the com-
mitment to remain on this empirical surface-level of things, without connecting con-
crete objects, items, and devices to the ‘abstract machines’ that are involved in their
production, distribution, and consumption. This is precisely what characterizes the
ecological politics of Bennett’s book as a posthumanist version of the ‘politics of rec-
ognition’: trash, Bennett writes, is not simply “dead stuff” (5) but should be concep-
tualized as animate or active ‘vital matter’; she therefore recommends that we should
be more mindful of how we engage with things, matter, objects, junk.What the book
does not include, however, is any serious analysis of the causes, conditions, course,
and scale of the current ecological crisis – and of an effective politics that would po-
tentially be able to resolve it.
This draws attention to what, in reference to Felski, we may call the limits of post-
critique. It appears that these limitations are a general issue in theoretical currents
that rely on Latour and ANT – and it is here where the charge of political quietism
(cf. Robbins 2017) and compliance with the neoliberal status quo (cf. Michaels in this
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volume) can indeed claim some validity.¹⁰ This is not to say that actor-network theory
is without merit, especially not since Latour can be credited for reintroducing a ver-
sion of the (now ubiquitous) concept of materiality into the humanities, at a time
when the focus was almost exclusively on discourse, signs, and signification. Never-
theless, it is his deliberately ‘flat’ topography of the social – which seems to conflate
the commitment to an egalitarian ontology with an accurate description of social re-
ality – that often contributes to an oversimplified understanding of systemic asym-
metries, political conflict, and the constitution of social regularities.¹¹ Still, Latour’s
dismissal of the concept of social totality is a key point of reference in the postcritical
discourse: “For Latour […] there is no historical box and no society, if we mean by
this term a bounded totality governed by a predetermined set of structures and func-
tions” (Felski 2015, 157). The idea of totality, however, against which Felski and other
postcritics polemicize, had already been defeated with the rise of poststructuralism
in the early 1980s. Hence,when Martin Jay wroteMarxism and Totality (1984), a wide-
ranging account of the diverse history of the concept, he did so “in a tragic or satiric
mode” (20), discussing its decline in an epilogue entitled “The Challenge of Post-
Structuralism” (510‒537). Yet, while some authors related to poststructuralism were
careful not to dismiss the notion tout court,¹² Latour and his followers made sure
to eradicate the last remnants of it, directing their focus exclusively towards concrete
(human and nonhuman) actors and assemblages. Now, in a strange echoing of Mar-
garet Thatcher’s neoliberal dictum that there’s no such thing as society (cf. Latour
2005, 5), to even use fairly familiar ‘shortcuts’ like capitalism, society, or mode of
production comes under suspicion (pun intended). “Like God,” writes Latour, “cap-
italism does not exist” (Latour 1993, 173). And: “It is no longer clear whether there
exists [sic] relations that are specific enough to be called ‘social’ and that could
be grouped together in making up a special domain that could function as ‘a soci-
ety’” (Latour 2005, 2).
To be sure, postcritique’s all-too-ready adoption of ANT’s polemic against the
concept of totality may, in the late 2000s, seem a bit like flogging a dead horse.
The point in time, however, is significant. For the late 2000s not only saw the rise
of postcritique in academic discourse, they were also in many ways informed by
the experience of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. This event –
which started with a seemingly isolated depreciation in the American subprime mort-
gage market that led to the then deepest global economic downturn since the Great
 There are, however, various attempts at adopting aspects of actor-network theory for a left poli-
tics. As one example, cf. Mitchell 2013.
 Cf. Robbins 2017, 374: “Latour’s signature example for actor-network theory, and one that Felski
repeats, is the modest speed bump. […] It is the allegory of a social world where all the infractions are
minor – where some people may want to drive too fast, but there are no malevolent intentions, there
is no collective coercion, there is no systemic injustice.”
 Deleuze, for example, preferred to speak of “nodes of totalization” (Deleuze 1995, 86).
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Depression¹³ – has evidently contributed to a certain resurgence not only of the con-
cept of totality in critical discourse, but also of the general engagement with econom-
ic issues and Marxist theory in some sections of the humanities, including cultural
and literary studies.¹⁴ Against this backdrop, it may not require too suspicious a
reader to assess the interventions of postcritique – including its adoption of ANT’s
concept of the social – not just in view of their philological methodology, but also
in terms of their political implications.
Close-Up and Long Shot
As another instance of the postcritical turn, I will now focus on Marcus and Best’s
concept of surface reading – articulated in their introduction to a 2009 special
issue of Representations – which ties in well with the previously discussed new ma-
terialist version of a politics of recognition: the tendency to focus on, and champion,
the concretely given (actual actors, objects, and relations) over abstract totalizations
or adversarial decryptions. Along these lines, Marcus and Best argue that readers
should concentrate on the ‘surface’ of texts, rather than reading them ‘symptomati-
cally’ by attempting to uncover their hidden depths and latent meanings:
[W]e take surface to mean what is evident, perceptible, apprehensible in texts; what is neither
hidden nor hiding; what, in the geometrical sense, has length and breadth but no thickness, and
therefore covers no depth. A surface is what insists on being looked at rather than what we must
train ourselves to see through. (Best and Marcus 2009, 9)
While Felski has stated that she shares Marcus and Best’s reservations about routi-
nized attempts at “deciphering hidden meaning,” she claims that the problem of a
suspicious hermeneutics is not restricted to symptomatic approaches: “an interest
in surfaces does not automatically free us from the straitjacket of suspicion” (Felski
2015, 55‒56). Nevertheless, there are obvious overlaps between the two approaches.
One of them is the status of Fredric Jameson, who functions, for Marcus and Best as
well as for Felski, as the perhaps central antagonist. In Marcus and Best’s case, the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of The Political Unconscious (1981) was in
fact constitutive of their idea to devote an entire special issue to the concept of sur-
 It is possible that the current Covid-19 pandemic will have even more severe effects on the world
economy.What the two events have in common is that they both reveal how today any incident, how-
ever local and seemingly insignificant, is ultimately embedded in the totality of social and economic
relations that constitute what Immanuel Wallerstein has conceptualized as the ‘world-system’ (cf.
Wallerstein 2004).
 On the resurgence of the concept of totality, cf., for example, the perspective of Toscano and Kin-
kle (2015), whose point of departure is not Hegel’s Absolute Spirit or the idea of an unbroken god’s-
eye-view, but Jameson’s notion of ‘cognitive mapping’ (cf. Jameson 1988).
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face reading, thereby seeking to render obsolete the approach attributed to Jameson,
symptomatic reading.
Despite the loss in significance of Marxist criticism since at least the 1990s, this
choice of Jameson as counterexample is understandable. “Interpretation,” writes
Jameson, “is here construed as essentially an allegorical act, which consists in rewrit-
ing a given text in terms of a particular interpretative master code” (Jameson 2002:
x). This programmatic definition – highlighting the necessity of “rewriting” the
text’s surface in order to reveal its deeper structure or ‘political unconscious’ – cer-
tainly makes Jameson into a key representative of what Marcus and Best conceptu-
alize as symptomatic reading. But their engagement with Jameson appears reductive
in that they leave out a key dimension of his idea of interpretation. While they take
statements as the one just quoted as normative prescriptions of how the critic should
engage with literary texts, what they pay less attention to are the more general her-
meneutic and philosophical principles on which Jameson’s perspective is based.
Here, statements as the one referred to are not simply normative, for Jameson’s argu-
ment is that any reading is necessarily based on certain premises – or theoretical pre-
conceptions, codes, filters, selections, values, etc. – which is why the idea of a pure
surface reading, from Jameson’s perspective, would be flawed from the start. “It
should not,” he writes,
be necessary laboriously to argue the position that every form of practice, including the literary-
critical kind, implies and presupposes a form of theory; that empiricism, the mirage of an utterly
nontheoretical practice, is a contradiction in terms; that even the most formalizing kinds of lit-
erary or textual analysis carry a theoretical charge […]. (Jameson 2002, 43)
One does not have to agree with the details of Jameson’s perspective to see that this
argument touches a sore spot when it comes to contemporary postcritique. From
Bennett’s new materialism and Felski’s appropriation of Latour’s network model to
Marcus and Best’s surface reading, there is a pronounced reluctance to reveal the
theoretical premises that guide one’s ‘selections.’ A similar point is made by Winfried
Fluck, who criticizes symptomatic approaches in the style of Jameson – and in par-
ticular Jameson’s reliance on the Althusserian idea of structural totality – but holds
that Marcus and Best’s surface approach in no way presents a proper alternative as it
is marked by “a stunning hermeneutical naiveté.”¹⁵ “The problem of interpretation,”
Fluck writes,
is that of selection (which even a ‘mere’ description has to make) and the principles […] on which
these selections are made. Literary theory is not the opposite to description; it is the attempt to
 According to Fluck, this is most evident in Marcus and Best’s treatment of the New Criticism: “In
spite of sixty years of scholarship on the New Criticism, the authors seem to be entirely unaware of
the fact that the close reading practiced by the New Criticism stood in the service of a particular aes-
thetic theory which made New Critics register and value certain formal properties and dismiss or ig-
nore others.” (Fluck 2014, 57)
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clarify what the principles of selection are, no matter whether the interpretive focus lies on the
surface or on other levels. (Fluck 2014, 57)
In this respect, Jameson’s work has the obvious advantage of displaying a form of
self-reflection and transparency that is absent from most postcritical approaches.
For instance,when Jameson famously claims, in the first sentence of The Political Un-
conscious, that literary criticism shall ‘always historicize’ (Jameson 2002, ix), he does
so based on a specific concept of history, whose outlines and dimensions he puts up
for discussion. This is strikingly different from Marcus and Best, whose own engage-
ment with history seems largely anecdotal. When they argue, for instance, that the
idea of surface reading is today an attractive mode of reading “because, at the
end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, so much seems to be on the sur-
face” (Best and Marcus 2009, 2), it appears as if the mere gesture of historicization is
retained, but without any actual interest in seriously exploring historical processes.
Indeed, well after postmodernism and a generation of scholars focusing on cultural
or textual simulacra, and decades after the emergence of literary or artistic move-
ments and techniques such as concrete poetry, the cut-up and fold-in technique,
the nouveaux roman, pop art, photorealism, and hyperrealism, to hear literary schol-
ars highlight the timeliness of surface reading by claiming – in 2009 – that so much
these days “seems to be on the surface” may appear not only belated, but also like a
fitting demonstration of the postcritical notion that ‘context stinks.’¹⁶
In any case, what a more serious engagement with the history of the turn to the
surface would undoubtedly have revealed is that the phenomenon is in many ways
entangled with questions that postcritics typically omit, namely those pertaining to
the nexus of culture and economy. In this context, the work of early twentieth-cen-
tury German authors and cultural critics like Georg Simmel,Werner Sombart,Walter
Benjamin, and Siegfried Kracauer is particularly illuminating. For these authors
linked their own analytical interest in what Janet Ward has emblematically termed
‘Weimar Surfaces’ (Ward 2001) to a particular development of capitalism, one that
was marked by the shop window’s ‘flat’ aestheticization of commodities. In this
early phase of consumer capitalism, many authors felt inclined to combine a phe-
nomenological impulse to ‘go back to the things themselves’ (Husserl) and examine
concrete, everyday surface phenomena with a keen interest in Marxism and historical
 To underpin their argument for surface reading, Marcus and Best mention a number of political
examples – like the photos of torture at Abu Ghraib that “immediately circulated on the internet” or
“the real-time coverage of Hurricane Katrina” – meant to confirm that demystification as a critical
strategy is nowadays “superfluous” (Best and Marcus 2009, 2). While the impact of contemporary
media technology is certainly relevant here, to insinuate that because these incidents were visible,
everything is, or that their sheer visibility suggests a particular hermeneutics – namely, surface read-
ing – is an obvious generalization. (In other words, what is seen on the surface may still be un-
thought.)
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materialism – a tendency that is strikingly absent in the work of most contemporary
postcritics.¹⁷
Turning to a text in which the tendency to combine phenomenology and histor-
ical materialism – or surface reading and economic analysis – is especially evident, I
will now briefly discuss Siegfried Kracauer’s 1927 article on the ‘mass ornament.’¹⁸ In
this mere 14-page essay, which reads today like an anticipation of Horkheimer and
Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), Kracauer outlines a philosophy of history
entailing the by now well-known idea that capitalist rationalization facilitates a pos-
sible regression from enlightenment to mythology. What is noteworthy, however, is
the role Kracauer assigns to surface-level phenomena that risk getting lost in the
grand narratives of historiography but are immensely valuable for historical knowl-
edge and understanding. “The position that an epoch occupies in the historical pro-
cess,” Kracauer writes, “can be determined more strikingly from an analysis of its in-
conspicuous surface-level expressions than from that epoch’s judgments about
itself” (Kracauer 1995, 75). Along these lines, and somewhat similar to Walter Benja-
min’s description of modernity from the perspective of the flâneur, Kracauer aimed at
engaging with his epoch by diagnostically ‘reading’ its surfaces and, in particular,
everyday details, architectural features, and mass cultural phenomena (film, photog-
raphy, dance, travel, advertising, department stores, hotel lobbies, etc.) that seeming-
ly encapsulate the wider socioeconomic trends and transformations.¹⁹
In “The Mass Ornament,” Kracauer’s focus lies on the precision dance routines
of showgirl troupes like the Tiller Girls, whose popular revues constituted a central
aspect of 1920s entertainment culture.What Kracauer finds significant about the Till-
er Girls’ chorus lines is how their synchronized movements and collective formation
of abstract ornamental patterns resonate with the Taylorist system of industrial pro-
duction: “The hands in the factory correspond to the legs of the Tiller Girls” (79).²⁰
According to Kracauer, this analogy between popular mass culture and scientific
management is plausible in that the Tiller Girls, too, embody the (Taylorist) princi-
ples and logic of instrumental rationality, real abstraction, de-individualization,
and a strict division of labor: “These products of American distraction factories
are no longer individual girls, but indissoluble girl clusters whose movements are
demonstrations of mathematics” (75‒76). Hence, comparable to the industrial worker
who, under capitalist circumstances, is unable to oversee (and recognize his own role
 Which is not to say that there are no exceptions. Cf., for example, Christopher Nealon’s contribu-
tion in Marcus and Best’s Representations issue (Nealon 2009).
 I would like to thank Tanja Prokić for her helpful comments on Kracauer and 1920s visual culture.
 Epistemologically speaking, this hermeneutical interest in details and surfaces manifests itself
against the backdrop of a reinvigoration – and diversification – of physiognomic thought in the
1920s. With respect to authors like Kracauer and Benjamin, cf. Christians 2000.
 Before Kracauer, this link had already been highlighted by Fritz Giese, whose work was located at
the intersection of industrial psychology and motion study. Cf. especially his book on ‘Girl Culture’
(Giese 1925).
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in) the totality of the production process, the single Tiller girl is unable to behold the
mass ornament as a whole and thus recognize her own role in its constitution:
Although the masses give rise to the ornament, they are not involved in thinking it through. As
linear as it may be, there is no line that extends from the small sections of the mass to the entire
figure. […] The more the coherence of the figure is relinquished in favor of mere linearity, the
more distant it becomes from the immanent consciousness of those constituting it. (Kracauer
1995, 77)
What, then, is the significance of this analysis from the perspective of the contempo-
rary debate about symptomatic reading and surface reading? On the one hand, Kra-
cauer’s position must appear to the postcritic as a typical form of symptomatic read-
ing, with the mass ornament representing merely “the aesthetic reflex of the
rationality to which the prevailing economic system aspires” (79). On the other
hand, however, Kracauer substantially complicates the distinction between the
two kinds of hermeneutics. First off, by stating that “the aesthetic pleasure gained
from ornamental mass movements is legitimate” (79), his engagement with the Tiller
Girls’ dance performances can hardly be swept aside as overly negative or suspi-
cious. More important, and different from how Marcus and Best characterize symp-
tomatic reading, Kracauer does not conceptualize the surface as hiding anything. To
the contrary, what he finds valuable about the mass ornament is precisely its imme-
diate visualization of the socioeconomic constellation. Kracauer thus argues that the
mass ornament’s “degree of reality is still higher than that of artistic productions
which cultivate outdated noble sentiments in obsolete forms” (79):
The intellectually privileged who, while unwilling to recognize it, are an appendage of the pre-
vailing economic system have not even perceived the mass ornament as a sign of this system.
They disavow the phenomenon in order to continue seeking edification at art events that
have remained untouched by the reality present in the stadium patterns. The masses who so
spontaneously adopted these patterns are superior to their detractors among the educated
class to the extent that they at least roughly acknowledge the undisguised facts. The same ra-
tionality that controls the bearers of the patterns in real life also governs their submersion in
the corporeal. (Kracauer 1995, 85)
This passage underlines the differences between Kracauer’s approach and what is
typically understood as symptomatic reading. For the mass ornament is not a meta-
phor or allegory of the economic system; rather, it is this system – a miniature ver-
sion of it. More accurately, it constitutes a section or detail of a constellation in which
cultural and economic production are effectively intertwined. To highlight this con-
stellation, Kracauer undoubtedly approaches the surfaces he studies not ‘spontane-
ously,’ but based on a number of theoretical premises, among them both Marxist and
phenomenological ideas and concepts.²¹ Yet, while Kracauer’s reliance on context
analysis and historical materialism seems to be incompatible with contemporary
 For an introduction to Kracauer’s work and its intellectual influences, cf. Koch 2012.
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postcritique, his approach also differs from Jameson’s insofar as he neither conceives
of the mass ornament as an allegory – if we understand by it a literary device that
implies some kind of substitution – nor does he engage in an actual ‘rewriting.’
Rather, to use Kracauer’s own film-theoretical vocabulary, what he does is repeatedly
switch between long shot and close-up, seeking to understand the mass ornament
not as a singular, isolated phenomenon but to also grasp its particular outside:
the assemblage or constellation in which it is embedded.²²
The Living Leviathan
Without wishing to replicate Kracauer’s critical method, but along the lines of his im-
pulse to combine (rather than tear apart) surface and context, distance and proxim-
ity, I will now engage with an example from literary history, namely Herman Mel-
ville’s Moby-Dick (1851).²³ That Melville’s novel lends itself to a reading in terms of
the notion of poetic critique is not surprising, given that it seems to represent precise-
ly the text Schlegel had in mind when he reflected on the concept in his review of
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister. After all, with its fusion of literature and philosophy, its
exuberant mix of various narrative formulas, metaphysical ideas, theological insin-
uations, and literary references, Moby-Dick embodies just the kind of intertextual
‘critique’ performed as part of a literary (i.e. ‘poetic’) creation Schlegel called for.
And just as Wilhelm Meister comments on Shakespeare’s Hamlet – thereby forming
“once more what has already been formed” (Schlegel 2003, 281) – Melville’s own en-
gagement with Shakespeare’s literature (especially in Moby-Dick) is a well-establish-
ed fact.²⁴
Given the novel’s hypercanonization – especially in the American context, where
it has long functioned as a sort of sacred text for the national imaginary – Moby-Dick
has of course been read and analyzed in all kinds of fashions. And yet, the most in-
fluential readings seem to proceed in a symbolic or allegorical manner – with the
whale, Ahab, the Pequod, etc. serving as symbols, conceptual personae, or meta-
phors that function as placeholders for something else, while the book’s manifest
 Cf. Kracauer 1969, 122: “The macro historian will falsify his subject unless he inserts the close-ups
gained by the micro studies – inserts them as integrant elements of his over-all pictures. In conse-
quence, the historian must be in a position freely to move between the macro and micro dimensions.”
While his books From Caligari to Hitler (1947) and Theory of Film (1960) give the most detailed ac-
count of his engagement with cinema, it is noteworthy that Kracauer frequently uses film-theoretical
vocabulary – as demonstrated in the above quote – in his social and historical analyses too.
 Some of the ideas laid out in this chapter are also discussed in two earlier publications of mine
(cf. Schleusener 2011 and Schleusener 2015, 181‒233).
 Cf., for example, Matthiessen’s remarks on Shakespeare’s influence in his American Renaissance
(Matthiessen 1968, 369‒514).
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subject matter (the whale hunt) plays a minor role at best.²⁵ Against this backdrop,
my own reading attempts to take seriously what the novel says on its surface, but
without neglecting to examine the text’s outside. The aim here is not to pit text
against context, nor is it to value content over form, but to demonstrate the impos-
sibility of separating one from the other.²⁶
To be sure, academic criticism has taken great pains to establishMoby-Dick as an
allegorical text so as to divorce it from any sense of the merely entertaining, trivial,
exotic, or adventurous – an image that Melville himself sought to get rid of after the
publication of his first two novels, the much more financially successful Typee and
Omoo. The notion that the white whale needs to be read as a symbol has been estab-
lished ever since the 1920s, the period that saw the reappraisal of Melville’s oeuvre.
For instance, Melville’s novel is addressed by D.H. Lawrence in his highly influential
Studies in Classic American Literature. “Of course,” Lawrence writes, “[Moby-Dick] is
a symbol. Of what? I doubt if even Melville knew exactly” (Lawrence 1923, 214). Along
similar lines, Moby-Dick was later approached in Matthiessen’s American Renais-
sance and in the context of the myth-and-symbol school, where, against the back-
drop of the Cold War, the conflict between Ishmael and Ahab was habitually read
as an allegory of the conflict between American freedom and totalitarianism.²⁷ But
even after the revisionist turn and the methodological reorientation of the field (cf.
Pease 1994), allegorical and symbolic readings of Moby-Dick persisted. For example,
Toni Morrison analyzed the novel in the context of American race relations, arguing
that the whiteness of the whale needs to be read against the backdrop of the ideology
of white supremacy and the racist idealization of whiteness. Consequently, she de-
clares Ahab to be not a “maniacal egocentric” but “the only white male American
heroic enough to try to slay the monster that was devouring the world as he knew
it” (Morrison 1989, 17).
Morrison’s reading of Moby-Dick thus differs from older American Studies ap-
proaches in that she underlines the importance of race in Melville’s writing and in-
 While more could be said about the specific differences between allegory, symbol, and metaphor
here – especially in their more complex formulation (Benjamin, Blumenberg, etc.) – such a discus-
sion goes beyond the scope of this essay. My general point is that insofar as Moby-Dick can be said to
make use of any of these literary devices, it is not based on a logic of substitution but for the sake of
intensification.
 This obviously is not a new idea, dating back at least to Hegel’s reflections on “the absolute re-
lation of content and of form” in §133 of his Encyclopedia (Hegel 2010, 200). In practice, however,
critics and postcritics rarely draw the conclusions that follow from the frequently invoked insepara-
bility of content and form: while old or new formalisms privilege form over content, much of dis-
course analysis and social or political criticism typically favor content over form.
 With regard to the exceptionalist context of these readings, Donald Pease has underlined the role
of Ishmael as the sole survivor of the novel’s catastrophe: “That final cataclysmic image of total de-
struction motivated Matthiessen and forty years of Cold War critics to turn to Ishmael, who in surviv-
ing must, the logic would have it, have survived as the principle of America’s freedom.” (Pease 1989,
144)
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verts the relationship between Ishmael and Ahab (now it is Ahab who, due to his
readiness to combat the plague of white supremacy, is elevated to the status of Amer-
ican hero). What remains in place, however, is the allegorical framework as such,
even though it too undergoes a noticeable revision. As Winfried Fluck has argued,
revisionist approaches like Morrison’s operate ‘metonymically,’ while the myth-
and-symbol critics of an earlier generation focused on what they understood to be
central ‘organic’ metaphors (the machine in the garden, the errand into the wilder-
ness, etc.) reflective of key facts about American culture. In Morrison’s case, however,
there “is no ‘organic,’ metaphoric relation between the whiteness of the whale and
the race problem; their ‘relation’ simply consists of the fact that they are both man-
ifestations of a problem that pervades all of American society.” In other words, “rac-
ism is everywhere and thus every aspect of the text can, in principle, stand for the
whole” (Fluck 2014, 48).
What Fluck’s analysis points to is that due to the allegorical (or metonymic) ori-
entation of Morrison’s reading, relatively little attention is given to the specificities of
Moby-Dick’s manifest subject matter. Hence, the equation ‘whiteness of the whale’ =
‘the monster of racism’ not only reduces the countless associations offered by Mel-
ville on the meaning of whiteness to a single signifier (‘race’); it also neglects the
‘whaleness’ of Moby Dick and the significance of the whale’s function as a nonhu-
man actor (to refer to Latour here for once) for Melville’s dismantling of the tradition-
al (Cartesian) subject-object relation, which is reflective of the book’s central philo-
sophical concern: that of the elusiveness of human knowledge, the withdrawal of any
definitive truth, the impossibility of establishing ultimate facts about life based on
mechanist systems of scientific classification. This belief – quite commonly held in
the context of dark or gothic romanticism – is in Moby-Dick inextricably implicated
with the world of whaling: with the narrator’s cetological reflections, with his delib-
erations about the (more or less) ‘erroneous’ depictions of the whale, and with the
human-animal relation in general.
With regard to the whiteness of the whale – as discussed in chapter 42 of the
book (Melville 2003, 204‒212) – this link between the novel’s epistemological skep-
ticism and its situatedness in the world of whaling might at first appear like an all
too artificial construct.What distinguishes Moby-Dick from other whales, the readers
are told, is his conspicuous white color: a whiteness that inspires Ishmael to forge a
burst of associations ranging from reflections on the idea of white innocence to
doubts about the adequacy of human cognition, and culminating in a general lament
about “the heartless voids and immensities of the universe.” Is it, he asks, that
in essence whiteness is not so much a color as the visible absence of color, and at the same time
the concrete of all colors; is it for these reasons that there is such a dumb blankness, full of
meaning, in a wide landscape of snows – a colorless, all-color of atheism from which we shrink?
And when we […] proceed further, and consider that the mystical cosmetic which produces every
one of her hues, the great principle of light, for ever remains white or colorless in itself, and if
operating without medium upon matter, would touch all objects, even tulips and roses, with its
own blank tinge – pondering all this, the palsied universe lies before us a leper; and like wilful
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travellers in Lapland, who refuse to wear colored and coloring glasses upon their eyes, so the
wretched infidel gazes himself blind at the monumental white shroud that wraps all the pros-
pect around him. And of all these things the Albino whale was the symbol. (Melville 2003, 212)
Here, then, Melville himself articulates that Moby-Dick shall be read as a symbol, one
that relates to the great ‘inversion of light’ performed in the above cited passage.
From antiquity to the enlightenment, light – as the condition for rendering things
visible and drawing them “out of their native darkness” (Deleuze 2008, 63) – was
typically associated with knowledge, reason, consciousness, and truth. The white
light on which Ishmael reflects, however, is not the light of the enlightenment.
Rather, it is an essentially blinding light that obstructs any effort to obtain definitive
insights, drawing attention to both the elusiveness of truth and the illusions on
which human knowledge and perception are based. All this, Ishmael claims, is sym-
bolized by the whiteness of Moby-Dick. This statement undoubtedly complicates the
postcritical commitment to evade allegorical or symbolic readings and stay focused
on what is present on the text’s surface. For what if a text like Moby-Dick, explicitly
and on its surface, tells us that the entity that gives it its title shall be taken as a sym-
bol?
Melville’s actual employment of symbolic imagery, however, is a specific and of-
tentimes ambiguous one.²⁸ Obviously, Moby-Dick entails a number of elements that
might at first sight lend themselves to an allegorical or symbolic reading. The whale,
for instance, is persistently addressed as ‘Leviathan,’ a highly loaded political sym-
bol that seems to refer to the heroic emblematics of the ‘charismatic animal’ (cf.Vogl
2007) rather than to the actual living creature. But while Melville is eager to include
all such symbolic and allegorical dimensions as part of the polyphonic and multi-
layered conception of his novel, it would be a mistake to assign their use to a method
of substitution. In other words, the whale inMoby-Dick is not the substitute for some-
thing else; instead, the actual animal is here related to its allegorical meanings in a
weird kind of parallelism in which the meticulous, naturalistic description of the
whale’s massive body, “his mighty swells and undulations” (Melville 2003, 288), is
consistently amplified by the mythological meaning of Leviathan as the most power-
ful creature of the sea. This fusion of naturalistic depiction and symbolic connotation
is best highlighted when Ishmael – paradoxically – refers to the whale as “the living
Leviathan” (288).
If we thus see the use of allegory and symbolism in Moby-Dick not as a form of
substitution but as one of intensification, we might also get a different sense of the
relationship between Ishmael and Ahab. Although the roles assigned to them differ
 With regard to this ambiguity, cf. another passage that plainly rejects the idea of taking the white
whale as an allegory: “So ignorant are most landsmen of some of the plainest and most palpable
wonders of the world, that without some hints touching the plain facts, historical and otherwise,
of the fishery, they might scout at Moby Dick as a monstrous fable, or still worse and more detestable,
a hideous and intolerable allegory.” (Melville 2003, 223)
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from one interpretation to the next, their relationship is typically characterized as
one of strict antagonism. In analogy to the parallelism between the text’s manifest
content and its use of symbolic imagery, however, one could also speak of a paral-
lelism between Ishmael and Ahab.While Ahab most clearly personifies the trajectory
of the actual plot – the ‘manifest’ hunt for the white whale – Ishmael can be said to
articulate the book’s ‘latent’ meaning in his metaphysical reflections about the elu-
siveness of absolute knowledge and truth. His endeavor, then, can be characterized
as a hunt too. Yet, while Ahab’s hunt is for the actual whale, Ishmael’s is a ‘hunt for
knowledge,’ one that is directed toward the whale as an object of science (cetology)
and representation (the “monstrous” and “less erroneous” pictures of whales; cf.
Melville 2003, 285‒293). Different from how the book is typically interpreted, this
‘parallel’ reading of Moby-Dick would thus not differentiate between Ahab’s sublime
failure and Ishmael’s fortunate survival, for both hunts – the epistemological hunt
for certainty and knowledge and the physical hunt for the actual whale – are even-
tually unsuccessful.
Above all, what the parallel reading proposed here would underline is that the
whale is certainly not a disposable vehicle merely used to transport a general mes-
sage or meaning. Indeed, the latent content that Moby-Dick is assumed to entail is
inextricably connected with the whale, to the effect that any meaning must necessa-
rily ‘pass through’ the whale, and any effort to reveal the book’s ‘deeper’ significance
must follow the whale’s own “hidden ways […] beneath the surface” (Melville 2003,
197‒198) and through “the utmost depths” (398) of the sea. For example, the critique
of representation articulated inMoby-Dick is based on an understanding of the whale
as a living creature with certain specific attributes and qualities that render impos-
sible the desire for an adequate depiction. As Ishmael explains:
Most of the scientific drawings have been taken from the stranded fish; and these are about as
correct as a drawing of a wrecked ship, with broken back, would correctly represent the noble
animal itself in all its undashed pride of hull and spars. Though elephants have stood for
their full-lengths, the living Leviathan has never yet fairly floated himself for his portrait. The
living whale, in his full majesty and significance, is only to be seen at sea in unfathomable wa-
ters. (288)
This passage underlines that the centrality of the whale in Melville’s novel is by no
means arbitrary or coincidental, which is why it would be impossible to subtract
Moby-Dick’s truth or meaning from the subject matter of whales and whaling. The
novel’s critique of representation, in other words – in the same way as its critique
of mechanistic concepts of science – is based on a questioning of the traditional no-
tion of the subject-object relation. According to Melville’s novel, to represent or to
categorize means, above all, to objectify, to turn the living whale into a “stranded
fish” or “wrecked ship.” It is therefore precisely Melville’s discovery of the whale
as a living actor – a quasi-subject possessing a particular form of knowledge and be-
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havior²⁹ – that complicates the traditional understanding of the subject-object rela-
tion, which, in Descartes, explicitly relies on an understanding of animals as (equiv-
alent to) machines.³⁰ Hence, Melville’s revision of the subject-object relation, in
which the whale is crucially implicated, is constitutive of both Moby-Dick’s critique
of representation and the book’s skepticism towards a certain image of scientific
thought.
While this analysis seems to be fairly in line with postcritical principles – in the
sense that the attention given to Moby-Dick’s situatedness in the world of whaling
implies an appreciation of the novel’s manifest content or surface level – I will
now argue that the focus on whaling will also engage the reader with precisely
those aspects postcritics typically seek to omit or relativize, namely history, social
context, and political economy. Of course, I do not claim that the novel’s narrative
is an “allegory of capitalism” (Morrison 1989, 15). What I do claim, however, is that
insofar as nineteenth-century whaling is a crucial part of capitalism, this context
is necessarily a fundamental aspect of Moby Dick’s ‘constellation.’ Similar to the
case of Kracauer’s analysis of the mass ornament, one could thus argue that capital-
ism is simultaneously part of the novel’s outside and inside. It constitutes the text’s
outside but is folded inward, so that Melville’s reflections about whaling are simul-
taneously reflections about capitalism. Again, to grasp this constellation adequately,
it is necessary to switch repeatedly from long shot to close-up and vice versa.
Hence, what needs to be kept in mind is that whaling was one of the most ad-
vanced capitalist industries of the nineteenth century, especially given the high de-
mand for the valuable whale oil (used for lamps, among other things) before the
large-scale use of petroleum initiated the gradual decline of the whaling industry.
Despite the romantic notions typically associated with life on the high seas, nine-
teenth-century whaling in the US was thus “eerily modern […] in the way it accumu-
lated capital and spread risk. At a time when most of the nation’s capital was dis-
persed in homes and on farms,” whaling was “centralized,” “technologically
innovative,” and “organizationally sophisticated” (Saunders 2004). While literature
often renders the space of the sea a site of romance and adventure, this other side
of the maritime experience – the sea as “a place of business” and “labor” (Jameson
2002, 201) – is an issue in many sea novels too.
To be sure, the tension between ‘romance and reification’ discussed by Jameson
in terms of the sea fiction of Joseph Conrad (194‒270) is also a key aspect of Moby-
Dick. After all, the original reason for the Pequod’s voyage is the commercially mo-
tivated purpose of delivering whale oil to the “Nantucket market” (Melville 2003,
 In fact, Melville repeatedly describes the knowledge of the whale as surpassing the knowledge of
humans. For example, Ishmael suggests “that the Nor’ West Passage, so long a problem to man, was
never a problem to the whale” (Melville 2003, 198). In this context, cf. also Bühler and Rieger 2006.
 Cf. Descartes 1998, 31: “[I]f there were such machines having the organs and the shape of a mon-
key or of some other animal that lacked reason, we would have no way of recognizing that they were
not entirely of the same nature as these animals.”
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177), an endeavor with which Ahab’s desire to take revenge on Moby-Dick naturally
conflicts. As Deleuze notes, Ahab breaks “the Whalers’ law, which says that any
healthy whale encountered must be hunted, without choosing one over another”
(Deleuze 1997, 79). Above all, what Ahab’s singularization of one specific whale –
Moby-Dick – thereby contradicts, is the capitalist logic of treating whales like a
mere natural resource, whose individual parts – blubber, whale bone, sperm oil,
or meat – all end up as commodities on the Nantucket market. In Moby-Dick, this
economic logic of commodification evidently coincides with the sort of objectifica-
tion highlighted above: the turning of the whale into an object of scientific categori-
zation and representational depiction. Melville’s critique of science is thus simulta-
neously a critique of capitalist reification. As Samuel Otter writes:
Melville represents the process of cutting into the skin and head of the whale as extraordinarily
violent and liquid, violating the integrity of the object and threatening to inundate the observer.
He associates knowledge with appropriation, representing the ways in which anatomy enables
commodity and the parts of the body become vendible. (Otter 1999, 132)
But the economic context of whaling is not just reflected in Moby-Dick’s narrative; it
also plays a role in the novel’s peculiar form. How so? Being a capitalist industry,
whaling of course involves a strict division of labor, a precise timing of the work pro-
cesses, a complex knowledge and understanding of these processes, and a high de-
gree of self-discipline on the part of captain and crew. Yet, many elements of the
novel contradict this tendency, especially regarding the question of temporality.
What this alludes to is the untimeliness of the whale hunt – its curious situatedness
at both the (dominant) center and on the (residual) fringes of nineteenth-century
capitalism. For if there is an unexpected calm at sea, there is hardly anything to
do on board of the ship but to exchange stories of past adventures (the famous ‘sea-
man’s yarn’). In other words, the time on board of the ship is not only the time of
labor and capitalist production; it is also the time of ‘the storyteller,’ as one might
assert with reference to Walter Benjamin’s essay on the works of Nikolai Leskov.
Here, Benjamin makes a sharp distinction between the novel and the “art of storytell-
ing,” the latter of which he sees “coming to an end” in the era of modern capitalism
(Benjamin 2007, 83). What makes Benjamin’s analysis all the more relevant with re-
gard to Moby-Dick is that he posits the “trading seaman” (85) as one of the major
sources of storytelling.
Moby-Dick, however, complicates Benjamin’s distinction. More in line with Bakh-
tin’s conception of the novel, what is characteristic about the book is its baroque het-
erogeneity and polyphony: the way in which it manifests itself as a proto-modernist
novel but also integrates aspects of storytelling, something which becomes especial-
ly evident in those episodes where the Pequod encounters other ships, such as the
Town-Ho (cf. Melville 2003, 265‒284) and the Jerobeam (341‒347). Here, the stories
of past journeys and adventures essentially interrupt the central plot and thereby
contribute to the novel’s heterogenous, heterochronic, and polyphonic character.
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It can be argued, then, that part of the transgressive charm of Moby Dick – the
book’s multiplicity of voices, genres, narratives, and modes of communication that
are only loosely kept together by the central storyline – is related to the untimely el-
ement of the whale hunt: the fact that nineteenth-century whaling was both a crucial
part of the capitalist economy while simultaneously contradicting some of its central
forms of organization and temporality. The whaling vessel is thus not just “the het-
erotopia per excellence” – as Foucault notes about the ship (Foucault 1986, 27) – but
is also marked by a peculiar ‘heterochronicity’: the coexistence of a time of capitalist
acceleration (which is also the time of the novel) with a time of boredom and relax-
ation (which is also the time of storytelling).³¹ In this sense, nineteenth-century
whaling can be said to manifest an untimely tendency within capitalism, represent-
ing not so much a romantic flight away from the world as a ‘line of flight’ within the
world, within, that is, the confines of the market.
Conclusion
In the previous chapter, I have sought to present a reading that resonates with the
notion of poetic critique in (1) the attempt to bridge the alleged gap between art
and criticism (demonstrated here by not so much ‘judging’ Moby-Dick than aiding
the book in performing its own version of poetic critique); and (2) the impulse of re-
fusing to separate the poetic and aesthetic from the critical and political. What this
implies is the idea that to genuinely do justice to a literary text, it is necessary to do
justice to its outside too. Here, I proposed a reading that is attentive to the text’s sur-
face and its manifest subject matter while simultaneously seeking to determine its
particular constellation. As I have tried to demonstrate, this does not mean caging
the text in its historical context – as if history were a “box” (Felski 2015, 154). Rather,
what is significant about Moby-Dick is the book’s untimeliness: the untimely way in
which its form is related to mid-nineteenth-century American literature and the
world of whaling it depicts was to the era’s economic system. Arguably, its untimeli-
ness is also related to why the novel continues to resonate and is time and again re-
actualized by the readers of a coming generation.³²
 On “boredom” and “mental relaxation” as conditions of storytelling, cf. Benjamin 2007, 91.
 This is not to deny the role of the novel’s hypercanonization in its ongoing (academic and non-
academic) popularity and relevance. It is noteworthy, however, that in American StudiesMoby-Dick is
among the few ‘renaissance’ texts that have survived the revisionist turn and are read as assiduously
among ‘old’ as among ‘new’ Americanists (cf. Chase 1962 and Jehlen 1994). More recently, Moby-Dick
has received much attention in the context of transnational and globalization studies (cf. Tally
Jr. 2009 and Cohen 2012).
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The untimely, however, is not timelessness.³³ It does not imply a movement ‘out
of history’ (cf. Brown 2001) for it is itself a product of it. Or, as Casarino writes: “The
untimely is the temporal register of that which is nonsynchronous with its own his-
tory, of that which at once is in history and yet can never completely belong to it”
(Casarino 2002, xxxix‒xl). Obviously, that Moby-Dick continues to be read is not un-
related to the fact that the world the novel depicts, imagines, and anticipates has
something in common with ‘the world we live in,’ as C.L.R. James subtitled his
own study about Melville in 1953. But this commonality is not to be perceived in
terms of a mere resemblance or analogy. Rather, it is a question of ‘resonance’
(Rosa 2019), of affinities that, however timeless or universal they may appear, are
still relatable to historical circumstances. In other words, if Melville’s novel contin-
ues to resonate in the twenty-first century, this is not least assignable to our own his-
torical moment’s version of globalization and rootlessness, transnational commerce
and mobility, waning state sovereignty and lawfulness, the commodification of ‘na-
ture’ and social relations, and precarious labor conditions for a new cohort of ‘mari-
ners, renegades, and castaways’ (cf. James 1953). In this respect, a “theory of attach-
ment” (Felski 2015, 18), as called for by postcritics like Felski, will remain insufficient
if it separates the affective and cognitive aspects of the reading process from their
historical conditions (hence Kracauer’s insistence on the combination of phenomen-
ology and historical materialism).
The reading I proposed, then, suggests an approach aimed at working out and
reactivating the political and historical implications of the text in question, yet with-
out switching to another linguistic or semantic register, and without separating be-
tween content and form. Hence, this sort of reading is meant to constitute an alter-
native to both the ahistoric and descriptivistic tendencies of postcritical readings and
Jameson’s concept of interpretation as an allegorical rewriting (in the strict sense of
the term).
But what, exactly, means ‘alternative’ here? This is an important point, for it un-
derlines the way in which contemporary critical and postcritical approaches are not
so different after all. Under the increasingly economized conditions of higher educa-
tion and the academy, the production of theory is in some sense bound to the same
market logic as is the production of other commodities. More specifically, the prod-
ucts of theory (concepts, turns, readings, approaches) are marked by the same logic
of competition, branding, self-fashioning, distinction, acceleration, and planned ob-
solescence that is characteristic of today’s capitalism on the whole. Whatever their
particular intellectual merits, the various ‘turns’ (linguistic, performative, material,
postcritical, speculative, descriptive, etc.) that have occurred in recent years are in-
extricably bound up with this context.³⁴ Here, what is suggested is that a new meth-
 According to Cesare Casarino, the Nietzschean notion of the untimely represents an alternative to
the binary relation between “the myth of the timeless genius” and “the timely writer” who is com-
pletely determined by his historical context (Casarino 2002, xxxviii).
 Cf. Mark Seltzer’s pointed discussion of what he refers to as the “turn turn” (Seltzer 2016, 166).
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odology will make up for a lack that characterized the previous one. The new theo-
retical product is then typically presented in such a way as to offer a ‘general alter-
native’: an across-the-board method of reading or interpretation that ostensibly
works in any case, irrespective of the nature of the specific text at hand. Along
these lines, and despite the postcritical imperative to be mindful, attentive and ‘do
justice’ to art and literature, what is hardly ever discussed is whether some texts
may not deserve to be read critically and suspiciously, while others do not; or that
in some cases it may be sufficient to read and ‘thickly describe’ the surface of a
text, while other texts are designed in such a way as to necessitate being read alle-
gorically.
Of course, the fact that I engaged with Moby-Dick to exemplify my version of a
reading that circumvents the deadlocked binarism between critique and postcritique
was based on the assumption that (this sort of) reading and (this sort of) text go well
together. Implied in my reading is the general idea that the text should be examined
in conjunction with its outside. But apart from this general commitment it is difficult
to assume that the reading I proposed works with any text whatever. To be sure, this
is not meant as a general call for pluralism and variation, but simply to acknowledge
that different kinds of texts require different kinds of readings. Perhaps, then, what a
reconsideration of Schlegel’s concept of poetic critique – including his understand-
ing of the literary text as demanding to be read “on its own terms” (Schlegel 2003,
275) – might encourage us to do is reflect more thoroughly on how our approach
to literature (be it critical or poetic, postcritical or uncritical) is related to our choice
of the specific texts and objects we study.
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